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In the last decade society has experienced an exponential growth in the number of devices 
connected to the Internet. Recently, new gadgets called Internet of Things devices have 
appeared in our homes. Although they often lack a physical interface to directly interact 
with them, they are able to read information from sensors and autonomously communicate 
with servers, performing decisions accordingly. 
However, most of the domestic devices that are being commercialized do not implement 
strict security policies, potentially leading to security breaches that compromise the user’s 
privacy. 
The following work provides an alternative to the WPS technology in the initial setup phase 
of these devices, in which the gadget has to be loaded with the Wi-Fi key so it can connect 
to the Internet. 
The use of infrared technology implementing a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to 
inject this key makes the process much safer, without compromising the cost of the device 
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1.1. Problem and Scenario Description 
The main problem this project pretends to solve is the lack of security and privacy 
when configuring a brand new IoT device by an end user, who might not have any 
technological knowledge. 
In this situation, is hard to design an easy-to-use and secure mechanism to 
authenticate the IoT devices without compromising their security, or even the overall 
wireless network protection. In most of the cases, we are working with tiny gadgets which 
may lack of any sort of input peripheral, screen or any other sort of device to physically 
input or retrieve a password or any kind of information. 
Therefore, most manufacturers rely on Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) technology to 
establish the connection between the access point of a domestic router and the device 
itself[1b]. Consequently, this procedure may seem to be reasonable at first, as it is offering 
a practical solution to the aforementioned scenario solving the obstacle of the absence of 
input mechanisms. WPS technology only requires the IoT device to implement a single 
input interface: a button acting as a WPS connector. 
WPS technology mainly employ (simultaneously or exclusively) two different 
mechanisms to connect a device to the access point: 
• Using a PIN. In this case, the device must have any kind of inputting interface to 
enter the PIN and connect to the router. This solution is commonly used with 
mobiles and laptops, as in these cases entering a PIN should not be a problem. 
• Pushing router’s WPS button while ordering the device to find and connect with 
the recently WPS-opened router inbounds. 
Between the two options above, we are interested in the latter, as it is the one 
adopted by most of the manufacturers of IoT devices. The final user only needs to have 
physical access to both the IoT gadget and the router, which is not a problem in most of 
the cases. 
Connection between access point and IoT device will be achieved after pushing the 
router’s WPS button and, within a small period (generally between 30 and 60 seconds), 
ordering the IoT device to connect to the router (for instance, by pushing the IoT node’s 
button acting as a WPS connector as mentioned before). 
Once this process is completed, the device has received the WPA Key and it is able 
to authenticate itself to the router. However, this process is not guaranteed to be secure 
due to the small window of opportunity in which any person can connect to the router, as 
well as the vulnerabilities the WPS protocol has been suffering since its massive worldwide 
adoption. 
At the end of the configuration phase, no one can guarantee that the domestic 
network has not been compromised, as any outsider could have sniffed the secret key, 
becoming part of the network. Moreover, most users do not have the enough knowledge 
to detect and identify the presence of third persons in their domestic network, aggravating 
the consequences of the use of this insecure implementation.  
Therefore, there is no need for the attacker to have physical access to the router or 
to any of the devices for this scenario to occur. The only requirements are to be relatively 
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close (within ~20 meters) and to be in possession of the necessary equipment to audit the 
wireless network state and security. 
As both necessary conditions are easy to achieve, if we make a Risk Assessment[2b] 
analysis for the described scenario, we can conclude that the risk or probability of this to 
happen is high (around 4/5 in the used scale) and the impact of it when it has happened, 
the severity, is very high or catastrophic (a 4/4 in the scale). If we link both factors through 
a Risk Assessment Matrix, like the one below, we can conclude that the Risk we are trying 
to reduce is currently very high. 
 
Figure 1 - Risk Assessment Matrix 
Despite not being able to reduce the impact directly, we can work on reducing the 
risk of this occurring. This can be done by designing a more secure procedure to initialize 
these devices, at the same time we try to keep the process as much user-friendly as 





1.2. Justification of the Solution Adopted 
The primary goal of this essay is to offer an alternative in the configuration phase 
of any commercial IoT device. As stated before, the vast majority of the most sold solutions 
implemented by most manufacturers to load or inject the secret key into an unconfigured 
IoT device do not consider important factors such as security and privacy. 
Key Injection is the most critical phase in the configuration process, as this secret 
key will be used later to authenticate the device to an Access Point, as the first and 
essential step before establishing a wireless communication with it, accessing internet, and 
allowing the user to configure and customize the device remotely. 
Therefore, before jumping into the core parts of the solution, it is important to specify 
a few assumptions that were made in the process of its design: 
• The IoT devices are kept physically safe. Third parties do not have direct access to 
them. 
• After the key exchange, it is supposed that all parties in the IoT ecosystem are 
safely storing the keys in their memory, and they cannot be retrieved by force.  
• Routers use a secure and not-vulnerable key encryption protocol, such as WPA2. 
• Not every user can afford updating their routers, therefore, each router may 
implement different WPS versions and not all of them are guaranteed to be secure 
and updated. 
Despite WPS security has greatly improved in the recent years, technology is under 
constant evolution and it is very likely that new vulnerabilities and design inefficiencies will 
come up from time to time. The following solution tries to put an end to this situation, with 
the certainty that it will remain secure during a long time, almost eliminating the possibilities 
and risks of suffering a successful attack. 
As a summary, our solution is a direct alternative to what WPS currently offers. 
Current method is completely sacrificing security in terms of usability. Our model 
implements a much more secure alternative at the cost of slightly increasing usability 
complexity. 
In the end, when a decision between usability and security must be taken by a final 
user, in most of the times the former is chosen. This is due to lack of awareness in security 
by most of the people, who will ultimately choose the easiest and fastest path without taking 
other factors into consideration. 
As a result, most manufacturers exploit this fact by designing and marketizing 
fastest solutions without investing in security and privacy. The proposed mechanism 
already implements robust security features by default, besides being easy to use by non-
experts. 
Also, the proposal is not only limited to the transmission of the private key itself, but 
it also covers other important steps of the initial configuration process, such as a true 
random key generation methodology using a high entropy level source, as well as the 
interface and interaction with the final user, allowing him in last instance to read and use 
the generated key. 
Finally, an architecture based on privacy and user control is proposed. It allows 
advanced users to configure and monitor the connections his IoT devices establish with 
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external services via internet. It will provide them with advanced tools to choose which 
services as servers each device is able to connect to, preventing them from accessing 





2. State of Art 
2.1. Key Distribution in IoT Devices 
Today, most of commercial IoT devices include a default private key injected in their 
firmware during the manufacturing process[3b]. To protect this key and the device itself, 
usually the firmware is encrypted and securely loaded via a secure boot loader. However, 
this does not guarantee the security of the device, as instead of compromising the firmware, 
which is encrypted, the boot loader can be targeted. No matter how many security 
encrypted layers we add, as in the bottom of them there always must be a plaintext-
programmed script to boot and load the firmware and the associated private key. 
Therefore, factory injected keys are vulnerable during the booting phase. Moreover, 
most of these keys are usually designed to be temporal and manufacturers recommend 
changing them as soon as we perform the initial device setup. This recommendation is 
frequently ignored by users, as it would involve investing additional time in the configuration, 
and, from their point of view, the predefined password works perfectly fine. 
Today, in domestic IoT, the vast majority of the industry employs Wi-Fi or Bluetooth 
technologies for distributing a new randomly generated symmetric private key between the 
domestic IoT hub controller (a mobile phone, a computer or a specific IoT device) and the 
different IoT local nodes (lights, speakers, TVs…) which are also usually connected to the 
router via Wi-Fi. 
Moreover, many IoT devices does not include a wired connection port such as 
Ethernet or USB, meaning that their configuration has to be performed wirelessly. 
This initial setup assumes two important facts: 
i) The Wi-Fi network or Bluetooth connection is completely secure, meaning 
that no third person is eavesdropping on our traffic at the time of the IoT nodes setup 
or key injection. 
ii) The Central IoT Node is able to generate truly random numbers, as the base 
for creating a private key that will be injected in the different client nodes. 
Both statements cannot be confirmed in every situation. Wi-Fi technology has been 
proven over the time to be unsecure or, at least, not as safe as it claims itself to be. In fact, 
a large number of vulnerabilities has been detected in the last decade, such as the well-
known Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) exploit or the Key Reinstallation Attack, both 
compromising WPA2 security. Moreover, even if we someday manage to create a robust 
and secure Wi-Fi network, there will always exist other possible unavoidable point of 
failures, such as human errors when configuring the network or establishing its associated 
security key. 
If an attacker is connected to the Wi-Fi network in the moment of the key injection[4b], 
he will be able to intercept and decrypt it, gaining control ultimately over all of our IoT 
devices, which may lead to terrible consequences in function of the kind of devices we 
were configuring. 
Once all of the previous information is considered, there could be a solution for this 
aspect: using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange approach[1]. This method was specifically 
design for this purpose: exchanging keys between devices, guaranteeing that no one will 
be able to read the information exchanged, assuring the confidentiality of the private key. 
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However, Diffie-Hellman does not protect against a combined Interception, Interruption and 
Fabrication attack, as it is discussed later in the present document. 
Also, it is really important to assure that there is a device with enough source of 
entropy as to support Real Number Generation (RNG). Otherwise, an attacker could 
discover potential exploitable patterns in the private key generation, easing the task to 
crack the private key. 
In definitive, it can be concluded that today’s private IoT key management and 
injection in a domestic IoT ecosystem is insecure, as some of the assumptions considered 




2.2. Wi-Fi Vulnerabilities 
WPA2 is not as secured as it is claimed to be. There are several attacks and exploits 
able to expose the traffic of an encrypted Wi-Fi network. In this document two of them are 
explained due to the fact they could drastically compromise the injection of a private IoT or 
WPA key. 
 
2.2.1. Key Reinstallation Attack 
In the middle of 2017, a vulnerability regarding an exploit affecting the 4-way 
handshake procedure used in WPA2 was publicly exposed. This attack, called Key 
Reinstallation Attack (KRACK), was firstly described in an investigation paper[2]. 
This threat allows an attacker to force reset the nonce of the encryption key used 
by the client to authenticate to the Router. This fact ultimately allows the attacker to decrypt 
many of the packets, by resetting some key parameters of the randomization algorithm 
used beside the encryption key itself. Two common parameters used in this randomization 
are the nonce, which represents the number of transmitted packets, and the replay counter, 
which reflects the number of received packets. 
The exploit allows to decrypt the packets mainly travelling from the client to the 
router (although packets from router to client can be sniffed if we initially target the router). 
A critical issue regarding this attack is that every device has to be patched individually via 
a software update. This means that updating the router does not prevent a device 
connected to it from being attacked, and vice versa. 
Despite not revealing the WPA2 key itself, in our scenario this attack would allow 
the attacker to intercept the private key sent by a user to an IoT device in the setup process. 
The risk of exposure to this attack gets multiplied if we considered the fact that many people 
don’t update their devices, so it can lead to a potential exposure of the information travelling 
through a Wi-Fi connection. 
 
2.2.2. Wi-Fi Protected Setup Attack 
Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) is a mechanism certified by the Wi-Fi Alliance and 
implemented in most of modern routers which allows for a quicker an easier way of 
connecting a device to the router, as an alternative to the classical way of manually writing 
the password in every device. Non-specialists people often use this method rather than 
manually entering the key due to its easiness of use. 
However, WPS has proven to be a concerning security hole. Most security 
organizations[5b] have agreed it is better to not implement it or to disable it if possible. 
As Indra Dwi Rianto[3] clearly explains, WPS can be implemented as a push button 
to enable pairing between a device and the router and/or an 8-digit numeric PIN. The key 
issue about this Brute-Force attack is that it is not needed to guess the 8 digits all together. 
Once the first 4 digits are found, the router will return a checkpoint confirming they 
were correct, letting the attacker know when to move on to the last 4 digits. Brute forcing 
two groups of 4 digits each is far easier than guessing them all together. Also, the 8th digit 
of the PIN is just a checksum, so in the end the guess is reduced to 4+3 digits. If the first 
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group of 4 digits and the second group of 3 digits are guessed, it is trivial to calculate the 
checksum that represents the 8th digit. In practice, we just need 11.000 (104+103) attempts 
to crack the PIN, which can be easily done in a few seconds. 
There are many available tools in the website that automatize this attack, for 
investigation purposes. One of the best known is called Reaver. There are many research 
papers[4] which describe how to conduct one of the possible variants of the WPS Brute 
Force attacks.  
There are two ways of protecting against this attack: disabling the WPS option in 
the router configuration software or using a router without WPS support. Also, most of the 
newer routers come with an effective way of blocking an attacker against a several number 
of failed attempts. Nonetheless, most manufacturers and modern routers are designed to 
detect and stop answering to WPS requests if they detect a brute force guess, making it 
harder nowadays to apply this technique. 
Once the PIN has been cracked, the attacker is sent the encryption key (WPA, WPA2…) 
the router uses, becoming the intruder part of the network. This would allow him to perform 
many different attacks, including retrieving any kind of confidential information like the 




2.3. Bluetooth Vulnerabilities 
Bluetooth can be considered as a much safer protocol than Wi-Fi to interconnect 
devices. However, it is not free of security vulnerabilities[5]. Most of them usually affect 
specific devices, although some others are related to the protocol itself. Some of those 
regarding the second mentioned group are briefly exposed in this document as an example. 
 
2.3.1. Elliptic Curve Checking in Bluetooth Key Exchange 
One of these vulnerabilities is the VU#304725[6b] discovered in the middle of the 
2018. It states that the part of the latest Bluetooth firmware in charge of validating the elliptic 
curve parameters during Diffie-Hellman key exchange.  
This situation may result in a remote attacker being able to utilize a man-in-the-
middle attack and to determine the cryptographic keys if performed during the key 
exchange. 
This breach can be solved by updating each device firmware, and many of the 
compromised firmware version are already substituted by patched ones. However, if a 
device is not patched, someone could intercept his Bluetooth pairing key and read the 
traffic it exchanges, including a cryptographic key if the victim was performing the setup of 
an IoT device using Bluetooth. 
 
2.3.2. BlueBorne Set of Vulnerabilities 
A set of vulnerabilities, known as BlueBorne[7b], was discovered in 2017 affecting 
many different devices and operative systems supporting Bluetooth connectivity. 
Each of those vulnerabilities affects specific functions of the protocol in specific 
devices. Some are related to causing overflows in the victim, reading or writing in forbidden 
memory regions, etc. Also, it may allow an attacker to perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack 
with all the consequences that entails. 
As a result, an attacker could obtain private information, including a private IoT key 
if the victim is performing the setup of an IoT device using Bluetooth. It could even allow 
an attacker to remotely execute code in a victim’s device. 
As it is a firmware issue in all the cases, they can be solved just by patching it via 
software updates. However, is an important issue to consider as most people are not up to 




2.4. Privacy in IoT Domestic Environments 
IoT security and privacy are both concepts frequently applied to any given IoT 
application, constituting a single domain problem[6]. However, this approach should be 
avoided as domestic IoT needs, challenges and objectives usually differ from the general 
approach. The needs of a critical wide infrastructure or a commercial operation are different 
from the ones that a domestic device may have. The financial and human resources used 
to operate or manage them are also different. Human factor, for instance, is much more 
influential and critical in a domestic ecosystem. Therefore, it would be convenient to keep 
domestic IoT at a different domain of application and needs. 
Apart from security, privacy is another major concern in any IoT network. This 
project introduces some ideas and designs to enhance the privacy of a domestic IoT 
ecosystem, which will be covered later. 
Despite its importance, this factor is often not covered in depth by manufacturers 
and designers, leading to potential issues and loss of privacy for the users of these type of 
devices. In the last years, many researchers and security experts have been working in 
this field, and many research papers have been published analyzing possible case 
scenarios and privacy risks, as well as providing some solutions to them. 
 IoT devices need connectivity to Internet to be able to perform their functions. 
Some of them allow the user to remotely manage and interact with them, while others need 
to periodically query external servers for some kind of information. These servers often 
gather all kind of sensitive and private data from our devices and could, in last instance, 
send malicious information or try to take over the device[7]. 
Depending on the device, different type of sensible information is retrieved by the 
servers the device interacts with. For example, an intelligent light bulb that sends data 
statistics could end up exposing the user schedules and routine. With the daily information 
about the periods in which the light bulb is on and off, one could make a precise estimation 
about the times the user is at home or away. 
Other major concern is the impossibility for a user to know what kind of information 
the device is really gathering. One clear example for this case is the hidden microphones 
in some devices that do not really use it for their functions. Earlier this year, a smart cuisine 
mixer robot, commercialized by Lidl in some European countries, was found to incorporate 
a hidden microphone that might be listening to private conversations of their users[8b]. This 
fact has cause major controversy, as the existence of this component was never advertised 
in the product specifications. 
Analogously, the act of connecting to an Internet service reveals the IP address of 
the device connecting to it. In a close future, large information servers will raise as the 
demand increases to answer the need of information for sensors and IoT device. They will 
act as an updated library that provide the answer to all those different IoT devices asking 
for an information update. However, the different is that instead of focusing on a specific 
field or service (for example, providing updated weather report information), they will try to 
comprise as many different services and information sources as they can. In the end, most 
IoT devices will end up connecting to one of this few megaservers, and they will make their 
profit from our information and big data information extraction tools. 
Despite these services will show useful for us as users, they will collect millions of 
gigabytes of information about our habits, preferences, routines and even political opinions. 
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They will also be able to link each IP address with a schema of all the IoT devices 
connected to internet and obtain even more information. As a consequence, once all the 
separated information from every sensor and device is put together by a common IP, a 
complete radiography of a given family will be exposed and commercialized in the form of 
useful data for advertisers and third parties that may find it profitable.  
As an attempt to prevent this privacy concern in a close IoT connected future, we 
provide some ideas to anonymize the traffic generated from IoT devices as much as 
possible, so it is no longer possible to group different IoT devices by their source IP address. 
The idea consists in using an internal IoT Router inside the domestic private network. This 
router would have advance firewall functionalities to prevent devices from connected to 
unwanted servers. Moreover, all the traffic coming out from this internal router would be 
redirected by the main home router to a TOR network, assuring its anonymity. 
A TOR network[8, 9b] is a distributed communication internet network in which the 
traffic is randomly conducted through a random number of nodes until finally being 
redirected to the server it was initially mean to reach. Although this makes the connection 
extremely inefficient in terms of performance (speed and delay), it makes the requester 
node almost impossible to unveil, assuring its anonymity to the server. When someone 
uses TOR, he can also act as an intermediate node and redirect other people traffic towards 
random nodes. 
As IoT devices do not require speed or low latency connectivity in most of the cases, 
this anonymity network could be the solution to some of these privacy issues. If the server 
which provides the service is not able to identify the place from which the request is coming, 
all the information in the request loses almost all of its value as a commercial item. 
Also, some IoT devices often perform specific requests may unveil important 
information. For example, a weather reporter device may poll the server for a weather 
report about its region. There are some ways to make this not obvious for the server. For 
example, instead of asking for the weather report today in Madrid, we could request the 
weather report in all the European capitals, and this way the server will not be able to 
determine where we live. 
Also, there are available search engines in the internet that are able to find and index 
online IoT devices the same way Google does with websites. The most popular website for 
this purpose is shodan.io[9, 10b], which frequently indexes many vulnerable devices whose 





2.4.1. Privacy Control within a TOR Distributed Network 
The way TOR operates makes it harder for a third party to compromise not only the 
integrity and confidentiality of the data, but also the real identity of the sender and the 
receiver of the information that is being sent. 
In short, this network acts as an intermediary through which all the information should 
be sent. The way the data is treated across this network makes the recipient unaware 
whether the packet was sent using TOR or not. 
In order to be able to establish a TOR session and send information through it, the 
user must install its client software in his communication device. This software includes a 
TOR directory fetcher, which is necessary to be able to acquire the list of available nodes 
worldwide. 
Once the client knows the available nodes, he can configure some connection 
parameters, such as the number of intermediary TOR nodes that will handle the traffic. The 
larger the number of nodes, the more secure the connection becomes, although latency 
increases as well. 
The packets within the TOR network (i.e. any packet that is exchanged between any 
pair of TOR nodes) are sent in an encrypted format with a fixed package length. Packets 
in TOR are called cells, and their length is 498 bytes. The fact of using a unique length for 
any given type of communication protocol makes it impossible to retrieve the type of 
communication that takes place. 
The whole process of using TOR to communicate to a public internet server is 
summarized in the following picture (both the picture and its explanation have been 
extracted from [10]): 
 
 





1. The user connects to the TOR network via Internet using the TOR software. It 
establishes a special handshake with the TOR bridge (the first TOR node). 
2. The client queries the TOR management directory for the available nodes and 
selects some of them to establish a unique circuit cell formed by other TOR nodes 
worldwide that will route the communication. Each TOR node only knows his two 
neighbor nodes in a circuit. 
3. The packets are sent to any interior TOR node in the fixed-length and encrypted 
cell format 
4. The exit node transforms the TOR packets into standard ones in order to be able to 
communicate with the server using Internet protocols. Once he received a reply, he 




2.4.2. Vulnerability Discovery of IoT Devices Using Shodan Search Engine 
Shodan is a search engine launched in 2009 and designed by John Matherly. Shodan 
is one of the most used tools when looking for IoT devices, such as IP cameras or home 
automation systems, and even industrial automation hardware. 
In a similar way to how website search engines work, Shodan crawls the Internet 
looking for online services and devices and their running ports. For each result, it locally 
creates a database entry consisting of its IP address, port and service banner. 
When a user navigates Shodan website a performs a search, he actually queries this 
database. In fact, the database is updated periodically, and it can be publicly accessed 
using their website or Shodan API. 
Shodan itself is a very powerful tool to discover services and potential vulnerabilities 
related to them. However, advanced search using this tool can become complex and are 
usually only performed by professional security researchers. 
The potential of Shodan has also been expanded by many different projects from 
security researchers worldwide. One of the most interesting of them is ShoVAT[11]. 
ShoVAT was designed to improve the efficiency of researchers in this type of 
scenario, in which they have to generate a vulnerability report that includes a list of potential 
vulnerable devices, including a record of the situation of these devices during each update 
and software version. 
It is able not only to find a vulnerable device, but also to discover when it became 
vulnerable and for how long it remained in this state until being patched. 
It also features a vulnerability assessment tool architecture, which relies on Shodan 
web servers to build on top a modular architecture with many additional features which help 
researchers, as featured in the following figure extracted from ShoVAT paper: 
 
Figure 3 - ShoVAT Shodan Based Modular Architecture  
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3. Project Development 
In this section it is covered in detail all the technical aspects of the proposed solution, 
the process involved in the design and construction of the solution, as well as other minor 
details that might be of interest and utility. It is divided into three large blocks: 
• Architecture: Topology of the domestic network and how each device is related to 
the others within it. 
• Hardware: Justification and description of the devices and electronic components 
used in the design of the solution. 
• Software: Everything related with the logic and protocols implemented to allow a 
secure and reliable transmission using infrared technology. 
The core of the project is the hardware and software parts. However, due to the 
time dedication and requirements for each one of these parts, it would be convenient to 
state that the latter was the most critical and complex of them all. 
While hardware reunites several devices and components, many of them were 
already pre-assembled boards ready to be used, reducing the complexity of our design. 
However, some schematics for amplifying the power of some IR components were still 
needed. Otherwise, the transmission would perform erratically as the LEDs could not 
transmit at full efficiency, increasing the Bit Error Ratio and the retransmission and, in 
consequence, the overall transmission time, as well as reducing the valid transmission 
range. 
Software part was focused on designing a reliable transmission system based on 
infrared connectivity. An IR library was used as the starting point, although it ended up 
being customized to increase its efficiency and allow bidirectional communication of large 
amounts of data. There are many other functionalities included in the code, memory 
management, use of EEPROM to store the credentials in case of power outage, 
management of LED display in the controller case, or an automated connection with the 
access point, so the user can later connect to it inside his domestic network. 
There is also an additional paragraph that dives into the different difficulties, 
setbacks and issues which had to be overcome. The objective is to give the reader a list of 
details and circumstances that ended up transforming the project and significantly 




3.1. Scenario Architecture and Configuration 
The design proposal for our IoT domestic network fulfils two main requirements: 
security and privacy. Both elements are key factors in a world where everything will end up 
being connected to internet and, therefore, accessible by unwanted third parties. The idea 
is implementing additional physical layers of security to increase the isolation of our 
network to external agents. 
The following Diagram represents the proposal for an IoT secure domestic network: 
 
Figure 4 - IoT Network Topology Proposal Diagram 
 
The network will feature two routers: 
• Main Router: The one provided by the ISP. It is the responsible for providing 
internet connection. All non-IoT devices, such as phones, PCs or Laptops, will be 
connected directly to it (by wired or wireless communication). This will allow them 
to have full internet access with the standard restrictions imposed to domestic 
networks by the ISP. The present solution is compatible with any current domestic 
network as it implies no modifications to this standard network, although advanced 
configurations may be needed to make some changes to their parameters. 
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• IoT Router: An IoT Access Point with firewall capabilities. This router is wire-
connected to the main router. It will only allow IoT devices to connect to it wirelessly. 
It will also implement extra features to provide security and privacy. 
 
The proposal adds a whole new network, the one created by the IoT Router, to the 
existing one. In our practical scenario, this IoT Router is a Raspberry Pi Model 3b+, whose 
main specifications will be covered later. It implements Raspbian OS, which is a Debian 
based operative system, and it is working as the access point for all the IoT devices we 
configured as an example. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Raspberry Pi Model 3b+ Board 
 
It run several python scripts in order to make AP setup easier, user will only have 
to call the script within the command line of the system terminal. 
For instance, if we type: 
$> python wifi_setup.py <ssid> <psk> 
It would configure a new AP whose SSID and PSK is determined from the data 
passed as first and second arguments. This AP will be visible by default, although it could 
be hidden as well, which basically means that it would not advertise itself to close devices, 
and therefore any user that may desire to connect to it would have to manually enter its 
SSID within the router’s range. This can be done to increase the security as well as to 
discourage non-expert users from connecting normal devices to this AP. However, 
monitoring packets with a wireless card will end up showing traffic to this AP, and therefore 
revealing its existence and ubication. 
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The AP also implements an IoT multimedia software with a built-in firewall able to 
monitor the traffic of the devices in the network and allow/disallow certain types of packets 
or destination. 
• Monitor Mode: will allow the user to check their status send specific commands to 
each IoT device (like turning off the lights, reboot, send now sensor information, 
etc.). This feature converts the router in an IoT Hub, where all the management is 
performed by users. This will also include the creation and maintenance of local 
databases in the AP that some devices might use to send any kind of information 
that may be gathered by their sensors. 
• Firewall: write traffic rules based on different conditions such as device affected, 
packet type, addressee, etc. It will increase the security for all the IoT ecosystem, 
preventing devices for being tracked. 
 
The configuration process that must be executed to have this scenario up and 
running consists in only 4 basic steps, which are the following: 
• Random Key Generation: A new pair of <ssid, psk> is created in the Remote IoT 
Controller. It employs true random sources to generate a 32-byte key. The key is 
saved in clear in the EEPROM memory, so it is not erased when the device is shut 
down. Therefore, it is assumed that the remote is physically kept in a safe place 
away from intruders. 
• Secure Key Injection: The controller sends the key to all the devices the user 
desires to initialize. It uses custom infrared protocols with a Diffie-Helman key 
exchange solution, implementing an elliptic curve with which a shared secret is 
generated to, in last instance, encrypt the data. This process is done once per 
device needed to be initialized. 
• IoT Router Initialization:  Some alternatives are provided on this step: 
o The first one is using a mobile QR reader to read a QR Code which encodes 
the SSID and PSK. User will have a readable string of characters 
representing this previously generated tuple. They will only have to log into 
the Raspberry Pi (IoT router) and manually execute the script, python 
wifi_setup.py <ssid> <psk>, typing the SSID and password, in order to have 
the Access Point running. 
o The second alternative is identical to the previous one but, instead of 
running the script in the device, it is done remotely by an SSH connection, 
executing the python automated script with the SSID and PSK values as 
arguments of the script. 
o The third alternative is using the Raspberry Camera module as a QR Code 
Scanner. It would work exactly the same way a QR is scanned with a mobile. 
However, in this case the camera module is not as good as the one included 
in most of the smartphones. Therefore, it is not currently possible to directly 
scan from the ESP8266 OLED screen. The solution is using the phone as 
the intermediate, scanning the OLED screen and representing again in a 
bigger format the QR code in its screen so it can be finally scanned by the 




o Another alternative would be plugging the IoT Controller device to the USB 
port of the RaspPi and calling a script that is able to read the serial port 
information and extract the credentials from it. This script has been 
implemented as part of the project. 
o The last alternative would employ Infrared technology to transmit the 
information the same way it is done with IoT devices. Despite having 
designed the IR circuit, there were issues implementing a valid IR Library 
compatible with the one used in the controller (on an ESP8266). Therefore, 
this method was abandoned, although it is theoretically possible (but really 
complex) to program a library and make it compatible with the ESP8266 one. 
• Connection between IoT device and AP: This step is automatically done once 
the AP is up and running and the device has received the Wi-Fi credentials. From 
this moment, all configured IoT devices will be actively and periodically looking for 
an access point whose SSID matches the one received in the transmission with the 
controller. Once they detect it, they will connect to it with the provided password. 
 
At this point, the basic configuration is done, and the network should be running 
fine. From now on, it would enter into a maintenance and management phase, in which the 







The hardware used in this proposal consists in several devices and some circuits 
used as amplifiers for the infrared components. Many of the devices were purchased in a 
development board form-factor, as it significantly reduces the complexity of having to weld 
and design PCBs to put all the smaller parts together. 
In a commercial scenario, it would be advisable to buy the components separately 




3.2.1. ESP8266 NodeMCU as IoT Device 
To simulate IoT device behavior, ESP8266 microcontroller embedded in 
NodeMCU[11b] development boards is used. These chips are low cost, and its main features 
are, for the NodeMCU devkit, the following: 
• ESP8266 microprocessor, RISC 32bits CPU at 80MHz 
• 32 kiB instruction RAM depending on the model 
• 96 kiB user + system data RAM 
• 4 MiB flash memory 
• IEEE 802.11 b/g/n Wi-Fi 
• 10 GPIO pins (soldered) 
• USB tension regulated for powering 
 
 








3.2.1.1. IR LED Transmitter Circuit Design 
All IoT simulation devices have a circuit to amplify the power of the output IR LED. 
Despite already working if connected directly to the PINs, after testing, the range was found 
to be reduced and the Bit Error Ratio was significantly higher. Therefore, it was concluded 
to be worthy to invest a bit more to design an amplifier circuit to feed the LED with more 
current. 
 
The designed transmission circuit is the following: 
 
Figure 7 - IR LED Transmitter Circuit 1 LED 
 
The current value in the LED (D1 in the diagram) was around 91mA in DC. The 
voltage between its terminals is 1.3 V. We have a security margin of almost 10mA, as the 
LED manufacturer recommends not to exceed 100mA of current and to have a voltage 
between 1.2 and 1.4V. 
With this circuit, new testing proved the communication to be quicker and much 
more reliable. However, the range was still limited, and some packets got corrupted, 
increasing the transmission delay. 
A redesign was made to the circuit above with the objective of fixing this, and a new 
circuit was proposed with 2 LEDs in series with a greater range. This was the design we 
finally chose for our final testing, as after analyzing the cost, we concluded the extra 
investment was worth it. 





Figure 8 - IR LED Transmitter Circuit 2 LEDs 
 
As it can be appreciated, the circuit is similar to the previous design, although there 
are now 2 LEDs in series and the values of the resistors were changed in order to assure 
a stable current of 93mA in DC and 1,3V in the diodes’ terminals. 
As we could not found a commercial value of 7.5Ω for the resistor. We substituted 
it by two resistors in series of 5.6Ω and 1.8Ω, which result in a total of 7.4Ω. This means 
that, in practice, the current in the diodes is slightly higher. However, this does not imply a 
redesign as it is still below the max current value of 100mA. 
Also, the tolerances of 1% of the diagram resistors could not be found in the store. 
Therefore, the circuits implement resistors with 5% tolerance. 
 
3.2.1.2. Bit Error Ratio Analysis 1 LED vs 2 LEDs 
We made some calculations to theoretically determine distances and error 
probabilities in the transmission. The results are summarized in the following table: 
 
ERROR PROBABILITY at 4 meters 
 1bit block 32bit block 
1 LED 6.4*10-4 2*10-2 
2 LEDs 8*10-6 2.6*10-4 
Table 1 - Error Probability 1 LED vs 2 LEDs 
 
As we can appreciate, the error probability was greatly reduced (around 100 times 
less probability of error) if using two transmission IR LEDs. As an extra IR LED cost is 




3.2.1.3. IR Receiver Circuit Design 
The IR receiver circuit is simpler, as it works properly if connected directly to the 
GPIO Pins and it does not require any kind of adjustment. 
The IR component used as the receiver is the TL1838[12b]. We chose this model due 
to its low price and correct performance. However, there are better but more expensive 
models in the market, such as the TSOP2238[13b], with greater performance at detecting 
false positives and filtering out infrared environmental interference.  
 
The IR receiver circuit is the following: 
 
 
Figure 9 - IR Receiver Circuit 
 
The IR receiver component has 3 terminals, Ground, Data, and Vcc. The design 















3.2.2. ESP8266 Heltec Wi-Fi Kit 8 as IoT Controller 
Acting as the controller, we are employing a different board which implements the 
ESP8266 microchip as well. The controller is a crucial device is the design, as it is 
responsible for loading the key to each IoT Node by pressing a single button, as well as 
allowing the user to retrieve the generated tuple of SSID and PSK to configure the Access 
Point. 
The features of the Wi-Fi Kit 8[14b] we are using are the following: 
• ESP8266 microprocessor, RISC 32bits CPU at 160MHz 
• 32 kiB instruction RAM depending on the model 
• 96 kiB user + system data RAM 
• 4 MiB flash memory 
• IEEE 802.11 b/g/n Wi-Fi 
• 17 GPIO pins (unsoldered) 
• Onboard 128x32 dot matrix OLED display 
• USB tension regulated for powering 
• Onboard battery interface, with charge capabilities 
 
 
Figure 10 - Heltec Wi-Fi Kit 8 Board 
 
The key differences with the NodeMCU board are the OLED screen and the battery 
interface. Those are the main reason why we chose this model to act as a controller despite 
costing almost as twice as a NodeMCU board. 
The OLED screen is used to display to the user some configuration menus (which 
are navigated via short press and confirmed the selection with a long press) as well as a 
QR Code. This QR Code is the way the device communicates with the user to allow him to 
retrieve the randomly generated key. This QR Code can be easily scanned using a mobile 
phone camera. 
The battery interface would permit freedom of movement to the user, allowing him 
to freely go around his home aiming at his new IoT devices to communicate with them and 
send them the AP key. This battery can also be charged by just plugging in the board with 
an USB cable to a computer. 
As this board is completely different, it also outputs a different current level in their 
GPIO Pins, which turns out to be higher than in a NodeMCU board. Therefore, in this case 
we decided to just connect the IR LED and Receiver directly to the board, as the current 
supplied to the LED was enough and the communication worked correctly this way. 
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3.2.3. Raspberry Pi Model 3b+ as the IoT Hub 
The present design proposes creating an isolated network for the IoT devices inside 
the existing domestic one. Therefore, a device capable of providing Wi-Fi connectivity, 
router and firewall features, as well as scripting support was needed. We chose a RaspPi 
due to its versatility and upgradeability, as well as the wide variety of open source libraries 
that can be used to provided extended functionalities. 
The Raspberry Pi 3b+ has the following features[15b]: 
• 64bits 1.4GHz CPU 
• 1Gb LPDDR2 SDRAM 
• Wi-Fi module at 2,4 and 5GH, IEEE 802.11b/g/n 
• Bluetooth 4.2 Module 
• Ethernet over a USB 2.0 port 
• Full size HDMI Port 
• Camera support Port 
• Touch Screen support Port 
• Video and Audio in Stereo Ports 
• Micro SD Card Port to store the Operative System and Data 
• 40 GPIO Pins 
 
 
Figure 11 - Raspberry Pi Model 3b+ Ports and PINs 
 
In order to load the generated key to the RaspPi and create an Access Point, three 
alternatives are provided: 
• Connecting to it via an SSH session and running the already programmed python 
script (which will be described in detail in the Software section), manually inserting 
the credentials information. 
• Scanning the QR code with the RaspPi Camera Module. In this case, the camera 
focus quality is not good enough to read it directly from the Heltec Wi-Fi Kit 8 screen. 
User would need to read it with the mobile phone and a suitable application capable 
of switching between decoded information and read QR Code itself. This way, the 
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RaspPi camera would finally be able to read a bigger code from the smartphone 
screen. 
• Injecting the Code using IR communication between the RaspPi and the ESP8266 
Controller. However, this alternative was discarded due to both software (which are 
covered later in the Software section) and hardware issues by which the 





The software part is the one that took most of the time to complete. Its core part is 
the design of a communication protocol to communicate securely and as fast as possible 
between pair of devices (a controller with an IoT device). As this communication requires 
the use of interruptions whenever a signal is detected, it is not trivial to make a design 
beforehand. Therefore, the initial design was iterated many times (sometimes adding new 
functionalities, other times just implementing the solution differently due to poor 
performance) until obtaining a code that performed efficiently. 
However, many other software solutions were adopted to cover other requirements 
of our design. In the case of everything concerning the ESP8266, C programming language 
was used; while in the case of the RaspPi, we opted for different versions of Python. The 
reasons for choosing different languages in each platform are covered later.  
There are many other features implemented apart from the custom IR 
communication protocol itself. In this section all of them will be covered in detail, explaining 
how everything works and justifying the implementation decisions that were taken in each 
case. 
Finally, in the Annex part a full documentation of every program and script will be 







The ESP8266 was used for both controller and IoT node simulation. Therefore, it 
was required to develop two different programs in C to allow them to communicate with 
each other and to satisfy the development requirements. Two programs were coded: 
• Receiver Program: It is implemented in every IoT Node. It waits for a 
communication from a controller, interacts with him, and saves the received 
credentials in the EEPROM memory. Finally, it connects to the Access Point 
corresponding to the credentials received. 
• Controller Program: It runs on the ESP8266 Wi-Fi Kit 8 board. Beside 
implementing the same communication architecture and routines than his 
counterpart, it also implements other functionalities, such as true random 
SSID and key generation, OLED screen management, QR Code encoding 
and display and user interface menu. Unlike every receiver, the Controller 
will not try to connect with the Access Point. 
Every one of these features will be broken down and explained in depth in the 
following sections, including all technical information. 
Due to the high level of detail, the following subsections are not included in the 
general index of the document. The structure of the ESP8266 part is the following one: 
• ESP8266 Controller 
o OLED Screen Management and User Interaction 
o EEPROM Memory Management 
o SSID and PSK Key Random Generation 
• ESP8266 Receiver 
o EEPROM Memory Management 
o Connection to AP 
• Controller and Receiver Bidirectional Transmission 
o IR Communication Design Process 
o Type of Packets and IR Packet Frame Design 
o Data Encryption 
o IR Protocol Communication Diagrams 












3.3.1.1. ESP8266 Controller (Heltec Wi-Fi Kit 8 Board)  
In this section the major details of the code programmed for the Controller device 
are discussed and analysed in depth. Nonetheless, attached to this report there is a HTML 
documentation of the program generated with Doxygen, and also the full code is available 
for consulting in the Annex I. 
 
 OLED Screen Management and User Interaction 
As showed in an image in the hardware sections, the board used as a controller 
has a built-in OLED display, with dimensions 128x32 pixels. The library 
Adafruit_SSD1306[16b] is used to be able to print information in the screen. Once it is 
initialized, we can use Adafruit library to print information on the OLED screen the same 
way we would print it on the serial console. 
User interaction with the screen is limited to two selection menus (mainly used for 
the development, they might be suppressed in a commercial version) and a single button. 
There are two menus that prompt for user input when the device is turned on: 
• Node Selection Menu: Allows the developer to force communication with an 
already saved device, in case the credentials were changed. The default option 
is adding a new device by using a broadcast packet, however, an already 
initialized device will ignore this kind of packets. 
• Encryption Selection Menu: Allows the user to communicate in an encrypted 
way (default option) or sending the credentials in clear. Encrypting increases the 
security but also the time needed to send the data. Probably, a commercial 
device should omit this menu and force the device to perform every 
communication using encryption. 
User input is done via the built-in flash button in the board. A single press would 
switch among options and a long press would confirm the selected one. Screen displays 
the highlighted option in every moment. Once user confirms both menus, the controller tries 
to communicate with a node. 
Once communication is successfully completed, the screen will display the QR code 
which encodes the credentials generated and transmitted. In order to generate this pixel-
based code a library called QRCode[17b] was used. 
Although the library was conceived to print a QR code on a terminal, it was trivial to 
print it on the OLED screen with the screen library’s printPrixel() function. The amount of 
information that can be encoded on a QR Code depends on both its size and its Error 
Correction (EC). The higher the size and the lower the error correction capabilities, the 
larger the amount of data that can be encoded. 
The QR codes are classified according to their version and EC. The size of it is 
given by the formula: size = 4*version+17. As our screen is limited by its height of 32 pixels, 
the only versions we can implement are 1 (21x21), 2 (25x25) and 3 (29x29). Version 4 
would surpass the height limit, as it would have a size of 33x33. 
Also, it is important to check the amount of information that is planned to be encoded. 
In our case, we are encoding a SSID (16 bytes) and a PSK (32 bytes). That makes a total 
of 48 required bytes. Also, it would be advisable to add some extra characters to split both 
strings, so a user can distinguish the SSID and the PSK after reading the code. 
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Due to these limitations, there is only one possible combination which meets all the 
requirements. That one is version 3, 29x29, with a Low level of Error Correction. This code 
will allow us to encode up to 53 bytes, which means we have 5 spare bytes to add some 
special characters (such as spaces, line breaks…) that will separate both strings. 
A comparative table of the different versions and their impact in the QR Code final 
capacity are summarized in the following table: 
Version Size Error Correction 
Mode 
Version Size Error Correction 
Mode 
Numeric Alphanumeric Byte Numeric Alphanumeric Byte 
1 21x21 
LOW 41 25 17 
7 45x45 
LOW 370 224 154 
MEDIUM 34 20 14 MEDIUM 293 178 122 
QUARTILE 27 16 11 QUARTILE 207 125 86 
HIGH 17 10 7 HIGH 154 93 64 
2 25x25 
LOW 77 47 32 
8 49x49 
LOW 461 279 192 
MEDIUM 63 38 26 MEDIUM 365 221 152 
QUARTILE 48 29 20 QUARTILE 259 157 108 
HIGH 34 20 14 HIGH 202 122 84 
3 29x29 
LOW 127 77 53 
9 53x53 
LOW 552 335 230 
MEDIUM 101 61 42 MEDIUM 432 262 180 
QUARTILE 77 47 32 QUARTILE 312 189 130 
HIGH 58 35 24 HIGH 235 143 98 
4 33x33 
LOW 187 114 78 
10 57x57 
LOW 652 395 271 
MEDIUM 149 90 62 MEDIUM 513 311 213 
QUARTILE 111 67 46 QUARTILE 364 221 151 
HIGH 82 50 34 HIGH 288 174 119 
5 37x37 
LOW 255 154 106 
11 61x61 
LOW 772 468 321 
MEDIUM 202 122 84 MEDIUM 604 366 251 
QUARTILE 144 87 60 QUARTILE 427 259 177 
HIGH 106 64 44 HIGH 331 200 137 
6 41x41 
LOW 322 195 134 
12 65x65 
LOW 883 535 367 
MEDIUM 255 154 106 MEDIUM 691 419 287 
QUARTILE 178 108 74 QUARTILE 489 296 203 
HIGH 139 84 58 HIGH 374 227 155 
Table 2 - QR Code Version, Size and Capacity Comparison 
As we can see, in the implementation adopted there is low error correction, which 
may cause a single dead pixel in the OLED screen to make the whole QR Code unreadable. 
Also, this limitation prevents the design from using a larger private key of, for instance, 64 
bytes, as it would not be possible to be encoded in a 29x29 code. 
Another critical issue of using such a small screen is the difficulty to read it with a 
normal camera. The size of the pixels and the screen backlight can prevent some mobile 
phones from detecting and scanning the code. 
After many attempts, we found out that inverting the QR code colours would make 
it easier for a phone to read it. Instead of using white pixels over a black background, we 
turned the whole screen white and then turned off the QR turned on dots. This fix works as 
it helps the camera to adjust its light exposure and focus the code with more precision. 
A good idea would be using a NodeMCU board as the IoT Controller and connect 




• a) Keep QR Code version and increasing every QR dot to 2x2 pixel size, 
making it easier to scan, or 
• b) Keep 1 pixel per QR dot and use QR version 11 (61x61) with Error Correction 
High. This would allow us to increase the size of the PSK key to 64 bytes and 
still being able to encode it, at the same time we are enhancing the robustness 
of the QR Code itself. 
However, a larger screen would make the controller less comfortable to use, 
reducing its portability and its battery life. 
 
EEPROM Memory Management 
In order to make information persistent, the built-in EEPROM memory that the 
ESP8266 integrates is used. Although there is more memory available, the controller only 
uses 256 bytes of memory. 
There is a library (included in the ESP8266 own devkit) called EEPROM which 
makes writing/reading easier. However, some custom functions are included on top of this 
library in order to read/write information in a much simpler way. 
Each memory address can store up to one byte of data. The memory mapping, 
which gives information about the where each piece of data is stored in the memory, is the 
following:  
Controller EEPROM Mapping (256 B) 
Address Information Total Size 
0x00 - 0x0F SSID 16 
0x10 - 0x2F PSK 32 
0x30 Number Nodes 1 
0x31 Node 1 1 
0x32 Node 2 1 
---- ---- ---- 
0xFE Node 206 1 
0xFF Control Char 1 
Table 3 - Controller EEPROM Memory Mapping 
The first 48 Bytes are reserved for the SSID a PSK information of the Access Point. 
The very next Byte, the 0x30, indicates the number of nodes that have been 
initialized and have the credentials in their memory. This value allows the device to know 
where to stop reading the memory for Node IDs. 
As the Number of Nodes is only one byte, it restricts the number of nodes to 28 = 
256 devices. Nonetheless, as some of the addresses are used for the Wi-Fi credentials, 
the number of storable devices is lower: 206. However, this number should be more than 
enough for most of the cases. 
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Finally, there is an important char located in the last used memory address, the 
0xFF. The Control Char address is the very first one that is read when the device is booted 
up. It will allow it to realize whether the device has been initialized in the past or not. 
If the value read is equal to the character ‘Y’, or 0x59 in hexadecimal, it means the 
memory has already data stored in the other addresses. Otherwise, the device will 
randomly generate a SSID and PSK and initialize the number of nodes to 0. 
 
 
SSID and PSK Key Random Generation 
One of the most important features of the ESP8266 is its ability to generate true 
random number from high level entropy sources. However, the stock random generation 
function in C is not truly random, so an external library had to be used. This library is the 
ESP8266TrueRandom. This library gets the entropy by reading the ESP8266 internal 
hardware random number generator register or by measuring the voltage level of the 
A0/TOUT pin. 
• SSID Generation: The SSID has 16 bytes, with the format: IOT_aaaaaa-nnnnn. 
It starts with a prefix “IOT_”, 6 characters, a separator ‘-‘, and 5 numbers. 
Each ‘a’ character represents any letter, lower or capital, of the English alphabet 
(52 possibilities per character). The ‘n’ character can be any number from 0-9 (10 
possibilities per character). The randomness of the SSID is not critical, as it will 
end up being a public value when announced by the Access Point. 
• PSK Generation: The method used for generating the PSK is quite simple. 
o The random() function of the custom library, which generates a number of 
32 bits, is called 4 times in a row. 
o Afterwards, each number is appended resulting in a 128-bit random 
number. 
o Finally, we split the 128-bit chain in 32 chunks of 4 bits, resulting 32 random 
hexadecimal numbers. 
o These hexadecimals are converted from 4-bit HEX Char to their ASCII 
representation (8 bits). This conversion duplicates the length of the key up 
to 256 bits, while still assuring the readability of the information. For 
instance, character ‘C’ in Hexadecimal would be 0b1101, while its 
conversion to ASCII is 0b1000 0011. 
In the end, despite having 32 chars or 256 bits of information, the real entropy 




3.3.1.2. ESP8266 Receiver (NodeMCU Board)  
Alike the Controller part, this section covers the code designed specifically for the 
Receiver devices. The documentation of the full program is attached to this report in HTML, 
and the code can also be found in the Annex II of this report. 
 
EEPROM Memory Management 
Analogously to the Controller, the memory mapping in the receiver uses the same 
principles and mechanics to read and write persistent data. In this case, the total memory 
used is 64 bytes. In these devices, the amount of stored information is lower as there is no 
need to store the whole list of initialized devices. 
It also uses the same custom functions to read/write with more easiness to the 
EEPROM. The way the information is organized inside a receiver’s memory is the following: 
 
Receiver EEPROM Mapping (64 B) 
Address Information Total Size 
0x00 - 0x0F SSID 16 
0x10 - 0x2F PSK 32 
0x30 Dev ID 1 
0x31 - 0x3E Unused 14 
0x3F Control Char 1 
Table 4 - Receiver EEPROM Memory Mapping 
 
Out of the 64 bytes assigned, 14 are not used. However, I considered adequate to 
allocate an amount of memory resulting from a base power of 2 (28). 
Also, as it happens in the controller, there is a control char that, if equal to the 
character ‘Y’ means that memory was initialized. In this case, the device would directly 
read the SSID and PSK and try to connect to the Access Point. 
Finally, unlike the case of the controller, where there is no need to store its own 
device ID as it is hardcoded and it is always equal to 1, the receiver needs to store his ID 
in case of power shutdown. The ID is used for identifying the device in both infrared 










Connection to AP 
The ESP8266 Arduino devkit includes a library to handle the Wi-Fi connectivity in 
the device. It also includes a lightweight IP protocol stack in the chip. The library is called 
WiFiClient[18b], and it allow the device to act as an Access Point, or as a station and connect 
it to another AP. 
As it will be explained later, in the Access Point section, the subnet used for the IoT 
ecosystem is the 192.169.100.0/24. The gateway is the 129.168.100.1, and each IoT 
device asks for a static connection based on his ID. Each device will request a connection 
with an address of the type 192.168.100.devID. 
While connected to the AP, the device will keep listening for infrared communication 
from a controller sending his own ID. This will allow a controller to change the device’s 
stored credentials. 
As the application layer definition is not object of study of this work, once the device 
is connected to the AP its functionality will be limited. However, it will still answer to some 


























3.3.1.3. Controller and Receiver Bidirectional Transmission 
The act of transmitting the information using infrared can be considered the core 
functionality of this project. Infrared was not designed for a reliable bidirectional 
transmission of information. Therefore, it was needed to develop from scratch new 
functions that provided these requirements. 
The creation of this part of the project was also the most time consuming one. It 
involves asynchronous calls as well as constant interaction with the hardware (IR receivers 
and senders) that make the behavior kind of unpredictable. In the end, a lot of time was 
invested in developing, testing and iterating each new design until the final version, which 
can be considered completely functional, reliable and secure. 
Due to its nature, the initial design that was made to code all the logic needed 
continuously evolved during the implementation process. Given the lack of experience and 
knowledge in IR communication in the beginning of this process, many errors were made 
and important things to consider were not. 
Therefore, this significantly delayed the predicted development schedule, as a lot 
of iterations were finally needed. Moreover, not only the software suffered changes, but 
also the hardware. At a certain point, there were some erratic behaviors that were not 
seemed to be caused by the software. We suspected that the transmitting LED was not 
receiving enough current, ending up redesigning its circuit and including two LEDs fed with 
more power. 
The actual working version has been well optimized; however, it is not perfect. 
There are many small details that could be implemented to achieve further time 
improvements and memory reduction. However, due to personal schedule restrictions and 
the fact of already spending almost 4 times more time than intended for this part, I decided 
to leave it as it is in order to have some time left for the other parts of the project. 
In each of the following subsections, all remarkable features of the bidirectional 
communication will be explained in detail. Nonetheless, I will try to avoid long code writing 
to keep the document clean and readable. In case a feature produces any confusion in the 
reader, please refer to the full source code that will be annexed at the end of this report. 














IR Communication Design Process 
Before diving into details, it is important to take a glimpse at the iterative process of 
the design, from the very first working version to the current one: 
1. Unidirectional testing, from controller to receiver and vice versa. Sending of some 
test data to see behavior. 
2. Bidirectional testing. Controller starts communication sending a packet 
representing a number, receiver sends back same number plus one, and so on. 
3. IR Library Protocols testing. Analysis of every protocol specifications and 
behavior in practice, until choosing the best one: RC6. 
4. Definition of each type of packet needed. 
5. Design of the frames. Each frame contains not only data as the payload, but also 
other useful information such as the destination, or the type of packet. 
6. Design of the communication phases: Handshaking, data sending, and 
connection close. 
7. First working version. Information was sent using a Stop&Go protocol, without 
any error correction mechanism. It took around 8 seconds to transmit without 
encryption. 
Each packet was sent periodically until receiving its ACK and switching to the next 
one. Drawbacks: Time inefficient, error if there were two consecutive packets with 
identical payload (as there was no space for a packet counter in a data frame). 
8. Handshaking optimization: in the case of concurrence (when 2 devices are 
listening at the same time for the controller), the initial handshaking method caused 
devices to collide with each other when trying to answer simultaneously a HELLO 
packet. 
The solution was simple: the HELLO packet sequence was extended, including a 
random number challenge, so only the receiver which generated that same random 
number can continue the communication with the controller. 
9. Protocol and Time optimizations. The library was slightly modified to reduce the 
time it takes to send a packet. Also, the RC6 protocol uses a frequency of 36Khz. 
To avoid signal losses due to frequency mismatch, it was changed to match the 
frequency used by our IR receptor: 38Khz. 
10. Second working version. The Stop&Go protocol was substituted by two burst 
sequences (for both SSID and PSK) with an ending ACK each. Also, a checksum 
for error detection was included in the last packet. This version solved many issues 
of the first one, as well as some hardware erratic behavior. Also, it reduced the time 
needed to send all information. It took around 5.5 seconds to transmit all information 
in clear. 
11. Design of the encryption. A new communication phase was included to provide 
support for the public key sharing using a Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange method. 
12. Further optimizations. The key exchange significantly increased the total 
transmission time. Some adjustments and minor changes were made to reduce it. 
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13. Third working version. Added some failure conditions to prevent endless loops in 
case of communication interruption, as well as more optimizations. It reduced the 
transmission delay: 2.2 seconds in clear, 4.5 seconds encrypted. 
14. Fourth working and current version. This version reduces the transmission time 
around a 15% compared with the previous one. It reduces the number of total 
transmitted bursts from 3 to 2, as it includes the controller’s public key in the data 
burst it sends. The resulting time delays are 2.0 seconds in clear, 3.7 seconds if 
encrypted. 
 
In general, each new version has been adapted to the circumstances and 
requirements of the current problem. This means that the transmission protocol has 
evolved from a very generical one able to transmit any kind of information but in an 
inefficient way to the current one, in which we are transmitting three times more information 
in three times less time, at the cost of versatility and adaptability. The code has been 
optimized for this particular case. However, this does not necessarily mean any additional 
data can no longer be transmitter, but the complexity of allowing it would translate into an 
additional cost in terms of effort when programming and optimizing it to fit the rest of the 
code. 
Despite the loss in versatility, the use of infrared communication is not a widely 
adopted solution. The decision was done to meet a security requirement. Therefore, it is 
very unlikely that the transmission functionality that has been developed requires any 




















Type of Packets and IR Packet Frame Design 
In order to make the communication possible, there was a strong need to design 
differentiated packets that allowed the receiver to know beforehand the type of content that 
goes inside a frame. 
Therefore, the definition of the type of packets was done at the very beginning of 
the design of the protocol. However, as the program evolved, so did the initial definition. 
Some new types were added, and some others were removed to meet each new 
specification. 
The final version implements two different sizes for the frames: 16 and 36 bits. 
 
16-bit packets 
Used in all ACK frames. This was done to reduce the transmission time for the 
acknowledge and, therefore, improve the overall efficiency of the protocol. The structure of 
this frame is the following: 
ACK Frame Structure (16 bits) 
Packet Type Is From Controller Payload (12 bits) 
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Table 5 - ACK Frame Structure 16 bits 
The 3 most significant bits are used to identify the packet. In this special case, as 
the ACK is the only packet which has 16 bits length, it could be suppressed. However, it is 
interesting to provide an identifier in case a future improvement includes another different 
16 bits length packet. The 3-bit identifier corresponding to an ACK is 0b100. 
The bit 12 is a flag used to differentiate packets coming from controller (if set to 1) 
and packets coming from IoT nodes (if set to 0). This bit is not strictly necessary, however, 
it was included as an additional integrity measure, as we wanted to leave the payload with 
an even number. 
The 12 less significant bits are reserved for the ACK payload. ACKs are sent after 
receiving a final data packet identifying the end of a burst of information packets. The 
payload is filled with the information of the number of received packets. Again, it is not 
strictly needed as we are including a much trusty checksum method for integrity verification, 
but it provides an extra layer of reliability. 
 
36-bit packets 
These packets are used for all the other stages of the communication. The type of 
packets is limited to 8, as we are using a 3-bit field as their identifier in-frame. The 36-bit 
possible packet types are the following:  
• Hello New: 0b010. This type of packet is responsible for the communication 
establishment with a new node. It is always broadcasted from a controller to all 
listening devices, including in its payload the new nodeID which the answering 
node will adopt. It is answered by an IoT node with a packet of the same type, 
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including in the payload a random sequence as a concurrency prevention 
mechanism. 
• Hello: 0b001. This packet is sent after a Hello New, in case a new node is 
contacted. It can also be the first packet of the communication in case we are 
connecting to a known node. It is first sent by the controller, with the payload equal 
to the selected random sequence received by the node in case there was a Hello 
New; or filled with the existing node ID, in case an existing node is contacted. The 
answer is always another Hello packet with the nodeID in the payload. 
• Hello Encrypt: 0b000. It has the same functionality than a normal Hello packet. 
However, as there is not room for an extra bit indicating an encryption flag, a new 
packet type was set for the controller to indicate a node that information will be 
sent encrypted, and therefore it should prepare in first place for a public key 
exchange procedure. 
• Data: 0b011. The type of packet whose payload is actual information. It will come 
inside a burst of variable number of Data packets. 
• Data End: 0b101. It indicates the ending of a burst of Data packets. Its payload 
also contains information. However, since the inclusion of the checksum, the 32 
bits of the payload in the Data End packet are always the checksum corresponding 
to the payloads of the entire burst of packets. 
• Data End Encrypt: 0b110. It also indicates the end of a burst, as well as 
specifying that the information was sent encrypted and it is needed to decrypt it 
before being able to read it.  
The role of each packet type will be explained in more detail when reviewing the 
actual communication workflow of the infrared protocol. 
The structure of a 36-bit frame varies depending on the type. This was done to 
optimize the payload in the data frames, where the destination ID information was removed 
to add an extra octet of payload. 
The frame structure of any variation of a Hello packet is the following one: 
 
HELLO Frame Structure (36 bits) 
Packet 
Type (3bits) destID (8bits) 
Is From 
Controller Payload (24bits) … 
35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 
                                    
… Payload (24bits) 
17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Table 6 - HELLO Frame Structure 36 bits 
 
In comparison with the ACK frame, the extra 20 bits give more room for extending 
the payload by 12 bits (from 12 to 24) and including an octet for identifying the addressee 
of the packet. 
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However, once the handshaking sequence is done, it is guaranteed we are talking 
with the right node as all the others will remain silent until the next Hello sequence. 
Therefore, there is no need to keep including a destination ID header anymore. By 
assigning this space to the payload, we are increasing the packet information efficiency by 
a 50% (from 24 to 32 bits). 
The frame of every Data packet has the following structure: 
 




Controller Payload (32bits) … 
35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 
                                    
… Payload (32bits) 
17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Table 7 - DATA Frame Structure 36 bits 
 
This implementation of two different structures for a same packet length is possible 
since the identifier of a packet, the packet type field, remains in the same position if both 
cases. In the program logic, after receiving a frame, the first thing the code does is looking 
for the type of packet to determine its structure. 
This design decision was taken in an attempt to optimize the protocol. Allowing 
more useful information in a packet means fewer packets to transmit, reducing in the end 

















The ultimate objective of this research is to provide the user a safe alternative to 
load Wi-Fi credentials into their IoT devices without compromising easiness of use. The 
use of infrared communication to achieve this objective constitutes, on its own, a much 
secure process than using other technologies, as WPS. However, this fact is not a reason 
to avoid including additional security measures. 
With the inclusion of a Diffie-Hellman based encryption scheme we are increasing 
the protection strength to a point in which it can be assured that data will never be 
compromised by intercepting the communication in any case. At this point, it would be 
much more practical to simply raid the house and steal the information or devices physically 
(and this circumstance is far beyond our study). 
 Both parts in the communication implement in their code the same library to 
generate the keys that will be ultimately used for encryption and decryption. This library is 
curve25519-donna[19b]. 
This curve is widely used in cryptography due to its 128 bits of security and 
calculation speed when deriving new keys. Also, it is free to use, as it has not been covered 
by a patent. The library makes use of this key for generating public keys from the private 
ones. 
In the code, the full process, by which the shared key is finally generated by 
combining both public keys from controller and node, which, at the same time, are derived 
from different private keys, is the following: 
1. Private Key Generation 
A 32-byte key is randomly generated. This is done outside the curve25519 library. 
In our project, we use the same library used for the random generation of the 
Access Point credentials. 
2. Public Key Generation 
A 32-byte public key is calculated from the private key and a basepoint which is 
usually a constant (in the code, uint8_t basepoint[32] = {9}]. After having created 
both private key and basepoint, using the library function curve25519_donna() will 
return a public key calculated using this elliptic curve. 
3. Public Keys Exchange 
After both devices have generated their pair of public/private keys, they send the 
public key to each other. This is done using the designed infrared communication 
protocol described in this paper. As we are using infrareds, the probability of being 
intercepted in unlikely to happen. Even if it is sniffed, the Diffie-Hellman scheme 
prevents the attacker from decrypting the communication as he would also need 
the private key that is never shared. 
4. Shared Key Generation 
Now that each part has the public key of the other, they can generate the shared 
key, which is the one that is finally used for the encryption/decryption of the 
information. With the same library function, curve255519_donna() called with the 
arguments my Private Key and his Public Key, the 32-byte Shared Key is generated. 
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Both keys should always be equal due to the mathematics underlying the key 
generation. 
5. Data Encryption 
The encryption is only limited in our case to the Access Point private key of 32 bytes. 
There are multiple ways of encrypting the data, as well as different available 
libraries based on initialization vectors and nonces to avoid encryption key leaking 
due to the overuse of the key. In the project none of these libraries is used, due to 
the particularities of our case. As it can be appreciated, the length of the data to 
encrypt matches with the length of the shared key: both are 32 bytes long. Therefore, 
a simple bit-level XOR (eXclusive OR) function is used to encrypt and to decrypt 
the information: 
• Data Encrypted = Data Clear XOR Shared Key 
• Data Clear = Data Encrypted XOR Shared Key 
 
The XOR logic table is very simple, and it can be resumed in the following table: 
 
XOR Logic Table 
INPUT OUTPUT 
A B A XOR B 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 0 
Table 8 - XOR Logic Table for Encryption 
 
As we can see, if we apply the XOR operation to any given value against itself, the 
result is always 0. For example, [x XOR A] XOR A is always equal to x as: 0 XOR 
0 == 1 and 1 XOR 1 = 0. This make XOR operation a very simple and fast manner 
to encrypt and decrypt information in the case the information to encrypt matches 
the encryption key in length. 
It is important to remark that each new communication implies the repetition of this 
process. Therefore, a new private key will be generated. Also, as the shared key is 
only used once to encrypt the information, there is no need to use nonces (random 
numbers of a single use that modify the key in each use) or initialization vectors and 
the encryption complexity is significantly reduced. If the key length was higher, for 
example 64 bytes, using the same key to encrypt two blocks of 32 bytes would 






IR Protocol Communication Diagrams 
The code implementation of each communication stage and process described 
above could be resumed in the following simplified workflow: 
 
 
Figure 12 - IR Protocol Transmission Summary Workflow 
 
However, this workflow does not reflect the complexity of the communication 
specific phase itself. As a detailed alternative, the following graphic focus on a much lower 
level, exposing the way each packet is sent in each stage. It represents the most complex 
case: connection to a new node, using encryption. 
Also, it gives a clear answer to how the overall transmission sequence is made, 
how and when a packet is sent, as well as the time spent in each one of the communication 
phases. The details of the timed packet diagram are discussed below its figure. 
In the following pages two time-diagrams corresponding to the two most recent 
versions are represented and explained in detail. As new versions have been programmed 
with further optimizations and upgrades, it is interesting to contrast two different 
approaches to see the difference and understand how each development decision may 







• Dest. Device Selection Input
• Encryption Selection Input
Hello New 
Packet
• Only if destination device is a new one
• 1st packet: Controller -> Node. Broadcasted to all unconfigured new IoT nodes
• 2nd Packet: Node -> Controller. Answer from all nodes, each one with a random payload to differenciate them
• Includes a concurrence prevention mechanism
Hello Packet
• 1st packet: Controller -> Node. If it was a new device, includes its random payload; otherwise, payload set to node's ID
• 2nd packe: Node -> Controller. Confirmation
Public Key 
Exchange
• Node's key is sent first. Controller key will be sent later inside the data burst
• Exchange is only performed if encryption was selected by the user                                                            
Credentials TX
• Controller sends in a single burst its public key (in clear), SSID (in clear) and PSK (encrypted)
• If encryption was agreed, PSK is encrypted, otherwise it is sent in clear and public key is obviously not sent
End of Comm.
• If encryption was agreed, IoT node calculates the shared key and decrypts the information
• IoT node stores the credentials in the EEPROM and connects to the Access Point
• Controller saves the new Node's ID in its memory and displays the QR code with the credentials
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The above diagram has been extracted directly from the communication terminal 
logs in a real scenario communication between our controller and receiver, using the third 
working version. Every single transmitted packet has been represented, and the reflected 
times (in milliseconds) are exactly the ones that took each of the communication phases to 
finish, based on the logs. 
It starts with the transmission of the first New Hello broadcasted packet once the 
controller device is switched on and the new device and encryption menus are confirmed. 
In this moment the controller will periodically transmit a packet until receiving a response. 
In our scenario, the first packet is usually the one received and replied; however, the 
response will not reach the controller before it sends a second New Hello. 
The New Hello initially sent by the controller will have the assignable address ID in 
its payload (in this case, it was an id=2). Therefore, the receiver knows that the next hello 
packet, if containing a 2, will be sent towards it. The New Hello Reply implements a 
concurrence prevention mechanism by which the payload will be filled with a random 
number of 24 bits. 
This New Hello Reply is also periodically sent until stopping receiving New Hello 
packets. This moment is the most critical one in the implementation, as the device are not 
new device & 
encryption selected 
New Hello 
New Hello RX 
New Hello Reply 
New Hello Rep RX 590 ms 
8+1 packets 






3rd Working Version Transmission Diagram 
New Node, encrypted communication 
150 ms 
Hello Encrypt  ID=2 
Hello Reply 
780 ms Hello Encrypt ID=2 RX 
1260 ms Hello Rep RX 
Data Burst DH PK 
2175 ms Final Data RX & 
Checksum OK Burst ACK 2225 ms Burst ACK RX 
Data Burst DH PK 
3280 ms Final Data RX & 
Checksum OK 
Burst ACK 
3350 ms Burst ACK RX 
*Shared Key Calculation* 
*Shared Key Calculation* 
Data Burst SSID+PSK 
 
4350 ms Final Data RX & 
Checksum OK 
Burst ACK 4450 ms Burst ACK RX 
Figure 13 - 3rd Working Version Transmission Detailed Diagram 
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synchronized yet and collisions may happen. As a countermeasure, this New Hello Reply 
transmission period has been randomized, to avoid multiple collisions due to a permanent 
synchronization that may infinitely delay the handshaking stage. 
In the diagram, the initial 2 New Hello Reply packets where lost probably due to the 
collision with the second New Hello packet transmitted by the controller. However, finally 
the third packet made it to its destination informing the controller that a new unconfigured 
node is listening. 
The controller will stop transmitting New Hello and immediately transmit a Hello. 
Collisions may still happen, as receiver keeps periodically sending New Hello Reply 
packets. Sending timers were optimized to prevent collisions at this stage, which translates 
into the first or second Hello packet is usually received by the receiver. 
In this test, the first Hello packet was correctly received in the IoT node. In this 
moment the node will send three times in a row a final Hello Reply packet. Although the 
first one is correctly received, controller will keep the reception window opened, as it is 
aware that the receiver will send it three times and, until finishing, it will not be able to listen 
to any incoming packets. 
Due to the initial configuration input by the user, the encryption mode was selected 
in the above diagram example. Therefore, the Hello packets sent by the controller are, in 
reality, Hello Encrypt packets, which tells the receiver node that communication will be 
done encrypted, and they first need to exchange their public cryptographic keys. 
Once the Hello is acknowledged and the reception window is closed, the controller 
sends a data burst of 9 packets containing its public key. The public key length is 32 bytes, 
each data packet can hold up to 4 bytes, so in the end there are 8 packets containing data 
plus an additional packet containing the checksum of the previous 8 packets. 
Typically, in case of failure in the checksum due to a missing packet, the burst is 
retransmitted until receiving the Burst ACK. In this test all burst were received at first 
attempt, and therefore there are no retransmission. In the case there is a failure, sender 
will enter an ACK timeout state and retransmit the entire burst. There is no NACK 
functionality or a way to detect which packet got corrupted or did not reach destination. 
Burst ACKs are a critical part in the communication. As there is no double ACK 
functionality to make the process faster, ACKs are always sent 4 times in a row to make 
sure they are received at least once. If by any case info is correctly received and all ACKs 
are missed, receiver, would go into the next state while transmitter would keep sending 
data burst. Both devices would no longer be able to contact each other, so a global timeout 
scheme was adopted in each communication stage. If a communication stage takes 3x 
times longer than usual, all the process will start over. They would have to start from scratch, 
but it gives them an additional opportunity to send to information correctly. 
The full process reset mechanism is just an extreme solution to a very infrequent 
situation. In normal tests this circumstance only happens if provoked manually (by 
interrupting the line of sight), as usually all packets are correctly received the first time once 
the handshaking has been done. 
After receiving the controller’s PK, the receiver sends his using the exact same 
routine. The controller receives it, ACK it, and immediately starts sending the Access Point 
credentials in a single burst. This transmission was optimized to make it fit in 8 data packets. 
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SSID is included in the first 4 packets, in clear, while the PSK is encrypted in the next 4 
data packets. The Final Data packet will include the checksum of the previous 8 payloads. 
The whole communication process of the real test that is reflected in the diagram 
took less than 4,5 seconds to complete. As we can appreciate, the slowest and most 
inefficient part in the handshaking, as it suffers retransmissions and collisions and it 
becomes the slowest part while being the stage in which less information is actually 
transmitted. In fact, a whole Data burst of 9 packets and its ACKs take around 30-40% less 
time to be sent. 
 
4th (LAST) Working Version Transmission Diagram 
The current working version, which is the fourth one, developed in September 2019, 
reduces the delay in an additional 25% compared with the previous version. Its full 


















This implementation only differs in the total number of data bursts to be sent. In the 
3rd version, a dedicated key exchange procedure was implemented, so in the end, the 
controller would send two data bursts of 8+1 packets each. This design is completely logical 
for most of the cases. However, in this case, in which little real information is being 
encrypted and transmitted (only 32 bytes), it is inefficient to create two bursts and send 
them independently. 
This 4th version suppresses the controller’s public key exchange burst and includes 
the 32 bytes of the key inside the data burst. This saves a lot of time, as the most inefficient 
new device & 
encryption selected 
New Hello 
New Hello RX 
New Hello Reply 
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4th Working Version Transmission Diagram 
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Figure 14 - 4th (Current) Working Version Transmission Detailed Diagram 
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moment of the transmission is the ACK window, in which a same small piece of information 
is exchanged several times during a large window of time to guarantee confirmation will 
arrive. 
Also, there the shared key calculation and information decrypting were moved to 
the moment after the end of the transmission in the IoT Node. This decision saved further 
time in the communication, as key calculation and information decrypting can take up to 
0.5 seconds. In the controller, however, shared key calculation must be done just after 
receiving the node’s public key, as the shared key will be immediately used to encrypt the 
information before sending it. Therefore, this implies losing 0.4-0.5 seconds that end up 
delaying the whole transmission process. 
The improvements in the version 4th achieve a time of 3.7 seconds until receiving 
the Data ACK in the controller. This is a reduction of 0.75 seconds compared to the 
previous version, which is a 15% less time. 
An additional 0.4 seconds are needed later in the receiver to treat the information, 
but this step does not belong to the communication itself, as the controller is no longer 
involved in this stage. 
If the information is sent in clear, there is no time savings as there are no keys 























Time Evolution Analysis 
The delay in the in the transmission is one of the most important variables to take 
into account. The transmission delay for a secure key injection system via infrared can turn 
a useful design to not be commercially possible as an end user would not accept spending 
too much time in such a simple process. There has been put a lot of work into reducing this 
delay as much as possible. Below we can see a comparison figure of different time graphs 
and the efficiency increase over each new version. 
All the times reflected were extracted from the Receiver communication routine in 
different moments of different versions of the protocol development. They take as reference 
the time in which the first New Hello packet from the Controller arrives to the Receiver. 
Just to have an initial reference, the 1st working version, which is not featured here 
due to its early stage and inefficiency, implemented a Stop&Go design, and it needed 
almost 10 seconds to transmit the information in clear. It was decided not to include a graph 
due to its extreme inefficiency. 
We started analyzing the delays since the 2nd version. These three timelines belong 
to three different subversions from this 2nd working version. In it, the SSID and PSK were 
sent independently in different burst. Moreover, there was no encryption, and therefore 
there is no public key exchange procedure. This makes the delay shorter as information 
was sent in clear. 
 




We can see in the previous three timelines the favourable evolution of the total 
transmission time. These three graphs are all from the same version with different 
adjustments.  
We managed to go from 3 to 2 seconds, which supposes a 33% efficiency gain. 
This is due mainly to two different adjustments: 
• IR RC6 Protocol modifications: The protocol parameters were customized to reduce 
blank periods and to increase its speed. 
• Sending Logic: In the first 2 graphs, information of SSID and PSK is sent in two 
different blocks or bursts. This was changed in the third graph, were both SSID and 
PSK are included in a single larger burst. This greatly reduced times as we suppress 
one checksum and, more importantly, we now skip the time waiting for the 
additional burst final ACK. 
However, none of the subversions from the 2nd version used encryption, as in that 
moment it was not implemented as speed and efficiency was the main concern. Once 
encryption was added, the times logically increased. The final results are the following: 
 
Figure 16 - 3rd Version Time Diagrams | Clear & Encrypted Transmission 
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Now, as encryption was added, we need to differentiate sending in clear versus 
sending encrypted. The times gathered from sending in clear are similar to the ones 
obtained in the third graph of the previous capture. We did not manage to make further 
improves in this part. However, a delay of two seconds can be considered a low interval, 
and, in practice, it is completely functional to be commercially implemented. 
 The 3rd working version, jul19v2, is the first one implementing an encrypted 
communication. It used to take up to 5 seconds to transmit, that is 1.5 times more delay 
than sending the information in clear, as we were sending 3 information bursts rather than 
one. A second iteration of this version, sept19, employs additional adjustments which 
optimize the way each block is sent and take advantage of empty time slots to make 
calculations instead of having the other device waiting. This reduced the time from 5 to 
almost 4.6 seconds, which is around an 8% efficiency gain. 
Finally, the 4th and current version (sept19v2) was developed after analysing these 
time diagrams. It was concluded that the time cost of dedicating two independent bursts 
for the Controller to send both public encrypting key as well as the Access Point credentials 
was too high. Therefore, a single larger burst is now sent by the Controller consisting of 
16+1 data packets. 
Another modification was done in the IoT Receiver node, in which the shared key 
calculation and information decrypting is now done after concluding the transmission. This 
also saved some additional time. 
In the case of transmitting the information in clear, there was no improvement as all 
the previous changes we related to the encryption key, which is no managed in this kind of 
transmission. Therefore, the time for transmitting in clear in the 4th version is the same as 
the time obtained in the 3rd one. 
The commented results are summarized in the following two graphs: 
 






Although the total time appears to be 4145ms, the transmission actually ends in 
3861ms. The last red block is dedicated to encrypting key calculation a data decryption, 
that takes 284ms, but it should not be considered part of the transmission as the Controller 
is no longer involved at this point. Therefore, this version achieves a reduction of around 
500-700 milliseconds in the transmission time, which translates to a 11-15% efficiency gain 
if compared with the previous version. 
 
Finally, as a summary of all the time information explained in the section, an ultimate 
time graph is exposed. It reflects the evolution of the transmission time through the different 
programmed versions of the code. 
The results are the following: 
 
Figure 18 - Transmission Time Evolution with Version 
 
As we can see, encryption was added once the transmission time in clear was an 
acceptable number. We can also see that information regarding the very first version 
(Apr19) is not included in any of the previous graphs due to its extreme inefficiency. 
However, it is interesting to include it in this graph as it was the initial reference point from 
which new versions where developed. This explains the jump from Apr19 to May19, where 
almost all the logic was changed. 
The clear transmission also suffers a slight increase after adding encryption, as a 
consequence of the extra code. However, this increase was reasonable, about 50ms. 
Regarding the encrypted transmission time evolution, first version was slightly 
above 5000ms. We managed to reduce it by more than 20% to almost 3850ms. Despite 
achieving the maximum efficiency level in the clear transmission, the encrypted variation 






























3.3.2. Raspberry Pi 
The emulation of the IoT Access Point is done through the Raspberry Pi Model 3b+ 
device. The components and interfaces of the device were already described in the 
hardware part. This section will be focused on the configuration of the RaspPi that was 
done in order to get the device configured and working as an Access Point. 
In contrast with the ESP8266, all the development has been done using the Python 
programming language. Due to library dependencies, some scripts use version 3.6, while 
the other one is using an older version, python 2.7. 
 
3.3.2.1. Initial Configuration 
The Raspberry comes without any kind of operative system. In fact, not even the 
SD card where the OS system should be installed is included. For this project, we are using 
the Debian based OS designed for this device: Raspbian. 
Raspbian is similar to other Linux based OS, and all the configuration was done 
through terminal commands. It only differs from it in some configurations and the 
management of the security policies, which have to be disabled locally. For example, in 
order to get the RaspPi camera module running, or to allow remote SSH connectivity, we 
would need to modify these security policies first. 
Once security policies are configured, it is important to set a static IP within the 
domestic network, in order to access it remotely later by other computers and to facilitate 
the configuration of the routing table once the Access Point is running. 










In this case, eth0 corresponds to the wired interface which connects the device 
directly to the home internet router. This is the one which will actually be used when 
configuring remotely the device from a computer. 
On the other hand, the wlan0 interface will be dedicated later as an Access Point. 
Therefore, we just assign it another static IP, it ends in .1 as it will act as the gateway for 
the IoT devices connected to this wireless network. However, wlan0 configuration does not 
have to be added manually, as the AP configuration script does it automatically when 
executed. 
In the project, the programming, execution and debugging of the RaspPi code has 
been completely done in remote. The computer used was running PyCharm Python IDE 
on a Win10 OS. This IDE has support for remote Python Interpreters and automatic file 
remote loading, easing significantly the programming of the device. 
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3.3.2.2. Access Point Automatization Script 
The creation of the Access Point can be easily done using the terminal. However, 
it takes a significant number of steps to do and it is crucial for the project to provide an easy 
way of configuring it automatically and overwriting a previous running AP. 
The configuration was done using Python 3. It uses already existing local libraries 
of python: os, sys, subprocess and re, so no external packages have to be installed 
beforehand. However, in order to make the routing IP tables persistent, an external 
package was installed: iptables-persistent. Other packages, dnsmask and hostapd, have 
to be installed as well. However, the installation of all needed packets has been automated 
in the script. 
The script has been called wifi_setup.py. It takes two parameters as arguments: 
SSID and the PSK that the configured AP will have. In order to get it running, it should be 
called via terminal with: 
sudo python3 wifi_setup.py <SSID> <Key> 
If sudo is not provided, the script will try to recall itself using sudo if possible. 
The script does the following actions: 
• Installation of all needed packages for the script to work properly. 
• Destruction of previous configuration of an Access Point if it exists. 
• Configuration of the new AP, with the provided SSID and Password. 
• Routing configuration between eth0 and wlan0 interfaces. It allows 
connectivity to internet of the devices connected to wlan0 by default, through 
NAT Masquerading. 
• Persistence configuration: The configuration was designed in order to 
assure persistence in case of device rebooting. The AP should run 
automatically every time the device is powered on. 
As the script is included in the Annex III, and by a simple read it can be easily 
verified which files are modified in order to make the configuration, we are not including an 
extended explanation here. The relevant files involved in the AP configuration are the 
following: 
• /etc/dhcpcd.conf: It assigns static IP to the RaspPi for the wlan0 interface. 
• /etc/dnsmask.conf: It defines the range of address for DHCP assignation. 
However, all IoT devices will connect with a static address. Addresses from .200 
to .250 are reserved of dynamic assignation, in case the user wants to connect 
another device without a static IP. 
• /etc/hostapd.conf: This is where the information related to the AP is kept, 
such as SSID, PSK, channel, mode, interface, etc. 
• /etc/iptables/rules.v4: This file hosts the information regarding the 
iptables configuration to be restored when it boots up. This file is created 
automatically by iptables-persistent package, and it is overwritten each time the 
script is called. 
• /etc/rc.local: This file includes a set of commands to be executed every 
time the device boots up. It is modified to load the iptables rules. 
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3.3.2.3. QR Scanner Script 
The second programmed script is a tool which facilitates the act of transmitting the 
AP credentials from the IoT Controller to the RaspPi. Although this can be done using the 
previous script and manually inserting the SSID and WPA2 Key, this process is not agile 
or satisfactory for the user. 
Therefore, we propose using this program as it takes out much of the manual trouble, 
as it only requires showing the camera a valid QR code with a SSID and PSK. Moreover, 
this script is logically linked with the AP creation one (which is the one we just explained). 
 The program uses OpenCV 3.4.4 to recognize and manipulate pixels of images, in 
order to look for a QR Code. As Raspbian does not include this library by default, it has to 
be compiled and installed before being able to run the scanner. 
 The installation of this library is quite a long and complex process[20b], and it can 
even take several hours to complete. Nonetheless, there are several tutorials available 
online, such as the one I used in this case. 
 Apart from OpenCV, there is another external library which must be installed: zbar. 
This library will be the one in charge of analyzing the image captured by OpenCV to look 
for a valid QR Code. It can be installed in the system, with apt install python-zbar; or 
using pip, with pip3 install pyzbar. 
This script uses Python 2.7 instead of Python 3. The main reason for this choice is 
the lack of documentation for OpenCV, which is quite an extensive library, in the later 
version. The developed code is a modification of a script found on the official Raspberry 
forum[21b].  
The implementation in the RaspPi forces the Scanner to keep taking and analysing 
pictures periodically, until a valid QR is found. A QR is valid if it can be correctly read, and 
if the decoded information matches the format used to encode the SSID and PSK. When 
these conditions are met, the program stops scanning and calls the wifi_setup.py script 
with the SSID and PSK as arguments, allowing it to configure the Access Point. 
The camera scanner can be manually run with python2 camera_scan.py. 
However, the Raspberry is configured to run this script automatically in every bootup, 
unless there is an existing Access Point. In this case, the script has to be manually run. 
Although the script, along with explanatory comments, is attached in the Annex IV, 






























When called, manually or automatically after booting up, the script initializes the 
RaspPi camera by specifying some capture configuration parameters, such as capture 
resolution. Once these parameters are set, the script enters in the next state: scanning. 
The scanning phase is an endless loop in which it periodically retrieves captures 
and analyse them until finding a QR code. While the capture does not feature a valid QR 
Code, the script will ignore it and make a new one. Finally, when it gets a valid QR code, it 
stops scanning and calls the Access Point creator script wifi_setup.py with the parameters 
decode from the QR Code that was present in the last capture. 
Currently, the program processes around 2-3 captures per second, with a resolution 
of 960x720 pixels. Increasing the frequency of the resolution could cause the device to 
heat up and to overload, so it is misadvised as it is intended to be permanently running in 
background. 
Unfortunately, hardware limitations in both RaspPi camera module and Heltec Wi-
Fi Kit 8 screen makes it currently not possible to directly scan the OLED screen with the 
camera module. However, it works if we use the higher resolution camera of our mobile to 
scan it, and then scan the code with the Raspberry from the smartphone’s screen. There 
are many apps able to retrieve not only the decoded information from a QR Code, but also 
to represent that same QR code in the mobile’s screen. 
Initalization 




Capture Image, and look for a QR 
QR not found 
Create new Access Point 
python3 wifi_setup.py <ssid> <psk> 
Valid QR found 
Stop Scanning 
Figure 19 - QR Scanner Script State Diagram 
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3.3.2.4. Serial Port Reader Script 
As an additional alternative, a script able to automatically read the credentials from 
the serial port has also been implemented in the Raspberry Pi. 
It was designed to work straightforward: first the script is run from a terminal, and 
secondly the IoT Controller is plugged in to the RaspPi via USB. The script will start reading 
directly and look in the Serial output for the Wi-Fi credentials: SSID and PSK. Once the 
credentials are read, the script will finish and call the wifi_setup.py program in order to get 
a new Access Point running, with the terminal command: 
python3 serial_reader.py 
  
This script works both with python 2 and python 3, however it has been thoughtfully 
tested only in python 3. It is also important to notice that, in order to get the correct 
behaviour, the IoT Controller must have assigned the port ttyUSB0. If there were any 
existing device connected to the RaspPi, it would have to be removed before connecting 
the controller. 
The complexity of this script is very low, as there is a preinstalled library for python, 
called serial which handles all the communication from and to a serial port. However, for 
this application there is no need to send any information to the Controller device. Its full 






















3.3.2.5. Access Point Initialization Summary 
As multiple alternatives were proposed and implemented for configuring an Access 
Point in the RaspPi, it is important to put them all together to analyse how they interact with 
each other. 


















As featured in the diagram above, there are currently three different alternatives for 
having the access point configured. While the first one would simply be typing it manually, 
the other two makes the process easier for the user. These information extraction scripts 
could also be configured to run in background during the RaspPi bootup, as in a normal 
scenario a user may not have knowledge to access it using a remote session. 
As we mentioned before, there is a fourth alternative not represented in the diagram, 
which consisted in transmitting the key to the RaspPi using infrared, as it is not working 




python3 wifi_setup.py <ssid> <psk> 
Serial Reader Script 
python3 serial_reader.py 
Camera Scan Script 
python2 camera_scan.py 
Plug in IoT 
Controller device 
to RaspPi via USB 
Get QR Code 
Displayed in 
Controller’s OLED 
Mobile QR Scan App 
Scan QR with mobile and 
amplify it in its Screen 
Point Camera to 
Phone’s screen 
Use keyboard to 
enter credentials 
manually 
Figure 20 – Access Point Setup Alternatives in RaspPi 
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3.4. Developmental Setbacks 
The development of the introduced solution to the proposed project has not gone 
straightforward, as many obstacles and unexpected situations have often come across. 
The following list is a summary of some of the most remarkable of those difficult scenarios 
and circumstances we had to face and solve in order to allow us to keep making progress 
in the project until the stage at which we have decided to stop its development, as a project 
is always subject to improvement and should never be considered to be finished. 
ESP8266 Hardware Design 
Initially, the IR Led and receiver seemed to work fine if directly connected to the 
board pins. The issue was that initial transmission tests were too simple to detect the 
failures. We took almost two months, when a more complex transmission protocol was 
developed, to realize that the LED current was not as high as desired and the high Bit Error 
Rate was causing too many packets to get corrupted. 
Moreover, we spent some time until we realized that there are different NodeMCU 
boards that may look similar but have some differences, and in the end, the current supplied 
to their pins was slightly different, causing troubles when switching on the IR Led to transmit. 
IR Transmission Protocol 
This has always been the core issue of the development, and it would be more 
precise to consider it a large number of small interconnected issues than a single large one. 
Also, the previous point made the transmission protocol to be even more erratic until we 
solved the hardware issues. 
The list of protocol issues is extensive, and many of them were already covered 
throughout the document: transforming a one way with no feedback protocol into a 
bidirectional acknowledged one, increasing the bitrate by modifying the RC6 protocol itself, 
dealing with the high BER by adding two transmission LEDs instead of just one, doing 
dozens of versions and iterations of the protocol, testing a huge number of approaches 
until deciding which version worked best, etc. 
Communication from Device to the User 
This was another important issue. As the SSID and PSK are generated internally 
by the controller, the user has no direct access to this information. Accessing it through a 
cable is not an option as the controller was conceived to be mobile, and it should be able 
to be accessible from everywhere. 
With these circumstances in mind, we finally decided to use a different board as the 
Controller, one which had an OLED built-in screen, such as the Wi-Fi Kit 8. However, as it 
can be considered to work, screen pixels turned out to be quite tiny, and in the end the 
scanning of the QR Code cannot be considered to be a satisfying experience, as one ends 
up struggling with the camera focus and distance until the mobile finally decodes the QR. 
Therefore, this issue can be considered to be partially solved, as it would be interesting to 





Design of the IoT Router 
We would have preferred to use a commercial model as the IoT Router, as it would 
have supposed a more realistic scenario for the project. However, the lack of 
programmable commercial routers and their high price made us finally choose a Raspberry 
Pi 3b+, due to its versatility, processing power, and ability to customize. 
IR Communication from Controller to IoT Router 
IR communication between Controller and IoT Router was our initial idea to transmit 
the AP credentials to the Router. However, these two devices are completely different, and 
after reading a lot of documentation and intensive testing, we decided to look for 
alternatives. The issue here is developing a protocol for the router that should be 
completely compatible with the one the Controller already uses. Moreover, time it has to 
be fully transparent for it as well, which means that the controller would connect and 
transmit the information to the router exactly the same way it does it with any IoT Node. 
We finally implemented the QR scanner script as the alternative for loading the credentials 






Although all the project results have already been exposed and analysed in the 
previous section, they are scattered throughout that development section, making it hard 
to retrieve them all at a glance. 
Therefore, this part will briefly collect all those dispersed results, conclusions and 
comments about them, serving as a global summary of what the project outcome was. 
 
4.1. Hardware Adopted 
The designs and equipment that were finally chosen, among the different 
alternatives already exposed, are the following: 
• Acting as any IoT Node, we finally chose an ESP8266 chip based NodeMCU 
development board, AI Thinker version. It has connected an IR Receiver 
model TL1838B directly to a GPIO Pin and two IR LED emitters in series 
using an amplifier circuit, as shown in figure 6. After intensive testing, we 
found out that LEDs were not receiving enough current, making the Bit Error 
Rate too high and losing many packets. 
• To act as the IoT Controller, the ESP8266 chip based Heltec Wi-Fi Kit 8 was 
finally selected. Both OLED screen and battery port are used in practice, 
and we only soldered an IR LED emitter and an IR Receiver model TL1838B 
directly connected to the board GPIO PINs. There was no need for an 
amplifier circuit design for the LED, as the current supplied to the PINs is 
higher than in a NodeMCU board. 
• The IoT Router and Firewall functionalities are finally implemented by a 
Raspberry Pi Model 3b+. Among all the alternatives used for loading the 
Private Wi-Fi Key, we are finally adopting the one that uses the USB Serial 
Port for a single reason: it does not require any additional hardware or circuit, 
which is translated into a reduction of both cost and complexity. 
 
In a real scenario, we would only need one IoT Controller and a single IoT Router. 
The number of IoT Nodes, and its associated components, will depend on how many IoT 
devices we would like to emulate. To make a Proof of Concept, a single IoT Node is enough 
to get it working. 
The analysis of cost for all the components that were selected to have all the 








4.2. Software Adopted 
During the accomplishment of this project, the software has been in constant 
evolution and improvement. Many different versions were developed and tested for all the 
different devices of the scenario. The followings are the ones that were selected in last 
instance and, therefore, are running in the devices: 
• Each IoT Node will implement the latest version of the receiver C code, coded in 
September 2019. The full code is available in the Annex II, as well as its 
documentation, which is attached to this report. 
• Analogously, the IoT Controller implements a similar code than the IoT Node, based 
on the most recent version of the controller C code. 
• The IoT Router firstly needed to get configured, following the steps detailed in the 
section 3.3.2.1. Once configured, due to the hardware finally selected, it will only 
implement two of the scripts programmed in Python 3: 
o Access Point Automatization Script: wifi_setup.py, which creates and 
configures a persistent access point based on the SSID and PSK passed, 
respectively, as first and second parameters. 
o Serial Port Reader Script: serial_reader.py, which waits for the IoT 
Controller to be connected to the USB Port and reads the serial outcome 
until reading the SSID and PSK, moment in which it will call the wifi_setup.py 
script to establish an access point automatically. 
 
All the developed code, including other Python scripts that are featured in the 

















4.3. Private Key Transmission Results 
The delay suffered as a consequence of transmitting the Wi-Fi private key, from the 
IoT Controller, which previously randomly generated it, along its associated SSID, towards 
an IoT Node, and using the last versions of the transmission protocol and the hardware 
described above, is the following: 
 
 
Figure 16 - 4th (Current) Version Time Diagrams | Clear & Encrypted Transmission 
 
It roughly took 2 seconds to transmit both pieces of information in clear. 
In case of the encrypted transmission, it took 3,86 seconds to transmit them, as 
there were around 0,3 seconds used later by the receiver to process the information, but 
that part does not belong to the transmission itself, which was over at t=3,86s. 
 Both delays make the use of infrared as the technology to transmit the key 
as a commercially viable safe alternative for domestic and closed environment use. 
Although a delay of 3,86 is significant, in a practice scenario it is a value that can be 
tolerated, as this step is only performed once per device, and usually there are not many 
domestic IoT devices that have to be configured altogether. 
Moreover, in case a massive configuration has to be quickly done, information can 
also be transmitted in clear, reducing the transmission time in a 50%. Infrared should 









4.4. Key Loading into the IoT Router 
Several alternatives, consisting in some cases in just software, and in some others 
in both hardware and software, were proposed: 
• Manual Key Loading: By directly using the wifi_setup.py script locally or remotely 
by manually inserting the credentials in a terminal. It works, although it is not user 
friendly. 
• QR Code Scanner: By using the camera_scan.py. It works for normal size QR 
codes. However, due to the tiny size of the IoT Controller OLED screen, it is not 
able to read from it directly, which makes it an unviable commercial solution until a 
solution is found. Also, it needs a RaspPi Camera module, which is as expensive 
as the Raspberry Pi Model 3b+ itself. 
• Infrared Credential Injection: It would basically imitate the concept used in the 
communication between the IoT Controller and the IoT Node, but in this case the 
controller would communicate using infrareds directly with the IoT Router. However, 
there are some technical difficulties that we were not able to save, as the libraries 
and hardware are completely different for both devices. This option, although 
technically possible, it would be extremely hard to implement and not worth doing 
it. Moreover, it requires some extra hardware which would raise the costs and 
complexity. 
• Serial Port Scanner: By using the serial_reader.py script. This script could just be 
configured to run on system boot and keep listening for a device to be attached to 
the USB Port. It is the simplest and easiest solution, although it requires physical 
access to the Router which should not be a problem in most of the cases. This 
option is the preferred one as it is cost-free and commercially viable. 
 
Among all the options, the last of them, the serial port scanner, is the one we are 
finally using due to the reasons exposed. It is the simplest, the most robust one and also 
the fastest. It is able to read the credentials from the IoT Controller in almost no time. In 
terms of security, it is safe as information is sent using a physical wire. Moreover, it also 
reduces the overall cost of the solution by not including additional hardware; and finally, it 
is user friendly, as it only requires a human for plugging in the device via USB to the Router. 
Therefore, this part of the project was also successfully solved, although some of 
the solutions could not finally be developed to get them working. Once the AP is running 
and the IoT Nodes are connected to it via Wi-Fi, the project becomes out of further scope 
as the interaction between both devices and between the IoT Node and external servers in 





5. Future Development and Conclusions 
5.1. Future Development 
At this point, every functionality which was developed or implemented has already 
been covered in the previous sections. However, this project should not be considered as 
totally completed, as there are many details and approaches with room for improvement. 
Despite implementing many of the core features, there have been left behind some other 
secondary features that, in the end, would suppose a huge difference in terms of overall 
usability, performance and security. 
This chapter tries to briefly cover all those features and ideas that were omitted due 
to time restrictions, technical difficulty or any other circumstance. It also serves as a critical 
review of some of the already implemented features which might be reiterated in order to 
raise the quality and make the whole project suitable as a commercial product. 
 
IoT Device Application Layer and Custom Hardware 
Despite the core idea of the project was about IR secure transmission protocols, the 
hardware acting as an IoT device is just a mere actor serving as an example of how an IoT 
node is like. Therefore, the device used for this project has no functionality included by 
default, which basically means that it would act as a dummy node. 
It would be a great improvement to build a small application layer that give support 
to some of the most common applications these devices usually implement, such as 
weather analysis, light analysis, status monitoring of some other device, etc. However, to 
make a correct software implementation of an IoT Application Layer which uses this 
project’s basis as the mechanism to safely retrieve the local network credentials it would 
also be crucial to design the hardware, a custom board, which could be based in the 
ESP8266 or in any other chip, as well as all the board schematic and PINs. The board 
should be easy to setup for the most common IoT applications, and at the same time it 
should allow the user to fully customize it for any other more complex use. 
Due to the complexity of those upgrades, this section could be perfectly separated 
into a completely different Internet of Things project. In the end, it involves both hardware 
and software aspects, and its size would make it more appropriate for a doctorate thesis 
than a master’s. 
 
IoT Custom Router and Application Layer 
Similarly to the previous point, our IoT router is not really a commercial router, but 
a Raspberry Pi configured to serve as one. 
The idea is basically the same, develop from scratch a programmable router whose 
firmware already include some sort of IoT application layer, with support for custom firewall 
configuration for non-technical users as well as a useful IoT device manager. 
The complexity of this implementation should not be underestimated, as the 
hardware would be needed to be designed from scratch, and the software should include 
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a custom firmware with routing, firewalling, and support for being programmed. In the end, 
it would be similar to a diminished version of the RaspPi we are using, removing all the 
features de RaspPi has and that are not needed for this project, and reducing its cost be 
using cheaper less powerful hardware, and implementing some kind of IoT management 
application. 
Again, this implementation would be too large to be carried on by a single person 
and it should be considered as a completely independent project that would take a lot of 
time to fully implement. 
 
IR Transmission Protocol Improvements 
One of the parts of the project in which more time was invested is the transmission 
protocol. Many different versions were developed, and extensive testing was done until the 
last version provided in this document was delivered. However, this last version should not 
be considered as the final or the definitive one. 
Some parts of the protocol have room for improvement. With the correct ideas, 
some additional time in the transmission could be saved, although the current delay is close 
to the theoretical limit. Nonetheless, time is not the only concern. There are some other 
features equally important, as the user experience, which was not heavily developed. Also, 
it would be interesting to work on versions for other platforms, or even to develop our own 
IR library to avoid depending from third parties at the same time we increase its efficiency. 
 
IR Communication with the Router 
It would be useful to allow the IoT controller to directly transmit the credentials using 
the existing protocol, or a modification of it, to the router. In the project, however, it was not 
possible to implement it as the router is a completely different platform and there was no 
way to make the RaspPi IR library compatible with the ESP8266 IRRemote library. 
In order to make this possible, it would be needed to develop an IR library in the 
RaspPi with the same protocol specifications and timings than the one in the IoT Controller. 
This is not a trivial implementation and it would require advanced knowledge as well as a 
lot of time for implementing and testing. 
 
QR Code Scanner Enhancement 
The QR Code currently serves as the one way of transmitting the randomly 
generated credentials to the user. However, the OLED screen used for its display has low 
resolution and too tiny pixels, making it hard for any camera to decode the information. In 
fact, currently the RaspPi camera module is not able to scan it, and the only way for it to 
scan is using the phone camera (for scanning from ESP8266) and screen (for representing 
the QR bigger) as intermediary. 
In this case, the software implementation is correct, and the issue lies in the size of 
the OLED screen that the Wi-Fi Kit 8 board has. An alternative would be using another 
board and welding a bigger screen module to it. If we manage to make the pixels a bit 
bigger, scanner would theoretically be able to detect the QR and decode the information. 
However, this needs to be done and tested in practice that confirm this hypothesis. 
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These are some of the possibilities in the future development of the project, from its 
current stage. However, due to the project potential, there is an almost endless list of 
possibilities and upgrades and, in the end, this could be refined to make it commercially 





Despite not being covered by any existing research paper, the act of using infrared 
technology to increase the security in the setup process of an IoT device in a domestic 
ecosystem has been proven to be not only possible, but realizable in commercial terms. 
Throughout this research there has been many struggles to make the solution efficient and 
user friendly. 
 As an additional layer, a key exchange protocol has also been successfully 
programmed into the IR transmission protocols. Moreover, the hardware and circuit 
designs are not complex or costly, as we will see later on in the budget chapter. 
 Although achieving positive results, all the project was based in a hypothetical 
scenario in which all the devices are representations of how a real IoT device would behave, 
and, in the end, they do not have any working application layer implemented. The next 
necessary step would be to design from scratch a real IoT device which already 
incorporates an IR transmitter and receiver module, along with the transmission protocols 
that has been programmed. 
This project also puts the focus in the lack of privacy current IoT users suffer at their 
homes. Private information is often gathered and sent by these devices to the manufacturer 
servers, without user knowledge. In other cases, external servers are programmed to scan 
for these specific devices to extract user habits and preferences. 
In order to address the privacy issue, our proposal suggest to setup a distributed 
network, based on the operating principles of the existing TOR network, in which every 
packet sent to the network is iterated randomly by other nodes in the network to anonymize 
it. For this purpose, the suggestion is isolating all the IoT devices under an IoT router acting 
as the gateway and firewall for all these packets. 
In the project, the role of the IoT Router is falls in a Raspberry Pi, whose Raspbian 
operating system allows deep customization and routing capabilities. To enhance the 
RaspPi behavior, some custom scripts were programmed to ease the user interaction with 
it, helping him to configure new Access Points in a pseudo-autonomous and automated 
way. 
The RaspPi worked perfectly for this task, however, it would be interesting to invest 
on designing a cheaper device that could perform properly without being that expensive. 
Domestic IoT is an investigation field which has not been covered in depth. In the 
last years many advances have been made in making IoT useful and user friendly. 
However, other more important but less tangible principles have been left behind, such as 
security and privacy. This project offered an untapped alternative to address these two 
concerns. With further research and investment, it would be possible to develop a 





This project contemplated both hardware and software design necessary to provide 
a solution to the introduced problem: safely transmitting encrypted Wi-Fi credentials using 
two IoT devices and infrared technology. 
 
The costs involved in all the hardware are summarized in the following table: 
Hardware Cost Analysis 
Item Quantity Unitary Cost (VAT excl.) 
Heltec Wifi Kit 8 ESP8266 1 5,048 € 
NodeMCU V3 ESP8266 AI Thinker 2 1,588 € 
Raspberry Pi Model 3b+ 1 29,578 € 
*Raspberry Camera Module 1 21,298 € 
IR Led Transmitter 10 0,144 € 
IR Receiver TL1838B 6 0,034 € 
BC337 NPN Transistor 5 0,006 € 
*2N2222 NPN Transistor 3 0,007 € 
Resistor 1kΩ±5% 5 0,001 € 
Resistor 1.8Ω±5% 5 0,001 € 
Resistor 5.6Ω±5% 5 0,001 € 
*Resistor 22Ω±5% 5 0,001 € 
*Resistor 10kΩ±5% 3 0,001 € 
TOTAL (with optional items) 60,809 € 
TOTAL (without optional items) 39,537 € 
*Item is optional, as final design does not require it 
Table 9 - Hardware Cost Analysis 
 
Smaller components quantity has been made redundant in case some of them 













However, the project was mostly based in research and software. As we can see in 
the following table, most part of the time has been invested in developing the code to 
provide all the different functionalities for every device: 
 
Dedicated Hours Analysis 
Task # Hours 
Cost per 
Hour 
IoT Controller & Receivers Hardware design 8 12,00 € 
IoT Controller & Receivers Assembling 4 12,00 € 
Raspberry Pi Hardware design 2 12,00 € 
Raspberry Pi Assembling 1 12,00 € 
IoT Controller Programming & Testing 150 12,00 € 
IoT Receiver Programming & Testing 100 12,00 € 
Raspberry Pi Setup, Programming & Testing 50 12,00 € 
TOTAL 3.780,00 € 
Table 10 - Dedicated Hours Analysis 
 
This table only includes the time put into developing the functionalities described in 
the project. It does not include the time invested in researching the current IoT situation, or 
the time that took writing this report. The hours should not be taken as an exact quantity, 
but as an approximation of the working time in each part. 
When comparing both hardware design and software programming times, it is clear 
that the real challenge of the project was creating all the logic for every different system. 
Nonetheless, the hardware part is also as important, although we decided to employ self-
contained development boards rather than soldering PINs and small chips to save time for 
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Annex I - ESP8266 Controller Code 
/** 
  * \defgroup main main.cpp TFM Controller Code 
  * 2019 - Rafael de la Rosa Ortiz \n1 
  * Allows a ESP8266 to transmit a <SSID,PK> to an IoT node.\n 
  * It generates a random SSID and Key, using true random numbers, and saves it in its 
EEPROM.\n 
  * It allows to send the Key to a node securely by implementing a Diffie Hellman Key 
Exchange Protocol.\n 
  * Once information is sent correctly, it displays a QR code which encodes it, allowing the 
user to scan it with a phone camera. 
  * @{ 























 * \defgroup global_variables 1. Global Variables Definition 




 * \defgroup eeprom_control_variables 1.1. Variables to Control EEPROM Status and Content 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// Remote Controller ID - Always 1 (hardcoded). 
const unsigned char devID = 1; 
 
/// Node ID to Communicate to (Selected when pushing the button). 
unsigned char selected_devID = 0; 
 
/// Node ID to Communicate to. Auxiliar temporal var assigned in contactNode(), equal to 
selected_devID unless the latter is 0. 
unsigned char dest_devID; 
 
/// EEPROM Control Char target, 'Y'. 
const unsigned char CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR[2] = {'Y', '\0'}; 
 
/// EEPROM Read Control Char is stored here. If equal to 'Y', memory was written before. 
unsigned char eeprom_control_char[2]; 
 
/// Max Number of Nodes is 206 (Limited by EEPROM). 
#define NUM_NODES_MAX 206  
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/// Array of Nodes. +1 to store empty char '\0' at last position. 
unsigned char nodes_array[NUM_NODES_MAX+1]; 
/// Number of Nodes. Default is 1. Value may change after reading EEPROM. 




 * \defgroup eeprom_address_map 1.2. EEPROM ADDRESS MAP 
 * It uses 256 addresses for the Controller. Each address can store 8 bits. 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// 0x00, ssid size = 16 B. 
#define ADDR_SSID 0 
/// 0x10, psk size = 32 B. 
#define ADDR_PSK 16 
/// 0x30, n_nod size = 1 B. 
#define ADDR_NUM_NODES 48 
/// 0x31, number nodes up to 206 Nodes. 
#define ADDR_NODE_1 49 
/// 0xFF, control character. if char=='Y', memory has data. 




 * \defgroup wifi_credentials 1.3. <SSID,PSK> global variables 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// SSID Max Size is 16 Bytes 
#define SSID_MAX_SIZE 16  
/// SSID Max Size is 32 Bytes 
#define PSK_MAX_SIZE 32  
 
/// Variables were EEPROM ssid data is stored. Initialized as empty "". 
unsigned char ssid[SSID_MAX_SIZE+1] = ""; 
/// Variables were EEPROM psk data is stored. Initialized as empty "". 
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_SIZE + 1] = ""; 
/**@}*/ 
 
/// Macro which translates a byte (8 bits) to 2 HEX Chars (4+4 bits). 
#define TO_HEX(i) ( (i) <= 9 ? '0' + (i) : 'A' - 10 + (i) ) 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
// Variables used in IR Send/Receive 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
/** 
 * \defgroup ir_variables 1.4. Variables used in IR Send/Receive 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// IR RX Pin D6 GPIO12 in ESP8266 WifiKit 8. 
const uint8_t kRecvPin = 12; 
/// Set the GPIO to be used to receive data. 
IRrecv irrecv(kRecvPin); 
 
/// IR TX D7 GPIO13 in ESP8266 WifiKit 8. 
const uint8_t kIrLed = 13; 
/// Set the GPIO to be used to send data. 
IRsend irsend(kIrLed); 
 
/// Variable where a received message is stored to. 
decode_results received_data; 
/// Variable where a message is stored before being sent. 
decode_results send_data; 
 
/// Transmission and Reception Buffers Size. 
#define MAX_PACKET_SEQUENCE 1024 









// Variables used in IR Frame Control 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
/** \defgroup frame_packet_types 1.5. Frame Packet Types 
  * Variables used in IR Frame Control: 
  * 3 bits for type of packet.\n 
  * 8 bits for dest deviceID.\n 
  * 32 bits for data.\n 
  * 16 bits for CRC16 Checksum.\n 
  * Type of Packet:\n 
  * 0, 000 -> HELLO_ENCRYPTED.\n 
  * 1, 001 -> HELLO.\n 
  * 2, 010 -> HELLO_NEW.\n 
  * 3, 011 -> DATA.\n 
  * 4, 100 -> ACK.\n 
  * 5, 101 -> DATA_END (Last Data Packet -> Checksum).\n 
  * 6, 110 -> DATA_END_ENCRYPTED (Last Data Packet (encrypted) -> Checksum).\n 
  * 7, 111 -> NACK - Not Used.\n 
  * @{ 
  */ 
#define TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT 0b000 
#define TYPE_HELLO 0b001 
#define TYPE_HELLO_NEW 0b010 
#define TYPE_DATA 0b011 
#define TYPE_ACK 0b100 
#define TYPE_DATA_END 0b101 
#define TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT 0b110 




 * \defgroup program_flags 1.6. FLAGS used by the program to distinguish between states 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// Hello Communication Flag. 1 means HELLO Exchange was done, so don't listen for more HELLO 
Packets. 
uint8_t FLAG_HELLO_DONE = 0; 
 
/// Encryption Flag. 1 means Data is encrypted(DH Key Exchange). Default is 1. 





//  VARIABLES USED IN OLED DISPLAY  
////////////////////////////////////////// 
/** 
 * \defgroup oled_display_variables 1.7. Variables used in OLED Display 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// OLED display width, 128 pixels. 
#define SCREEN_WIDTH 128 
/// OLED display height, 32 pixels. 
#define SCREEN_HEIGHT 32 
 
/// Displat Reset PIN Number, 16. 
#define OLED_RESET 16 
 
/// Init declaration for an SSD1306 display connected to I2C (SDA, SCL pins). 
Adafruit_SSD1306 display(SCREEN_WIDTH, SCREEN_HEIGHT, &Wire, OLED_RESET); 
 







 * \defgroup button_interrupt_variables 1.8. Variables to handle Button Interruptions 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// PIN used by the input button of the micro. 
#define BUTTON_PIN 0 
 
/// Bool used to distinguish is button was pressed or released. 
bool buttonIsHigh = false; 
/// Timer representing the instant the button was pressed. 
long timeInit = 0.0; 
/// Timer representing the instant the button was released. 
long timeEnd = 0.0; 
/// Bool that indicates a menu needs to refresh to reflect changes due to user input 
bool screen_needs_refresh = false; 
/// Bool that turns true when a long buttom press is registered. 
bool long_press = true; 
/// Bool that allows program to exit devID selection loop. 
bool devID_confirmed = true; 
/// Bool that allows program to exit encryption selection loop. 
bool encrypt_confirmed = true; 
/// Bool that prints the stages of communication in the OLED display. It slows down the 
transmission several ms. 
bool verbose_display = false; 
/// Unsigned char representing a number used to show progress in OLED display [x/10]. 








 * \defgroup functions 2. Functions 
 * Module with all the custom functions implemented in the controller source code 




 * \defgroup debug_functions 2.1. DEBUG Functions 
 * Functions which are used for debugging purposes (printing logs and traces mainly) 




  *  DEBUG Function which prints in terminal the time elapsed in seconds. 
  *   @param[in] long ref: Reference time where the counting period begins. 
  */ 
void printTimeSeconds(long ref){ 
  double elapsed = (millis()-ref)/1000.0; 




  * DEBUG function used to print in terminal information regarding received packets. 
  *  @param[in] uint32_t header_capture: integer that represents the 32bits captured in a IR 
frame. 
  *  @param[in] uint16_t received_counter: integer that represents the current packet counter 
in the data exchange. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t  received_type: integer that represents the type of packet that has 
been received. 
  */ 
void printCapturedSeq(uint32_t header_capture, uint16_t received_counter, uint8_t 
received_type) { 
  Serial.println("\nDEBUG: printCapturedSeq() HEX:"); 
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  Serial.print("Captured: ");       Serial.println(header_capture, HEX); 
  Serial.print("Counter: ");        Serial.println(received_counter, HEX); 
  Serial.print("packetType: ");     Serial.println(received_type, HEX); 
  Serial.println("*****\n"); 
} 
 
/// DEBUG function used to print in terminal sent packet frame, represented in the global 
variable send_data. 
void printSentPacket() { 
  Serial.println("printSentPacket() info:"); 
  serialPrintUint64(send_data.value, BIN); 
  Serial.println(""); 
  serialPrintUint64(send_data.value, HEX); 
  Serial.println(""); 
} 
 
/// DEBUG function used to print in terminal received packet frame, represented in the global 
variable received_data. 
void printReceivedPacket() { 
  Serial.println("printReceivedPacket() info:"); 
  //serialPrintUint64(received_data.value, BIN); 
  //Serial.println(""); 
  serialPrintUint64(received_data.value, HEX); 




  * DEBUG function used to print in terminal information regarding getRXFrameData() function 
output. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t destID: integer that represents frame's Device Destination ID value. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t packet_type: integer that represents the current packet's type. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t is_from_controller: integer of which only the LS bit is used. 1 means 
packet comes from controller device. 
  *  @param[in] uint32_t payload: integer representing the payload data of the frame. 
  */ 
void printRXPacketInfo(uint8_t destID, uint8_t packet_type, uint8_t is_from_controller, 
uint32_t payload) { 
  Serial.println("\nDEBUG: printRXPacketInfo()[BIN]: "); 
  Serial.print("destID: ");            Serial.println(destID, BIN); 
  Serial.print("packetType: ");        Serial.println(packet_type, BIN); 
  Serial.print("isfromcontroller: ");  Serial.println(is_from_controller, BIN); 
  Serial.print("payload: ");           Serial.println(payload, BIN); 
  Serial.println("*****\n"); 
} 
 
/// DEBUG function used to print stored EEPROM parameters: SSID, PSK, devID, number_nodes... 
void printEEPROMData(){ 
  Serial.print("\nSSID: "); 
  Serial.println((char *) ssid); 
  Serial.print("PSK: "); 
  for(int i=0; i<32; i++) { 
    Serial.printf("%c", TO_HEX(psk[i])); 
    } 
    Serial.println(); 
  for(int i=0; i<32; i++) { 
    Serial.printf("%d ", psk[i]); 
  }Serial.println(); 
  Serial.print("DeviceID: "); 
  Serial.println(devID); 
  Serial.print("Number of Nodes: "); 
  Serial.println(number_nodes); 
   
  Serial.print("List of devIDs stored: "); 
  for(int i=0; i<number_nodes; i++) { 
    Serial.print(nodes_array[i]); 
    Serial.print(", "); 
  } 
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  Serial.println(""); 
   
  Serial.print("Control char. target/actual: "); 
  Serial.print((char) CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR[0]); 
  Serial.print("/"); 
  Serial.println((char) eeprom_control_char[0]); 





 * \defgroup aux_functions 2.2. Program Auxiliar Functions 
 * Functions which are called to perform important processes during the execution of the main 
functions 




  *  Function which delays execution a variable random amount of time. 
  *   @param[in] bool short_time: If true, the delay will be a short delay. 
  */ 
void wait(bool short_time) { 
  if(short_time) 
    delay(150+(rand()%10)); // Wait 150 to 160 ms 




  * Function that generates a random SSID that will be saved into device EEPROM during its 
initialization. 
  *  @param[out] unsigned char* result: pointer to which random generated SSID will be saved. 
  */ 
void generateRandomSSID(unsigned char* result) { 
  const unsigned char seq[63] = 
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"; 
  strncpy((char *) result, "IOT_", SSID_MAX_SIZE+1); 
 
  for(int i=4; i < SSID_MAX_SIZE; i++){ 
    if      (i<10) { result[i] = seq[ESP8266TrueRandom.random(0,52)]; } 
    else if (i==10){ result[i] = '-'; } 
    else           { result[i] = seq[ESP8266TrueRandom.random(52, 63)]; } 
  } 
  Serial.print("New random SSID generated: "); 




  * Function that generates a random PSK that will be saved into device EEPROM during its 
initialization. 
  *  @param[out] unsigned char* result: pointer to which random generated PSK will be saved. 
  */ 
void generateRandomPSK(unsigned char* result) { 
  for(int i=0; i < 4; i++){ // 1 long 32 bits, divided by 4bits/HEXchar = 8 chars -> need 
array of 4 longs 
    uint32_t aux = ESP8266TrueRandom.random(); 
    result[8*i+0] = (unsigned char) ((aux & 0xF0000000) >> 28); 
    result[8*i+1] = (unsigned char) ((aux & 0x0F000000) >> 24); 
    result[8*i+2] = (unsigned char) ((aux & 0x00F00000) >> 20); 
    result[8*i+3] = (unsigned char) ((aux & 0x000F0000) >> 16); 
    result[8*i+4] = (unsigned char) ((aux & 0x0000F000) >> 12); 
    result[8*i+5] = (unsigned char) ((aux & 0x00000F00) >> 8 ); 
    result[8*i+6] = (unsigned char) ((aux & 0x000000F0) >> 4 ); 
    result[8*i+7] = (unsigned char) ((aux & 0x0000000F) >> 0 ); 
 
    // Serial.print("Raw 32bits: "); serialPrintUint64((uint64_t) aux, BIN); 
    // Serial.print("\nChars from Byte: "); 
    // Serial.printf("%c | %c | %c | %c | %c | %c | %c | %c\n\n", TO_HEX(result[8*i+0]),  
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TO_HEX(result[8*i+1]),  TO_HEX(result[8*i+2]),  TO_HEX(result[8*i+3]),  
TO_HEX(result[8*i+4]),  TO_HEX(result[8*i+5]),  TO_HEX(result[8*i+6]),  
TO_HEX(result[8*i+7])); 
  } 
 
  Serial.print("New random PSK generated: "); 
  for(int i=0; i<32; i++){ 
    Serial.printf("%c", TO_HEX(result[i])); 
  } 




  * Function used to simplify the process of reading a single entry stored in the EEPROM. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t start_addr: integer that represents the initial address where the 
information is stored. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t num_bytes: integer that represents the number of bytes (or addresses) 
to read. 
  *  @param[out] unsigned char* result: pointer to where the read output should be stored. 
  */ 
void readEEPROM(uint8_t start_addr, uint8_t num_bytes, unsigned char* result){ 
  EEPROM.begin(256); 
  uint8_t index = 0; 
 
  result[index] = (EEPROM.read(start_addr+index)); 
  while (index<num_bytes-1) { 
    index = index+1; 
    result[index] = (EEPROM.read(start_addr+index)); 
  } 




  * Function used to simplify the process of writing a single entry to the EEPROM. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t start_addr: integer that represents the initial address where the 
information is stored. 
  *  @param[in] unsigned char *data: pointer to where the read output should be stored. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t size: integer that represents the number of bytes (or addresses) to 
read. 
  */ 
void writeEEPROM(uint8_t start_addr, unsigned char *data, uint8_t size){ 
  EEPROM.begin(256); 
  uint8_t index = 0; 
  EEPROM.write(start_addr+index, data[index]); 
  while(index < size-1){ //data[index] != '\0' &&  
    index = index+1; 
    EEPROM.write(start_addr+index, data[index]); 
  } 
  EEPROM.commit(); 
  EEPROM.end(); 
} 
 
/// Function used to represent in the OLED display the device ID selection menu. 
void displayDeviceIDSelection() { 
  display.clearDisplay(); 
  display.display(); 
  display.setTextSize(1); 
  display.setTextColor(WHITE); 
  display.setCursor(0, 0); 
  display.println(F("Select devID (Short Push) | Confirm (Long)")); 
  display.print(F("[")); 
  display.print(current_entry); 
  display.print(F("/")); 
  display.print(number_nodes); 
 
  if(selected_devID==0) { 
    display.print(F("] Add New Device")); 
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  } else { 
    display.print(F("] Connect to ID ")); 
    display.print(selected_devID); 
  } 
  display.display(); 
} 
 
/// Function used to show in the display the Communication Encryption Selection Menu. 
void displayEncryptedCommSelection() { 
  display.clearDisplay(); 
  display.display(); 
  display.setTextSize(1); 
  display.setTextColor(WHITE); 
  display.setCursor(0, 0); 
  display.println(F("Short Push: Switch | Long Push: Confirm")); 
  display.print(F("Use Encrypted Communication?    ")); 
  if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA) { display.print("YES"); Serial.println("Current Choice: YES"); } 
  else                  { display.print("NO"); Serial.println("Current Choice: NO"); } 
  display.display(); 
} 
 
/// Function used to display QR Code in both OLED and Terminal 
void displayOLEDQRCode() { 
    display.clearDisplay(); 
    display.setTextSize(1); 
    display.setTextColor(WHITE); 
    display.setCursor(0, 0); 
    display.display(); 
    wait(1); 
    long dt = millis(); 
    uint8_t qrcodeData[qrcode_getBufferSize(3)]; // Version 3 -> size 29x29,  53 bytes of 
data if low error correction 
    char *str = (char *) malloc(53); 
    char *psk_hex = (char *) malloc(PSK_MAX_SIZE+1); 
    strcpy (str, (char*) ssid); 
    strcat(str, ":\n"); 
    for(int i=0; i<PSK_MAX_SIZE; i++){ 
      psk_hex[i] = TO_HEX(psk[i]); 
      Serial.printf("|%c|", TO_HEX(psk[i])); 
    } 
    strncat(str, psk_hex, 32); 
    printf("\n%s\n", str); 
    qrcode_initText(&qrcode, qrcodeData, 3, 0, str); 
    printTimeSeconds(dt); 
 
    for (uint8_t y = 0; y < 32; y++) { 
      for (uint8_t x = 0; x < 128; x++) { 
        display.drawPixel(x, y, WHITE); 
      } 
    } 
 
    for (uint8_t y = 0; y < qrcode.size; y++) { 
        Serial.print("        "); 
        for (uint8_t x = 0; x < qrcode.size; x++) { 
          // Print each module (UTF-8 \u2588 is a solid block) 
          Serial.print(qrcode_getModule(&qrcode, x, y) ? "\u2588\u2588": "  "); 
          if(qrcode_getModule(&qrcode, x, y)) { 
            display.drawPixel(48+x, y+1, BLACK); 
          } 
        } 
        Serial.println(); 
    } 
 
    Serial.println("\n\n\n"); 
    free(str); 




    display.ssd1306_command(SSD1306_SETCONTRAST); 
    display.ssd1306_command(0); 
    display.display(); 
    wait(0); 
    wait(0); 
    wait(0); 
} 
 
/// Function used to initialize the EEPROM with default parameters, generating random 
<SSID,PSK>. 
void setupEmptyEEPROM() { 
  Serial.println("EEPROM WAS NOT SET UP. CHARACTER in 0xFF WAS NOT 'Y'. Proceeding to 
initialize the memory with new SSID/PSK"); 
  generateRandomSSID(ssid); 
  generateRandomPSK(psk); 
 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_SSID, ssid, SSID_MAX_SIZE); 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_PSK, psk, PSK_MAX_SIZE); 
 
  // Conversion from int to char array - number of Nodes (initially 1) 
  unsigned char number_nodes_char[1]; 
  number_nodes_char[0] = number_nodes; 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_NUM_NODES, number_nodes_char, 1); 
 
  // Conversion from int to char array - devID of controller (1) 
  unsigned char devID_char[1]; 
  devID_char[0] = devID; 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_NODE_1, devID_char, 1); 
 
  // Write control char 'Y' in 0xFF to tell device's EEPROM has data 
  strncpy((char *) &eeprom_control_char, (char *) &CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR, 2); 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_CONTROL_CHAR, eeprom_control_char, 1);   
} 
 
/// Function used to read all EEPROM configuration values and load them in the program global 
variables. 
void loadConfigValuesFromEEPROM() { 
  // Read SSID,PSK 
  readEEPROM(ADDR_SSID, SSID_MAX_SIZE, ssid); 
  readEEPROM(ADDR_PSK, PSK_MAX_SIZE, psk); 
 
  // Read Num of registered Nodes 
  unsigned char number_nodes_char[2]; 
  readEEPROM(ADDR_NUM_NODES, 2, number_nodes_char); 
 
  number_nodes = number_nodes_char[0]; 
 
  // Read each registered NodeID 
  for(int i=0; i<number_nodes; i++){ 
    unsigned char current_devID[2]; 
    readEEPROM(ADDR_NODE_1+i, 2, current_devID); 
    nodes_array[i] = current_devID[0]; 
    nodes_array[i+1] = '\0'; 




  * Function that performs the Data integrity Check for a burst of received packets.\n 
  * It does a CRC32 check and determines if the data is valid. 
  *  @param[in] uint16_t size: Number of received packets in the RX_buffer. 
  *  @param[in] uint32_t rx_checksum: Checksum Received in the last data packet. 
  * @return bool: True is data is valid. False if data is not valid. 
  */ 
bool checkDataIntegrity(uint16_t size, uint32_t rx_checksum){ 
  uint32_t checksum = CRC32::calculate(rx_data_buffer, size); 
  Serial.println("Checking Checksums..."); 
  Serial.printf("Received: %d | calculated: %d\n", rx_checksum, checksum); 
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  if(checksum == rx_checksum) 
    return true; 
 
  Serial.println("Checksums not matching!"); 




  * Function used to handle button interruptions, mainly used in selection menu navigation.\n 
  * As there is a single button available, function is called in both press and release 
actions.\n 
  * It determines if the button was pressed or released, and differenciate between a short 
and a long press. 
  */ 
void handleButtonInterrupt() { 
  if(!buttonIsHigh) { // Falling Edge (Low to High) 
    long timeNow = millis(); 
    if(timeNow-timeInit<50) { //Anti-Bouncing 
      timeInit = timeNow; 
      return; 
    } 
    buttonIsHigh = true; 
    Serial.println("BUTTON PRESSED"); 
    timeInit = millis(); 
 
    return; 
  } 
 
  // else -> Rising Edge (High to Low), button was released 
  Serial.println("BUTTON RELEASED"); 
  buttonIsHigh = false; 
  timeEnd = millis(); 
  Serial.print("Time Elapsed: "); 
  Serial.println(timeEnd-timeInit); 
 
  if(timeEnd-timeInit<=100) // Anti-Bouncing, too short press, do nothing 
    return; 
   
  if(timeEnd-timeInit<=1000) { // Short Press, change selected DeviceID 
    timeEnd = 0.0; 
    timeInit = 0.0; 
    if(!devID_confirmed) { 
      if(number_nodes>1) { 
        Serial.println("Number nodes: "); 
        Serial.println(number_nodes); 
        if(selected_devID==nodes_array[number_nodes-1]){ // If Last Device was Selected, go 
Back to 0 
          selected_devID = 0; 
          current_entry = 1; 
          screen_needs_refresh = true; 
          return; 
        } 
        if(selected_devID==0){ // Skip passing from new Device(0) to 1, as ID=1 is his own ID 
          selected_devID = 2; 
          current_entry = 2; 
          screen_needs_refresh = true; 
          return; 
        } 
        for(int id=0; id<number_nodes-1; id++) { // Iterate to go to the next ID in list 
          if(selected_devID == nodes_array[id]) { 
            selected_devID = nodes_array[id+1]; 
            current_entry = current_entry + 1; 
            screen_needs_refresh = true; 
            return; 
          } 
        } 
      } 
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    } else if(!encrypt_confirmed) { 
      FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = !FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA; 
      screen_needs_refresh = true; 
      return; 
    } 
  } else { // Long Press (+1000ms), Confirm Selected Device 
    long_press = true 
    if(!devID_confirmed) { devID_confirmed = true; return; } 
    else if(!encrypt_confirmed) { encrypt_confirmed = true; return; } 




  * Function used to convert the info to send into a formatted frame ready to be sent. 
  *   @param[in] uint8_t destID: device to which the packet is sent.  
  *   @param[in] uint8_t packet_type: integer that represents the current packet's type. 
  *   @param[in] uint32_t payload: integer representing the payload data of the frame. 
  *  @return uint64_t: integer which represents the frame ready to be sent (up to 36 bits, 
RC6 IR protocol). 
  */ 
uint64_t buildTXFrame(uint8_t destID, uint8_t packet_type, uint32_t payload) { 
  uint64_t data = 0ULL; 
  if(packet_type==TYPE_ACK || packet_type==TYPE_NACK){ 
    data = 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(payload & 0xFFF)     << 0  | 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(1ULL)                << 12 | // Packet Sent From Controller, 
always 1 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(packet_type & 0b111) << 13; 
  } 
  else if(packet_type==TYPE_HELLO || packet_type==TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT || 
packet_type==TYPE_HELLO_NEW) { 
    data = 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(payload)     << 0  | 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(1ULL)        << 24 | // Packet Sent From Controller, always 1 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(destID)      << 25 | 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(packet_type) << 33; 
  } 
  else if(packet_type==TYPE_DATA || packet_type==TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT || 
packet_type==TYPE_DATA_END) { 
    data = 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(payload)     << 0  | 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(1ULL)        << 32 | // Packet Sent From Controller, always 1 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(packet_type) << 33; 
  } 
     
  //Serial.println("DEBUG: buildTXFRAME:"); 
    //serialPrintUint64(data, HEX); 
    //Serial.println(); 
    //serialPrintUint64(data, BIN); 
    //Serial.println("\n"); 




  * Function which processes the received frame stored in received_data global variable.\n 
  * It processes the information of the frame and determines if the packet is valid. 
  *   @param[in] uint16_t current_counter: represents the number of received packets in the 
current burst. 
  * @return uint32_t: integer which contains 2 different variables:\n 
  *   Packet type (8bits)  in the 8 LSBs.\n 
  *   New Counter (16bits) in the 16 MSBs. If NewCounter==current_counter_input+1, it means 
the packet is valid. Everything else means packet was wrong and it get discarded. 
  */  
uint32_t getRXFrameData(uint16_t current_counter) { 
  uint64_t data = received_data.value; 




  uint8_t destID = 0; 
  uint8_t packet_type = 0; 
  uint32_t payload = 0; 
  uint8_t is_from_controller = 1; 
 
  if(nbits==16) { // Short Frame -> TYPE ACK, NACK, BYE 
    packet_type = (uint8_t) ((data>>13) & 0b111); // 3 bits 
    payload = (uint32_t) (data & 0xFFF); // 12 bits 
    is_from_controller = (uint8_t) ((data>>12) & 0b1 ); // 1 bit 
  } 
 
  else if(nbits==36){ // Long Frame -> TYPE HELLO, DATA, DATA_END 
    packet_type = (uint8_t) ((data>>33) & 0b111); // Located in same place for all 36-bit 
frames 
     
    if(packet_type==TYPE_HELLO || packet_type==TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT) { 
      payload = (uint32_t) (data & 0x00FFFFFF); // 24 bits 
      is_from_controller = (uint8_t) ((data>>24) & 0b1 ); 
      destID = (uint8_t) (data>>25); //DestID only present in HELLO seqs 
    } 
    else if(packet_type==TYPE_HELLO_NEW) { 
      payload = (uint32_t) (data & 0x00FFFFFF); // 24 bits 
      is_from_controller = (uint8_t) ((data>>24) & 0b1 ); 
      destID = (uint8_t) (data>>25); //DestID only present in HELLO seqs 
    } 
    else if (packet_type==TYPE_DATA || packet_type==TYPE_DATA_END || 
packet_type==TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT){ 
      payload = (uint32_t) (data & 0xFFFFFFFF); // 32 bits 
      is_from_controller = (uint8_t) ((data>>32) & 0b1 ); 
    } 
  } 
 
  if(is_from_controller) {Serial.println("\n**a** (not coming from a node)");return -1;} 
 
  uint16_t next_counter = current_counter + 1; 
  uint32_t response_ok = packet_type | (((uint32_t) (next_counter))<<16); 
  uint32_t response_ko = packet_type; 
 
  //Serial.print("DEBUG: responseOK: "); 
  //serialPrintUint64(response_ok, BIN); 
  //Serial.println("\n\n"); 
 
  switch (packet_type) { 
    case TYPE_ACK: 
      //Serial.println("*Got ACK*"); 
        //Serial.printf("Payload: %d, current_counter: %d. Are equal: ", payload, 
current_counter); 
        //Serial.println((uint16_t) (payload)==current_counter); 
      if ((uint16_t) (payload)==current_counter) { //ACKs should contain nº of packets 
received 
        Serial.printf("Got ACK number %d\n", current_counter); 
        //printRXPacketInfo(destID, packet_type, is_from_controller, payload); 
        return response_ok; 
      } 
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_NACK: 
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT: 
      if(FLAG_HELLO_DONE) 
        return response_ko; 
      if(devID!=destID) 
        return response_ko; 
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      Serial.println("Got Hello Encrypt!"); 
      //printRXPacketInfo(destID, packet_type, is_from_controller, payload); 
      FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 1; 
      return response_ok; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_HELLO: 
      if(FLAG_HELLO_DONE) 
        return response_ko; 
      if(devID!=destID) 
        return response_ko; 
         
      Serial.println("Got Hello!"); 
      //printRXPacketInfo(destID, packet_type, is_from_controller, payload); 
      FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 0; 
      return response_ok; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_HELLO_NEW: 
      if(FLAG_HELLO_DONE) 
        return response_ko; 
      if(payload==0) 
        return response_ko; 
 
      Serial.println("Got Hello_NEW!"); 
      if(destID==devID) 
        return response_ok; 
       
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_DATA: 
      if(current_counter>0 && rx_data_buffer[current_counter-1]==payload && payload>0) 
        return response_ko; 
 
      //Serial.printf("Got Data! counter: %d\n", current_counter); 
      //printRXPacketInfo(destID, packet_type, is_from_controller, payload); 
      rx_data_buffer[current_counter] = payload; 
      return response_ok; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_DATA_END: 
      if(current_counter==0) 
        return response_ko; 
 
      //Serial.printf("Got *LAST* Data! counter: %d\n", current_counter); 
      if(checkDataIntegrity(current_counter, payload)) { 
        FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 0; 
        return response_ok; 
      }         
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT: 
      if(current_counter==0) 
        return response_ko; 
 
      //Serial.printf("Got *LAST* Data! counter: %d\n", current_counter); 
      if(checkDataIntegrity(current_counter, payload)) { 
        FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 1; 
        return response_ok; 
      }         
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    default: 
      return response_ko; 
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      break; 




  * Function which encrypts the data before sending it over IR. It uses a 32-byte shared_key 
to encrypt 32 bytes of information.\n 
  *  As the key is unique in each session, there is no need to use a Init_Vector, as in this 
case:\n 
  *  len(data)==len(key), we can use a simple XOR bit comparison to encrypt/decrypt the Data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *shared_key: Pointer to the session key used to encrypt/decrypt the 
data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *msg: Pointer to the message to be encrypted. 
  *   @param[in] bool hasPubKey: Boolean which, if true, allow to append the publickey in 
clear to the message. Default false. 
  *   @param[out] byte *encrypted: Pointer to where the encrypted result will be saved. 
 */  
void encryptData(byte *shared_key, byte *msg, byte *encrypted, bool hasPubKey = false) { 
  for(int i=0; i<SSID_MAX_SIZE; i++){ 
    encrypted[i] = msg[i]^shared_key[i]; 
    encrypted[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE] = msg[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE]^shared_key[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE]; 
    if(hasPubKey) { 
      encrypted[i+PSK_MAX_SIZE] = msg[i+PSK_MAX_SIZE]; 
      encrypted[i+PSK_MAX_SIZE+SSID_MAX_SIZE] = msg[i+PSK_MAX_SIZE+SSID_MAX_SIZE]; 
    } 




  * Function which decrypts the data received over IR. It uses a 32-byte shared_key to 
encrypt 32 bytes of information.\n 
  * As the key is unique in each session, there is no need to use a Init_Vector, as in this 
case:\n 
  * len(data)==len(key), we can use a simple XOR bit comparison to encrypt/decrypt the Data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *shared_key: Pointer to the session key used to encrypt/decrypt the 
data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *encrypted: Pointer to the message to be decrypted. 
  *   @param[out] byte *decrypted: Pointer to where the decrypted result will be saved. 
 */ 
void decryptData(byte *shared_key, byte *encrypted, byte *decrypted) { 
  for(int i=0; i<SSID_MAX_SIZE; i++){ 
    decrypted[i] = encrypted[i]^shared_key[i]; 
    decrypted[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE] = encrypted[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE]^shared_key[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE]; 




  * Function that translates data char array ("ssid_1234") (Between 16 and 32 bytes) to 
chunks of 32bits. 
  *   @param[in] byte *char_data: Pointer to the data 8-bits array to be converted into a 
24bits array. 
  *   @param[in] int size: size of the data in bytes. 
  *   @param[in] bool is_psk: Optimizes packet building in case the data is from the PSK, as 
it uses only 4 bits for each character (50% efficiency otherwise). Default is false. 
  * @return uint16_t: integer representing the number of data packets the TX_buffer contains. 
  */ 
uint16_t buildTXDataBuffer(byte *char_data, int size, bool is_psk=false) { 
  uint16_t number_chunks = (size*8)/32; 
  uint32_t checksum; 
   
  // Casting byte int array into uint32 array. 
  // 1 uint32 will hold 4 bytes, as payload is 32bits. 
  Serial.println("DEBUG: buildTXDataBuffer [HEX]:"); 
   
  if(is_psk){ 
    for(int i=0; i<32; i++){ 
      Serial.printf("%c", TO_HEX(char_data[i])); 
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    }Serial.println(); 
    number_chunks = number_chunks/2; 
    for(int i=0; i<number_chunks; i++) { 
      tx_data_buffer[i] =  
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[8*i])   << 0 | 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[8*i+1]) << 4 | 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[8*i+2]) << 8 | 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[8*i+3]) << 12| 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[8*i+4]) << 16| 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[8*i+5]) << 20| 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[8*i+6]) << 24| 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[8*i+7]) << 28; 
      serialPrintUint64(tx_data_buffer[i], HEX); 
      Serial.println(); 
    } 
     
  } 
  else { 
    for(int i=0; i<number_chunks; i++) { 
        tx_data_buffer[i] =  
          static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[4*i])   << 0 | 
          static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[4*i+1]) << 8 | 
          static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[4*i+2]) << 16| 
          static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[4*i+3]) << 24; 
        //serialPrintUint64(tx_data_buffer[i], HEX); 
        //Serial.println(); 
    } 
  } 
   
  // Avoid sending many 0's packet at the end of data. 
  for(int i=0; i<number_chunks; i+=0){ 
    if(tx_data_buffer[i]==0) { 
      for (int j=i; j<number_chunks-1; j++) { 
        tx_data_buffer[j] = tx_data_buffer[j+1]; 
      } 
      number_chunks -= 1; 
    } else{i+=1;} 
  } 
 
  // Checksum calculation 
  checksum = CRC32::calculate(tx_data_buffer, number_chunks); 
  tx_data_buffer[number_chunks] = checksum; 
  number_chunks += 1; 
 
  Serial.printf("Num of data packets: %d\n\n", number_chunks); 




  * Function that populates the transmission buffer with the PSK and SSID to be sent.\n 
  * It also calculates the checksum of the sending data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *shared_key: Pointer to the session key shared with the addressee. If 
not provided, data will not be encrypted. Default is NULL 
  *   @param[in] byte *mypublic_key: Pointer to the device public key that will be 
transmitted. If not provided, burst will not include those extra 32 bytes. Default is NULL 
  * @return uint16_t: integer representing the number of data packets the TX_buffer contains. 
  */ 
uint16_t buildAllDataIntoBuffer(byte *shared_key=NULL, byte *mypublic_key=NULL) { 
  uint16_t num_bytes; // 1 PSK char is only 4 bits, we can get 2 chars in a Byte 
 
  if(mypublic_key) { num_bytes = SSID_MAX_SIZE+PSK_MAX_SIZE/2+32; } // 32 B is pubkey length  
  else             { num_bytes = SSID_MAX_SIZE+PSK_MAX_SIZE/2; } 
 
  uint16_t total_packets = num_bytes/4; //4 bytes per packet 
  uint32_t checksum; 




  Serial.println("DEBUG: buildAllDataIntoBuffer():"); 
 
  for(int i=0; i<SSID_MAX_SIZE; i++) { // msg[0], msg[1], ..., msg[31] = ssid[0], ssid[1], 
..., psk[30]+psk[31] 
    msg[i] = ssid[i]; 
 
    msg[i+16] = psk[2*i+0]<<0 | (psk[2*i+1]<<4); 
 
    if(mypublic_key) { // Loop goes from 0 to 15 only, we need to access 32 bytes in position 
0-31 and allocate them in position 32-63 
      msg[i+32] = mypublic_key[i]; 
      msg[i+48] = mypublic_key[i+16]; 
    } 
  } 
 
  if(shared_key) { 
 
    //Serial.println("MSG before encryption: "); 
    //for(int i=0; i<num_bytes; i++) { 
    //  Serial.printf("Message i: %d = %d\n", i, msg[i]); 
    //} 
    if(mypublic_key) { 
      encryptData(shared_key, msg, msg, true); //result is returned into msg variable 
    } else { 
      encryptData(shared_key, msg, msg, false); 
    } 
 
    //Serial.println("MSG after encryption: "); 
    //for(int i=0; i<num_bytes; i++) { 
    //  Serial.printf("EncrMessage i: %d = %d\n", i, msg[i]); 
    //} 
  } 
   
  for(int i=0; i<total_packets; i++) { 
    tx_data_buffer[i] =  
      static_cast<uint32_t> (msg[4*i])        | 
      static_cast<uint32_t> (msg[4*i+1]) << 8 | 
      static_cast<uint32_t> (msg[4*i+2]) << 16| 
      static_cast<uint32_t> (msg[4*i+3]) << 24; 
    serialPrintUint64(tx_data_buffer[i], HEX); 
    Serial.println(); 
  } 
   
  // Checksum calculation 
  checksum = CRC32::calculate(tx_data_buffer, total_packets); 
  tx_data_buffer[total_packets] = checksum; 
  total_packets += 1; 
 
  Serial.printf("Num of data packets: %d\n\n", total_packets); 




  * Core Function which establishes a connection with a Node, transfers the Wi-Fi credentials 
and closes the connection.\n 
  * It is called periodically, until receiving a confirmation with Destination Node that info 
was correctly received.\n 
  * It includes several connection stages:\n 
  *     HELLO_NEW: Handshake with a random proof for new devices, which allows concurrence 
problems with multiple new devices answering the controller at the same time.\n 
  *     HELLO: Normal handshake, performed for all devices. it also informs the node if the 
transmission will be encrypted or not.\n 
  *     KEY_EXCHANGE: If users selects Encryption, there is a key exchange stage where both 
nodes send each other their public keys.\n 
  *     DATA_EXCHANGE: Sends the data (in clear or encrypted) until receiving final ACK from 
node. 
  * @return bool: True if data could be transmitted. False otherwise. 
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  */ 
bool contactWithNode() { 
  FLAG_HELLO_DONE = 0; 
 
  long ref_time = millis(); 
  long time0 = millis(); 
  bool HELLO_PENDING = true; 
  bool NEW_HELLO_PENDING = true; 
 
  uint32_t rand_seq_hello = 0; 
 
  // Send Broadcast (dest_addr=0, TYPE_HELLO_NEW, new ID in payload) 
  if(selected_devID==0) { 
    dest_devID = number_nodes+1; 
    uint8_t counter = 1; 
    send_data.value = buildTXFrame(0, TYPE_HELLO_NEW, dest_devID); 
    irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
    irrecv.resume(); 
 
    Serial.print("*TIME: Broadcast NEW HELLO Sent! "); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
     
    //Wait for Node HELLO Answer with Random Payload 
    while(NEW_HELLO_PENDING) { 
      delay(71); 
      if(irrecv.decode(&received_data)) { 
        if(received_data.decode_type==RC6) { 
          uint32_t header_capture = getRXFrameData(0); 
          uint8_t received_type = (uint8_t) (header_capture); 
          uint16_t received_counter = (uint16_t) (header_capture>>16); 
          if(received_type==TYPE_HELLO_NEW && received_counter==1) { 
            uint32_t payload = (uint32_t) (received_data.value & 0x00FFFFFF); // 24 bits; 
              NEW_HELLO_PENDING = false; 
              rand_seq_hello = payload; 
              Serial.printf("Received Hello with a Random Payload: %d\n", rand_seq_hello); 
          } 
        } 
        if(NEW_HELLO_PENDING && counter%3!=0) 
          irrecv.resume(); 
      } 
      if(NEW_HELLO_PENDING && counter%3==0) { 
        delay(33); 
        irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
        irrecv.resume(); 
        Serial.println("\nSent new Broadcast HELLO!"); 
      } 
       
      counter++; 
    } 
    Serial.print("*TIME: Broadcast NEW HELLO Answer Received! "); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
    printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
    if(verbose_display) { 
      display.clearDisplay(); 
      display.display(); 
      display.setTextSize(1); 
      display.setTextColor(WHITE); 
      display.setCursor(0, 0); 
      display.println(F("Communication Established")); 
      display.println(F("New Hello Answer Received")); 
      display.display(); 
    } 
  } 
  else { // selected_devID>0 (existing device) 
    dest_devID = selected_devID; 
    Serial.println(dest_devID); 
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    rand_seq_hello = selected_devID; 
  } 
 
  // *** HELLO FOR A KNOWN DEVICE STARTS HERE *** 
 
  // In case dest_devID was not known, send back hello with randomGen payload (rand_seq=0 if 
dev is known) 
  if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA) { send_data.value = buildTXFrame(dest_devID, TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT, 
rand_seq_hello); } 
  else { send_data.value = buildTXFrame(dest_devID, TYPE_HELLO, rand_seq_hello); } 
   
  irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
  irrecv.resume(); 
 
  Serial.print("*TIME: HELLO for Known DevID SENT! "); 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
   
  time0 = millis(); 
  uint8_t counter = 1; 
   
  //Wait for Node HELLO Answer 
  while(HELLO_PENDING) { 
    delay(71); 
    if(irrecv.decode(&received_data)) { 
      if(received_data.decode_type==RC6) { 
        uint32_t header_capture = getRXFrameData(0); 
        uint8_t received_type = (uint8_t) (header_capture); 
        uint16_t received_counter = (uint16_t) (header_capture>>16); 
        if( (received_type==TYPE_HELLO || received_type==TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT) && 
received_counter==1) { 
          uint8_t payload = (uint8_t) received_data.value; 
          if (payload == dest_devID) { 
            HELLO_PENDING = false; 
            Serial.println("Received Hello for Known DevID Answer!"); 
          } 
        } 
      } 
      if(HELLO_PENDING && counter%3!=0) 
        irrecv.resume(); 
    } 
     
    if(HELLO_PENDING && counter%3==0) { 
        delay(33); 
        irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
        irrecv.resume(); 
        Serial.println("\n Sent another HELLO for Known DevID!"); 
    } 
    counter++; 
 
    if(HELLO_PENDING && millis()-time0 > 5000) 
      return false; 
  } 
 
  if(!FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA) { 
    Serial.print("*TIME: HELLO Answer Received! "); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
    printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
    if(millis()-time0<600) 
      delay(610-(millis()-time0)); // Wait for receiver to stop sending hellos, before 
sending us 
  } 
 
  FLAG_HELLO_DONE = 1; // Flag=1 means we are ready to store data packets (in case they 
arrive) 
  Serial.print("*TIME: HELLO FINAL answer received! "); 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
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  printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
  if(verbose_display) { 
    display.clearDisplay(); 
    display.display(); 
    display.setTextSize(1); 
    display.setTextColor(WHITE); 
    display.setCursor(0, 0); 
    display.println(F("Hello Final Answer Received")); 
    if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA) 
      display.println(F("Sending PublicKey for Encryption...")); 
    else { display.println(F("Sending Data in Clear...")); } 
    display.display(); 
  } 
 
  uint8_t packet_max_number; 
 
 




  if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA) { 
    static const uint8_t basepoint[32] = {9}; 
    uint8_t mycurve_secret[32]; 
    uint8_t mycurve_public[32]; 
    uint8_t hiscurve_public[32]; 
    uint8_t mycurve_shared[32]; 
 
    for(int i=0; i<32; i++) { mycurve_secret[i] = ESP8266TrueRandom.randomByte(); } 
    curve25519_donna(mycurve_public, mycurve_secret, basepoint); 
    //for(int i=0; i<32; i++) { Serial.printf("Mycurve_public Byte %d: %d\n", i, 
mycurve_public[i]); } 
 
    // *** Waiting for Device's PublicKey Reception *** 
 
 
    bool IS_LAST_DATA = false; 
    bool CHECKSUM_ERROR; 
    time0 = millis(); 
    uint16_t packet_sequence; 
 
    // Loop for Device's PublicKey Reception 
    while(!IS_LAST_DATA) { 
      CHECKSUM_ERROR = false; 
      packet_sequence = 0; 
      irrecv.resume(); 
 
      if(millis()-time0>1500) 
        return false; 
 
      while(!IS_LAST_DATA && !CHECKSUM_ERROR) { 
        delay(2); 
        if(irrecv.decode(&received_data)) { 
          if(received_data.decode_type == RC6) { 
            uint32_t header_capture = getRXFrameData(packet_sequence); 
            uint8_t received_type = (uint8_t) (header_capture); 
            uint16_t received_counter = (uint16_t) (header_capture>>16); 
 
            if( received_type==TYPE_DATA && received_counter==packet_sequence+1 ) { 
              Serial.printf("PublicKey Data %d received.\n", packet_sequence); 
              packet_sequence++; 
            } 
            if(received_type==TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT) { 
              if(received_counter==packet_sequence+1){ 
                Serial.printf("**LAST** PublicKey Packet %d received.\n", packet_sequence); 
                IS_LAST_DATA = true; 
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                packet_sequence++; 
              } else { Serial.println("Checksum ERROR"); memset(&rx_data_buffer, 0, 
packet_sequence); CHECKSUM_ERROR = true; } 
            } 
          } 
          if(!IS_LAST_DATA) 
            irrecv.resume(); 
        } 
        if(packet_sequence>=9) 
          CHECKSUM_ERROR=true; 
      } 
    } 
 
    Serial.print("*TIME: Device's PublicKey Received"); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
    printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
    Serial.println("Sending DATA ACK"); 
    send_data.value = buildTXFrame(selected_devID, TYPE_ACK, packet_sequence); 
    time0 = millis(); 
 
    // ACK for device's PublicKey 
    for(int i=0; i<4; i++) { 
      delay(5); 
      irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 16); //ACK 
    } 
    //while(millis()-time0 < 180) { 
    //  irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 16); 
    //  delay(15); 
    //} 
 
    Serial.print("*TIME: ACK for PublicKey Sent - Pre-Saving Data"); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
    printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
    for(int i=0; i<packet_sequence-1; i++) { // PublicKey is 32bytes, there are 4bytes per 
packet: packet_seq=8 
      hiscurve_public[4*i+0] = (uint8_t) (rx_data_buffer[i] >> 0*8); 
      hiscurve_public[4*i+1] = (uint8_t) (rx_data_buffer[i] >> 1*8); 
      hiscurve_public[4*i+2] = (uint8_t) (rx_data_buffer[i] >> 2*8); 
      hiscurve_public[4*i+3] = (uint8_t) (rx_data_buffer[i] >> 3*8); 
      //Serial.printf("Buffer HisPublicKey %d: %d | %d | %d | %d\n", i, 
hiscurve_public[4*i+0], hiscurve_public[4*i+1], hiscurve_public[4*i+2], 
hiscurve_public[4*i+3]); 
      //Serial.println(); 
    } 
    memset(&rx_data_buffer, 0, packet_sequence); 
 
    curve25519_donna(mycurve_shared, mycurve_secret, hiscurve_public); 
    //for(int i=0; i<32; i++) { Serial.printf("Mycurve_shared Byte %d: %d\n", i, 
mycurve_shared[i]); } 
 
    Serial.println("Entering Encrypting function..."); 
    packet_max_number = buildAllDataIntoBuffer(mycurve_shared, mycurve_public); 
 
    if(verbose_display) { 
      display.clearDisplay(); 
      display.display(); 
      display.setTextSize(1); 
      display.setTextColor(WHITE); 
      display.setCursor(0, 0); 
      display.println(F("PublicKey Received & SharedSecret calculated!")); 
      display.println(F("Sending Encrypted Data...")); 
      display.display(); 
    } 
  } 










  bool ACK_PENDING = true; 
  time0 = millis(); 
 
  while(ACK_PENDING) { 
    Serial.println("\nEntering Sending DATA Loop..."); 
    for(int i=0; i<packet_max_number; i++){ 
      delay(5); 
 
      if(millis()-time0 >2500) { 
        break; 
      } 
 
      if(i+1==packet_max_number){ 
        if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA){ send_data.value = buildTXFrame(selected_devID, 
TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT, tx_data_buffer[i]); } 
        else {                 send_data.value = buildTXFrame(selected_devID, TYPE_DATA_END, 
tx_data_buffer[i]); } 
      } 
      else {                   send_data.value = buildTXFrame(selected_devID, TYPE_DATA, 
tx_data_buffer[i]); } 
       
      Serial.printf("Packet number %d\n", i); 
      irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
    } 
 
    Serial.print("*TIME: All info sent"); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
    printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
    irrecv.resume(); 
    Serial.println("Waiting for ACK"); 
    time0 = millis(); 
    uint8_t n_attempts = 0; // Return after 3 missing acks 
     
    while(ACK_PENDING) { 
      delay(2); 
      if(irrecv.decode(&received_data)) { 
        if(received_data.decode_type == RC6) { 
          uint32_t header_capture = getRXFrameData(packet_max_number); 
          uint8_t received_type = (uint8_t) (header_capture); 
          uint16_t received_counter = (uint16_t) (header_capture>>16); 
 
          if( received_type==TYPE_ACK && received_counter==packet_max_number+1 ) { 
            ACK_PENDING = false; 
            Serial.println("\n\n**Burst ACK Received for all DATA**\n"); 
          } 
        } 
        if(ACK_PENDING) 
          irrecv.resume(); 
      } 
      if(millis()-time0 > 300) 
        break; 
    } 
 
    if(ACK_PENDING){ 
      n_attempts += 1; 
      if(n_attempts>=3) 
        return false; 
    } 




  Serial.print("*TIME: DATA ACK received "); 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
  printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
  if(verbose_display) { 
    display.clearDisplay(); 
    display.display(); 
    display.setTextSize(1); 
    display.setTextColor(WHITE); 
    display.setCursor(0, 0); 
    display.println(F("Data Correctly Sent!")); 
    display.println(F("ACK Final Received. Printing QRCode...")); 
    display.display(); 
  } 
  wait(0); 
 
  // QR code Printing 
  long_press = false; 
  while(!long_press) { 
    displayOLEDQRCode(); 
  } 
 
  if(selected_devID==0) { 
    Serial.println("Saving New NodeID into Memory:"); 
 
    number_nodes += 1; 
    unsigned char array_number_nodes[1]; 
    array_number_nodes[0] = number_nodes; 
    writeEEPROM(ADDR_NUM_NODES, array_number_nodes, 1); 
 
    unsigned char array_dest_devID[1]; 
    array_dest_devID[0] = dest_devID; 
    writeEEPROM(ADDR_NODE_1+number_nodes-1, array_dest_devID, 1); 
  } 
 





 * \defgroup main_functions 2.3. Program Main Functions 
 * Functions which must be implemented by an ESP8266. They execute the main logic of the 
program with the aid of the previous functions 
 * @{ 
 */ 
 
/// Setup function which checks EEPROM, generate random <SSID,PSK> if not initialized, waits 
for user input in destID selection and Encryption menus, communicates with node, and prints 
the QR_Code. 
void setup() { 
  Serial.begin(115200); 
  while (!Serial) 
    delay(50); 
  Serial.println(); 
   
  time_t t; 
  srand((unsigned) time(&t)); 
 
  pinMode(BUTTON_PIN, INPUT_PULLUP); 
  attachInterrupt(digitalPinToInterrupt(BUTTON_PIN), handleButtonInterrupt, CHANGE); 
 
  //Uncomment this to reset memory by removing 'Y' control char 
  /* unsigned char a[2] = {'A', '\0'}; 
   * writeEEPROM(ADDR_CONTROL_CHAR, a, 1); 




  readEEPROM(ADDR_CONTROL_CHAR, 2, eeprom_control_char); 
  Serial.println("Memory before loading EEPROM:"); 
  printEEPROMData(); 
 
  // Control Char not found, init EEPROM (random <ssid,psk>, num_nodes=1, devID_1=1, 
control_char=1) 
  if ( !(eeprom_control_char[0]==CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR[0]) ) 
    setupEmptyEEPROM(); 
 
  loadConfigValuesFromEEPROM(); 
  Serial.println("Memory AFTER loading EEPROM:"); 
  printEEPROMData(); 
 
  // ********************************************** 
 
  Serial.println("Select devID (ShortPush)\n    &\nConfirm (Long Push)\n"); 
  // number_nodes = 6; 
  // unsigned char aux_array[6] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}; 
  // strncpy((char *) &nodes_array, (char *) &aux_array, number_nodes); 
   
  for(int i=0; i<number_nodes; i++) { 
    Serial.print(nodes_array[i]); 
    Serial.print(", "); 
  } 
  Serial.println(); 
 
  // SSD1306_SWITCHCAPVCC = generate display voltage from 3.3V internally 
  if(!display.begin(SSD1306_SWITCHCAPVCC, 0x3C)) { // Address 0x3C for 128x32 
    Serial.println(F("SSD1306 allocation failed")); 
  } 
 
  // QR code Printing 
  long_press = false; 
  while(!long_press) { 
    displayOLEDQRCode(); 
  } 
 
  display.display(); 
  displayDeviceIDSelection(); 
  devID_confirmed = true; 
 
  while(!devID_confirmed) { 
    if(screen_needs_refresh){ 
      screen_needs_refresh = false; 
      displayDeviceIDSelection(); 
    } 
    delay(100); 
  } 
 
  Serial.println("Want to Encrypt Transmission?"); 
  displayEncryptedCommSelection(); 
  encrypt_confirmed = true; 
 
  while(!encrypt_confirmed) { 
    if(screen_needs_refresh){ 
      screen_needs_refresh = false; 
      displayEncryptedCommSelection(); 
    } 
    delay(100); 
  } 
 
  display.clearDisplay(); 
  display.display(); 
  display.setTextSize(1); 
  display.setTextColor(WHITE); 
  display.setCursor(0, 0); 
  display.println(F("Selection Saved!")); 
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  display.print(F("Device Selected: ")); 
  if(selected_devID==0){ 
    display.println(F("NEW.")); 
  } else { 
    display.print(selected_devID); 
    display.println(F(".")); 
  } 
  display.println(F("Trying to Communicate")); 
  display.println(F("Point towards it...")); 
  display.display(); 
 
  // ******************************************** 
 
  irrecv.enableIRIn();  // Getting IR Receiver Ready 
  irsend.begin();       // Getting IR Transmitter Ready 
 
  int num_attempts = 1; 
  Serial.print("Contacting with the node. Current Attempt: "); 
  Serial.println(num_attempts); 
 
  while(!contactWithNode()){ 
    num_attempts += 1; 
    Serial.print("Contacting with the node. Current Attempt: "); 
    Serial.println(num_attempts); 
  } 
 




/// Loop() function not used. Just sleep. 
void loop() { 












Annex II - ESP8266 Receiver Code 
/** 
  * \defgroup main main.cpp TFM Receiver Code 
  * 2019 - Rafael de la Rosa Ortiz \n 
  * Allows a ESP8266 Node to receive a <SSID,PK> from an IoT Controller.\n 
  * It checks if device has EEPROM initialized. If not, it will start listening for a 
controller until receiving <SSID,PK>\n 
  * It receives the Key from the controller securely by implementing a Diffie Hellman Key 
Exchange Protocol.\n 
  * Once information is received correctly, it saves it in its EEPROM and tries to connect to 
the Access Point with the credentials. 
  * @{ 
























 * \defgroup global_variables 1. Global Variables Definition 




 * \defgroup eeprom_control_variables 1.1. Variables to Control EEPROM Status and Content 
 * @{ 
 */ 
 
/// Node Device ID - If 0, device has no ID assigned (it will start listening for a 
controller). 
unsigned char devID = 0; 
/// Auxiliar device ID. It is temporal during the communication. Will be copied to devID if 
communication ends successfully. 
unsigned char devID_aux = 0; 
 
/// Controller Device ID=1 (hardcoded). Nodes can only communicate with the controller. 
const unsigned char CONTROLLER_ID = 1; 
 
/// EEPROM Control Char target, 'Y'. 
const unsigned char CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR[2] = {'Y', '\0'}; 
 
/// EEPROM Read Control Char is stored here. If equal to 'Y', memory was written before. 
unsigned char eeprom_control_char[2]; 
 
/// Max Number of Nodes is 206 (Limited by EEPROM). 
#define NUM_NODES_MAX 206  
/// Array of Nodes. +1 to store empty char '\0' at last position. 
unsigned char nodes_array[NUM_NODES_MAX+1]; 
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/// Number of Nodes. Default is 1. Value may change after reading EEPROM. 




 * \defgroup eeprom_address_map 1.2. EEPROM ADDRESS MAP 
 * It uses 64 addresses for an IoT node. Each address can store 8 bits. 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// 0x00, ssid size = 16 B. 
#define ADDR_SSID 0 
/// 0x10, psk size = 32 B. 
#define ADDR_PSK 16 
/// 0x30, n_nod size = 1 B. 
#define ADDR_DEV_ID 48 
/// 0x3F, control character. if char=='Y', memory has data. 




 * \defgroup wifi_credentials 1.3. <SSID,PSK> global variables 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// SSID Max Size is 16 Bytes 
#define SSID_MAX_SIZE 16  
/// SSID Max Size is 32 Bytes 
#define PSK_MAX_SIZE 32  
 
/// Variables were EEPROM ssid data is stored. Initialized as empty "". 
unsigned char ssid[SSID_MAX_SIZE+1] = ""; 
/// Variables were EEPROM psk data is stored. Initialized as empty "". 
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_SIZE + 1] = ""; 
/**@}*/ 
 
//Translates a byte (8 bits) to 2 HEX Chars (4+4 bits). 
#define TO_HEX(i) ( (i) <= 9 ? '0' + (i) : 'A' - 10 + (i) ) 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
// Variables used in IR Send/Receive 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
/** 
 * \defgroup ir_variables 1.4. Variables used in IR Send/Receive 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// IR RX Pin D6 GPIO12 in ESP8266 nodeMCU. 
const uint8_t kRecvPin = 12; 
/// Set the GPIO to be used to receive data. 
IRrecv irrecv(kRecvPin); 
 
/// IR TX D7 GPIO13 in ESP8266 nodeMCU. 
const uint8_t kIrLed = 13; 
/// Set the GPIO to be used to send data. 
IRsend irsend(kIrLed); 
 
/// Variable where a received message is stored to. 
decode_results received_data; 
/// Variable where a message is stored before being sent. 
decode_results send_data; 
 
/// Transmission and Reception Buffers Size. 
#define MAX_PACKET_SEQUENCE 1024 
/// Reception data buffer of 32bits/packet. 
uint32_t rx_data_buffer[MAX_PACKET_SEQUENCE]; 







// Variables used in IR Frame Control 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
/** \defgroup frame_packet_types 1.5. Frame Packet Types 
  * Variables used in IR Frame Control: 
  * 3 bits for type of packet.\n 
  * 8 bits for dest deviceID.\n 
  * 32 bits for data.\n 
  * 16 bits for CRC16 Checksum.\n 
  * Type of Packet:\n 
  * 0, 000 -> HELLO_ENCRYPTED.\n 
  * 1, 001 -> HELLO.\n 
  * 2, 010 -> HELLO_NEW.\n 
  * 3, 011 -> DATA.\n 
  * 4, 100 -> ACK.\n 
  * 5, 101 -> DATA_END (Last Data Packet -> Checksum).\n 
  * 6, 110 -> DATA_END_ENCRYPTED (Last Data Packet (encrypted) -> Checksum).\n 
  * 7, 111 -> NACK - Not Used.\n 
  * @{ 
  */ 
#define TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT 0b000 
#define TYPE_HELLO 0b001 
#define TYPE_HELLO_NEW 0b010 
#define TYPE_DATA 0b011 
#define TYPE_ACK 0b100 
#define TYPE_DATA_END 0b101 
#define TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT 0b110 




 * \defgroup program_flags 1.6. FLAGS used by the program to distinguish between states 
 * @{ 
 */ 
/// Hello Communication Flag. 1 means HELLO Exchange was done, so don't listen for more HELLO 
Packets. 
uint8_t FLAG_HELLO_DONE = 0; 
 
/// Encryption Flag. 1 means Data is encrypted(DH Key Exchange). Default is 1. 









 * \defgroup functions 2. Functions 
 * Module with all the custom functions implemented in the controller source code 




 * \defgroup debug_functions 2.1. DEBUG Functions 
 * Functions which are used for debugging purposes (printing logs and traces mainly) 





  *  DEBUG Function which prints in terminal the time elapsed in seconds. 
  *   @param[in] long ref: Reference time where the counting period begins. 
  */ 
void printTimeSeconds(long ref){ 
  double elapsed = (millis()-ref)/1000.0; 






  * DEBUG function used to print in terminal information regarding received packets. 
  *  @param[in] uint32_t header_capture: integer that represents the 32bits captured in a IR 
frame. 
  *  @param[in] uint16_t received_counter: integer that represents the current packet counter 
in the data exchange. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t  received_type: integer that represents the type of packet that has 
been received. 
  */ 
void printCapturedSeq(uint32_t header_capture, uint16_t received_counter, uint8_t 
received_type) { 
  Serial.println("\nDEBUG: printCapturedSeq() HEX:"); 
  Serial.print("Captured: ");       Serial.println(header_capture, HEX); 
  Serial.print("Counter: ");        Serial.println(received_counter, HEX); 
  Serial.print("packetType: ");     Serial.println(received_type, HEX); 
  Serial.println("*****\n"); 
} 
 
/// DEBUG function used to print in terminal sent packet frame, represented in the global 
variable send_data. 
void printSentPacket() { 
  Serial.println("printSentPacket() info:"); 
  //serialPrintUint64(send_data.value, BIN); 
  //Serial.println(""); 
  serialPrintUint64(send_data.value, HEX); 
  Serial.println(""); 
} 
 
/// DEBUG function used to print in terminal received packet frame, represented in the global 
variable received_data. 
void printReceivedPacket() { 
  Serial.println("printReceivedPacket() info:"); 
  //serialPrintUint64(received_data.value, BIN); 
  //Serial.println(""); 
  serialPrintUint64(received_data.value, HEX); 




  * DEBUG function used to print in terminal information regarding getRXFrameData() function 
output. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t destID: integer that represents frame's Device Destination ID value. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t packet_type: integer that represents the current packet's type. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t is_from_controller: integer of which only the LS bit is used. 1 means 
packet comes from controller device. 
  *  @param[in] uint32_t payload: integer representing the payload data of the frame. 
  */ 
void printRXPacketInfo(uint8_t destID, uint8_t packet_type, uint8_t is_from_controller, 
uint32_t payload) { 
  Serial.println("\nDEBUG: printRXPacketInfo()[BIN]: "); 
  Serial.print("destID: ");            Serial.println(destID, BIN); 
  Serial.print("packetType: ");        Serial.println(packet_type, BIN); 
  Serial.print("isfromcontroller: ");  Serial.println(is_from_controller, BIN); 
  Serial.print("payload: ");           Serial.println(payload, BIN); 
  Serial.println("*****\n"); 
} 
 
/// DEBUG function used to print stored EEPROM parameters: SSID, PSK, devID, number_nodes... 
void printEEPROMData() { 
  Serial.print("\nSSID: "); 
  Serial.println((char *) ssid); 
  Serial.print("PSK: "); 
  Serial.println((char *) psk); 
  Serial.print("DeviceID: "); 
  Serial.println(devID); 
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  Serial.print("Control char. target/actual: "); 
  Serial.print((char) CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR[0]); 
  Serial.print("/"); 
  Serial.println((char) eeprom_control_char[0]); 





 * \defgroup aux_functions 2.2. Program Auxiliar Functions 
 * Functions which are called to perform important processes during the execution of the main 
functions 




 * Function which connects the device to the IoT Acess Point (a RaspPi IoT Hub). 
 * It assigns a static Ip Address to the device, based on his Device ID: 192.168.100.devID. 
 * AP Gateway is 192.168.100.1 
 */ 
void connectStaticToAP() { 
  IPAddress staticIP(192, 168, 100, devID); // ESP static IP address 
  IPAddress gateway(192, 168, 100, 1);      // IP Address of Gateway (RaspPi) 
  IPAddress subnet(255, 255, 255, 0);       // Subnet mask 
  IPAddress dns(8, 8, 8, 8);                // DNS (Google) 
 
  const char* deviceName = "IoT_Node_"+devID; // Descriptive device name 
  WiFi.hostname(deviceName); 
 
 
  char *psk_hex = (char *) malloc(PSK_MAX_SIZE+1); 
  for(int i=0; i<PSK_MAX_SIZE; i++){ 
    psk_hex[i] = TO_HEX(psk[i]); 
  } psk_hex[PSK_MAX_SIZE] = '\0'; 
 
 
  WiFi.disconnect(); 
  WiFi.persistent(false); 
  WiFi.begin((char *) ssid, psk_hex); 
  WiFi.config(staticIP, gateway, subnet, dns); // Make config effective 
 
  Serial.println((char *) ssid); 
  Serial.println((char *) psk_hex); 
 
  WiFi.mode(WIFI_STA); // WiFi Station mode 
   
  // Wait for connection 
  Serial.print("Connecting to AP "); 
  Serial.print((char *) ssid); 
  while (WiFi.status() != WL_CONNECTED) { 
    delay(500); 
    Serial.print("."); 
  } 




  *  Function which delays execution a variable random amount of time. 
  *   @param[in] bool short_time: If true, the delay will be a short delay. 
  */ 
void wait(bool short_time) { 
  if(short_time) 
    delay(150+(rand()%10)); //Wait 150 to 160 ms 






  * Function used to simplify the process of reading a single entry stored in the EEPROM. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t start_addr: integer that represents the initial address where the 
information is stored. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t num_bytes: integer that represents the number of bytes (or addresses) 
to read. 
  *  @param[out] unsigned char* result: pointer to where the read output should be stored. 
  */ 
void readEEPROM(uint8_t start_addr, uint8_t num_bytes, unsigned char* result) { 
  EEPROM.begin(64); 
  uint8_t index = 0; 
 
  result[index] = (char) (EEPROM.read(start_addr+index)); 
  while (index<num_bytes-1) { 
    index = index+1; 
    result[index] = (char) (EEPROM.read(start_addr+index)); 
  } 




  * Function used to simplify the process of writing a single entry to the EEPROM. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t start_addr: integer that represents the initial address where the 
information is stored. 
  *  @param[in] unsigned char *data: pointer to where the read output should be stored. 
  *  @param[in] uint8_t size: integer that represents the number of bytes (or addresses) to 
read. 
  */ 
void writeEEPROM(uint8_t start_addr, unsigned char *data, uint8_t size) { 
  EEPROM.begin(64); 
  uint8_t index = 0; 
  EEPROM.write(start_addr+index, data[index]); 
  while(index < size-1){ //data[index] != '\0' &&  
    index = index+1; 
    EEPROM.write(start_addr+index, data[index]); 
  } 
  EEPROM.commit(); 
  EEPROM.end(); 
} 
 
/// Function used to initialize the EEPROM with the received information from controller: 
<SSID,PSK> and NodeID. 
void saveConfigEEPROM() { 
  Serial.println("Saving Received Data From Controller into EEPROM..."); 
 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_SSID, ssid, SSID_MAX_SIZE); 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_PSK, psk, PSK_MAX_SIZE); 
 
  // Conversion from int to char array - devID of controller (1) 
  unsigned char devID_char[1]; 
  devID_char[0] = devID; 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_DEV_ID, devID_char, 1); 
 
  // Write control char 'Y' in 0xFF to tell device's EEPROM has data 
  strncpy((char *) &eeprom_control_char, (char *) &CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR, 2); 
  writeEEPROM(ADDR_CONTROL_CHAR, eeprom_control_char, 1);   
} 
 
/// Function used to read all EEPROM configuration values and load them in the program global 
variables. 
void loadConfigValuesFromEEPROM() { 
  // Read SSID,PSK 
  readEEPROM(ADDR_SSID, SSID_MAX_SIZE, ssid); 
  readEEPROM(ADDR_PSK, PSK_MAX_SIZE, psk); 
 
  // Read Node DeviceID 
  unsigned char devID_char[2]; 
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  readEEPROM(ADDR_DEV_ID, 2, devID_char); 
  devID = devID_char[0]; 
 
  // Read Control Char 
  unsigned char control_char[2]; 
  readEEPROM(ADDR_CONTROL_CHAR, 2, control_char); 




  * Function that performs the Data integrity Check for a burst of received packets.\n 
  * It does a CRC32 check and determines if the data is valid. 
  *  @param[in] uint16_t size: Number of received packets in the RX_buffer. 
  *  @param[in] uint32_t rx_checksum: Checksum Received in the last data packet. 
  * @return bool: True is data is valid. False if data is not valid. 
  */ 
bool checkDataIntegrity(uint16_t size, uint32_t rx_checksum){ 
  uint32_t checksum = CRC32::calculate(rx_data_buffer, size); 
  Serial.println("Checking Checksums..."); 
  Serial.printf("Received: %d | calculated: %d\n", rx_checksum, checksum); 
  if(checksum == rx_checksum) 
    return true; 
 
  Serial.println("Checksums not matching!"); 




  * Function used to convert the info to send into a formatted frame ready to be sent. 
  *   @param[in] uint8_t destID: device to which the packet is sent.  
  *   @param[in] uint8_t packet_type: integer that represents the current packet's type. 
  *   @param[in] uint32_t payload: integer representing the payload data of the frame. 
  *  @return uint64_t: integer which represents the frame ready to be sent (up to 36 bits, 
RC6 IR protocol). 
  */ 
uint64_t buildTXFrame(uint8_t destID, uint8_t packet_type, uint32_t payload) { 
  uint64_t data = 0ULL; 
  if(packet_type==TYPE_ACK || packet_type==TYPE_NACK){ 
    data = 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(payload & 0xFFF)     << 0  | 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(0ULL)                << 12 | //Packet Sent From Node, always 0 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(packet_type & 0b111) << 13; 
  } 
  else if(packet_type==TYPE_HELLO || packet_type==TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT || 
packet_type==TYPE_HELLO_NEW) { 
    data = 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(payload)     << 0  | 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(0ULL)        << 24 | //Packet Sent From Node, always 0 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(destID)      << 25 | 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(packet_type) << 33; 
  } 
  else if(packet_type==TYPE_DATA || packet_type==TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT || 
packet_type==TYPE_DATA_END) { 
    data = 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(payload)     << 0  | 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(0ULL)        << 32 | //Packet Sent From Node, always 0 
      static_cast<uint64_t>(packet_type) << 33; 
  } 
     
  //Serial.println("DEBUG: buildTXFRAME:"); 
    //serialPrintUint64(data, HEX); 
    //Serial.println(); 
    //serialPrintUint64(data, BIN); 
    //Serial.println("\n"); 






  * Function which processes the received frame stored in received_data global variable.\n 
  * It processes the information of the frame and determines if the packet is valid. 
  *   @param[in] uint16_t current_counter: represents the number of received packets in the 
current burst. 
  * @return uint32_t: integer which contains 2 different variables:\n 
  *   Packet type (8bits)  in the 8 LSBs.\n 
  *   New Counter (16bits) in the 16 MSBs. If NewCounter==current_counter_input+1, it means 
the packet is valid. Everything else means packet was wrong and it get discarded. 
  */  
uint32_t getRXFrameData(uint16_t current_counter, uint32_t rand_hello_target=0) { 
  uint64_t data = received_data.value; 
  uint16_t nbits = received_data.bits; 
 
  uint8_t destID = 0; 
  uint8_t packet_type = 0; 
  uint32_t payload = 0; 
  uint8_t is_from_controller = 0; 
 
  if(nbits==16) { // Short Frame -> TYPE ACK 
    packet_type = (uint8_t) ((data>>13) & 0b111); // 3 bits 
    payload = (uint32_t) (data & 0xFFF); // 12 bits 
    is_from_controller = (uint8_t) ((data>>12) & 0b1 ); // 1 bit 
  } 
  else if(nbits==36){ // Long Frame -> TYPE HELLO, DATA, DATA_END 
    packet_type = (uint8_t) ((data>>33) & 0b111); // Located in same place for all 36-bit 
frames 
 
    if(packet_type==TYPE_HELLO || packet_type==TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT) { 
      payload = (uint32_t) (data & 0x00FFFFFF); // 24 bits 
      is_from_controller = (uint8_t) ((data>>24) & 0b1 ); 
      destID = (uint8_t) (data>>25); //DestID only present in HELLO seqs 
    } 
    else if(packet_type==TYPE_HELLO_NEW) { 
      payload = (uint32_t) (data & 0x00FFFFFF); // 24 bits 
      is_from_controller = (uint8_t) ((data>>24) & 0b1 ); 
      destID = (uint8_t) (data>>25); //DestID only present in HELLO seqs 
    } 
    else if (packet_type==TYPE_DATA || packet_type==TYPE_DATA_END || 
packet_type==TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT){ 
      payload = (uint32_t) (data & 0xFFFFFFFF); // 32 bits 
      is_from_controller = (uint8_t) ((data>>32) & 0b1 ); 
    } 
  } 
 
  if(!is_from_controller){Serial.println("\n**a** (not coming from controller)");return -1;} 
 
  uint16_t next_counter = current_counter + 1; 
  uint32_t response_ok = packet_type | (((uint32_t) (next_counter))<<16); 
  uint32_t response_ko = packet_type; 
 
  //Serial.print("DEBUG: responseOK: "); 
  //serialPrintUint64(response_ok, BIN); 
  //Serial.println("\n\n"); 
   
  switch (packet_type) { 
    case TYPE_ACK: 
      //Serial.println("*Got ACK*"); 
        //Serial.printf("Payload: %d, current_counter: %d. Are equal: ", payload, 
current_counter); 
        //Serial.println((uint16_t) (payload)==current_counter); 
      if ((uint16_t) (payload)==current_counter) { //ACKs should contain nº of packets 
received 
        Serial.printf("Got ACK number %d\n", current_counter); 
        //printRXPacketInfo(destID, packet_type, is_from_controller, payload); 
        return response_ok; 
      } 
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      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_NACK: 
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT: 
      if(FLAG_HELLO_DONE) 
        return response_ko; 
      //printRXPacketInfo(destID, packet_type, is_from_controller, payload); 
 
      if(devID==0 && devID_aux>0) { 
        Serial.println("Got a HelloEncrypt after NEW HELLO... "); 
        if(payload==rand_hello_target) { 
          FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 1; 
          return response_ok; 
        } 
        return response_ko; 
      } 
 
      if(devID>0) { 
        Serial.println("Got a Hello Encrypt... "); 
        if(payload!=devID) { 
          Serial.printf("...but it is for another devID: %d\n", payload); 
          return response_ko; 
        } 
        if(devID==destID) { 
          devID_aux = devID; 
          FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 1; 
          return response_ok; 
        } 
      } 
 
      Serial.println("HELLO Encrypt not for me :("); 
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_HELLO: 
      if(FLAG_HELLO_DONE) 
        return response_ko; 
      //printRXPacketInfo(destID, packet_type, is_from_controller, payload); 
 
      if(devID==0 && devID_aux>0) { 
        Serial.println("Got a Hello after NEW HELLO... "); 
        if(payload==rand_hello_target) { 
          FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 0; 
          return response_ok; 
        } 
        return response_ko; 
      } 
 
      if(devID>0) { 
        Serial.println("Got a Hello... "); 
        if(payload!=devID) { 
          Serial.printf("...but it is for another devID: %d\n", payload); 
          return response_ko; 
        } 
        if(devID==destID) { 
          devID_aux = devID; 
          FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 0; 
          return response_ok; 
        } 
      } 
 
      Serial.println("it is not for me :("); 
      return response_ko; 
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      break; 
 
    case TYPE_HELLO_NEW: 
      if(FLAG_HELLO_DONE) 
          return response_ko; 
 
      if(devID>0) 
        Serial.printf("Broadcast New_Hello Detected, but I have my own id: %d\n", devID); 
      if(destID>0) 
        Serial.printf("Broadcast New_Hello Detected, but destID is not 0: %d\n", destID); 
      if(payload==0) 
        Serial.printf("Broadcast New_Hello Detected, but payload does not contain a newID: 
%d\n", payload); 
       
      if (devID>0 || destID>0 || payload==0) 
        return response_ko; 
       
      devID_aux = (uint8_t) payload; 
      Serial.print("\nNew devID assigned from HELLO_NEW: "); 
      Serial.println(devID_aux); 
 
      return response_ok; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_DATA: 
      if(current_counter>0 && rx_data_buffer[current_counter-1]==payload && payload>0) 
        return response_ko; 
 
      //Serial.printf("Got Data! counter: %d\n", current_counter); 
      //printRXPacketInfo(destID, packet_type, is_from_controller, payload); 
      rx_data_buffer[current_counter] = payload; 
      return response_ok; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_DATA_END: 
      if(current_counter==0) 
        return response_ko; 
 
      //Serial.printf("Got *LAST* Data! counter: %d\n", current_counter); 
      if(checkDataIntegrity(current_counter, payload)) { 
        FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 0; 
        return response_ok; 
      }         
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    case TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT: 
      if(current_counter==0) 
        return response_ko; 
 
      //Serial.printf("Got *LAST* Data! counter: %d\n", current_counter); 
      if(checkDataIntegrity(current_counter, payload)) { 
        FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA = 1; 
        return response_ok; 
      }         
      return response_ko; 
      break; 
 
    default: 
      return response_ko; 
      break; 




  * Function which encrypts the data before sending it over IR. It uses a 32-byte shared_key 
to encrypt 32 bytes of information.\n 
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  *  As the key is unique in each session, there is no need to use a Init_Vector, as in this 
case:\n 
  *  len(data)==len(key), we can use a simple XOR bit comparison to encrypt/decrypt the Data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *shared_key: Pointer to the session key used to encrypt/decrypt the 
data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *msg: Pointer to the message to be encrypted. 
  *   @param[out] byte *encrypted: Pointer to where the encrypted result will be saved. 
 */ 
void encryptData(byte *shared_key, byte *msg, byte *encrypted) { 
  for(int i=0; i<SSID_MAX_SIZE; i++){ 
    encrypted[i] = msg[i]^shared_key[i]; 
    encrypted[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE] = msg[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE]^shared_key[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE]; 




  * Function which decrypts the data received over IR. It uses a 32-byte shared_key to 
encrypt 32 bytes of information.\n 
  * As the key is unique in each session, there is no need to use a Init_Vector, as in this 
case:\n 
  * len(data)==len(key), we can use a simple XOR bit comparison to encrypt/decrypt the Data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *shared_key: Pointer to the session key used to encrypt/decrypt the 
data. 
  *   @param[in] byte *encrypted: Pointer to the message to be decrypted. 
  *   @param[out] byte *decrypted: Pointer to where the decrypted result will be saved. 
 */ 
void decryptData(byte *shared_key, byte *encrypted, byte *decrypted) { 
  for(int i=0; i<SSID_MAX_SIZE; i++){ 
    decrypted[i] = encrypted[i]^shared_key[i]; 
    decrypted[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE] = encrypted[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE]^shared_key[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE]; 




  * Function that translates data char array ("ssid_1234") (Between 16 and 32 bytes) to 
chunks of 32bits. 
  *   @param[in] byte *char_data: Pointer to the data 8-bits array to be converted into a 
24bits array. 
  *   @param[in] int size: size of the data in bytes. 
  *   @param[in] bool is_psk: Optimizes packet building in case the data is from the PSK, as 
it uses only 4 bits for each character (50% efficiency otherwise). Default is false. 
  * @return uint16_t: integer representing the number of data packets the TX_buffer contains. 
  */ 
uint16_t buildTXDataBuffer(byte *char_data, int size) { 
  uint16_t number_chunks = ceil((size*8)/32.0); 
  uint32_t checksum; 
   
  // Casting byte int array into uint32 array. 
  // 1 uint32 will hold 4 bytes, as payload is 32bits. 
  Serial.println("DEBUG: buildTXDataBuffer [HEX]:"); 
   
  for(int i=0; i<number_chunks; i++) { 
      tx_data_buffer[i] =  
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[4*i])   << 0 | 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[4*i+1]) << 8 | 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[4*i+2]) << 16| 
        static_cast<uint32_t> (char_data[4*i+3]) << 24; 
      //serialPrintUint64(tx_data_buffer[i], HEX); 
      //Serial.println(); 
  } 
   
  // Avoid sending many 0's packet at the end of data. 
  for(int i=0; i<number_chunks; i+=0){ 
    if(tx_data_buffer[i]==0) { 
      for (int j=i; j<number_chunks-1; j++) { 
        tx_data_buffer[j] = tx_data_buffer[j+1]; 
      } 
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      number_chunks -= 1; 
    } else{i+=1;} 
  } 
 
  // Checksum calculation 
  checksum = CRC32::calculate(tx_data_buffer, number_chunks); 
  tx_data_buffer[number_chunks] = checksum; 
  number_chunks += 1; 
 
  //Serial.printf("Num of data packets: %d\n\n", number_chunks); 




  * Core Function which listens for a connection from a Controller, receives the Wi-Fi 
credentials and writes the data in the EEPROM.\n 
  * It is called periodically, until correctly receiving the information from a Controller.\n 
  * It includes several connection stages:\n 
  *     HELLO_NEW: Handshake with a random proof for new devices, which allows concurrence 
problems with multiple new devices answering the controller at the same time.\n 
  *     HELLO: Normal handshake, performed for all devices. it also informs the node if the 
transmission will be encrypted or not.\n 
  *     KEY_EXCHANGE: If users selects Encryption in the Controller, there is a key exchange 
stage where both nodes send each other their public keys.\n 
  *     DATA_EXCHANGE: Receives the data (in clear or encrypted) until receiving final ACK 
from node. 
  * @return bool: True if data was received. False otherwise. 
  */ 
bool waitForControllerCommunication() { 
  Serial.println("DEBUG: waitForControllerCommunication2 begins - Waiting for HELLO 
packet."); 
  long ref_time = millis(); 
  uint32_t rnd_rep = 0; 
 
  devID_aux = devID; 
 
  FLAG_HELLO_DONE = 0; 
   
  bool HELLO_PENDING = true; 
  bool NEW_HELLO_PENDING = true; 
  uint16_t packet_sequence = 0; 
  long time0 = millis(); 
  irrecv.resume(); 
 
  if(devID==0) { 
    Serial.println("*TIME: HELLO_NEW Starts"); 
    while (NEW_HELLO_PENDING) { 
      ref_time = millis(); 
      delay(4); 
      if(irrecv.decode(&received_data)) { 
        if(received_data.decode_type==RC6) { 
          uint32_t header_capture = getRXFrameData(packet_sequence); 
          uint8_t received_type = (uint8_t) (header_capture); 
          uint16_t received_counter = (uint16_t) (header_capture>>16); 
 
          if( received_type==TYPE_HELLO_NEW && received_counter==1 ){ 
            NEW_HELLO_PENDING = false; 
            printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
            Serial.println("HELLO_NEW from Controller Received!"); 
 
            rnd_rep = ESP8266TrueRandom.random(1, 1<<24) & 0x00FFFFFF; 
            Serial.printf("Rnd Payload Gen.: %d\n", rnd_rep); 
 
            send_data.value = buildTXFrame(CONTROLLER_ID, TYPE_HELLO_NEW, rnd_rep); 
            irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
          } 
        } 
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        irrecv.resume(); 
      } 
    } 
    Serial.print("*TIME: HELLO_NEW Ends "); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
  } 
 
  time0 = millis(); 
  Serial.println("*TIME: HELLO Starts"); 
 
  while (HELLO_PENDING) { 
    if(NEW_HELLO_PENDING) { ref_time = millis(); delay(30); } 
    else { delay(123); } 
     
    if(irrecv.decode(&received_data)) { 
      if(NEW_HELLO_PENDING) 
        irrecv.resume(); 
      if(received_data.decode_type==RC6) { 
        uint32_t header_capture = getRXFrameData(packet_sequence, rnd_rep); 
        uint8_t received_type = (uint8_t) (header_capture); 
        uint16_t received_counter = (uint16_t) (header_capture>>16); 
 
        if( (received_type==TYPE_HELLO || received_type==TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT) && 
received_counter==1 ) { 
          HELLO_PENDING = false; 
          printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
          Serial.println("HELLO from Controller Received!"); 
          Serial.printf("REceived_type %d\n", received_type); 
          Serial.printf("Encrypt Flag: %d\n", FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA); 
          if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA) { send_data.value = buildTXFrame(CONTROLLER_ID, 
TYPE_HELLO_ENCRYPT, devID_aux); } 
          else {                  send_data.value = buildTXFrame(CONTROLLER_ID, TYPE_HELLO, 
devID_aux); } 
        } 
      } 
    } 
 
    if(!NEW_HELLO_PENDING) { 
      delay(49); 
      Serial.println("Sent NEW_Hello"); 
      irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
      irrecv.resume(); 
    } 
 
    if(!NEW_HELLO_PENDING && HELLO_PENDING && (millis()-time0 > 2500)) 
      return false; 
  } 
 
  Serial.print("*TIME: HELLO Received (while loop out) "); 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
  printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
  // HELLO MSG successfully received. Send Back a HELLO with our address as payload 
  Serial.println("\nAnswering Controller with a HELLO Response"); 
  time0 = millis(); 
   
  for(int i=0; i<3; i++) { 
    delay(55); 
    irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
  } 
  //while(millis()-time0<270) { 
  //  delay(55); 
  //  irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
  //} 
 
  Serial.print("*TIME: HELLO Response Sent "); 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
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  printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 




  // ***************** HELLO DONE, Exchanging Curve PublicKeys ***************** 
   
   
 
  uint8_t mycurve_shared[32]; 
  uint8_t hiscurve_public[32]; 
  uint8_t mycurve_secret[32]; 
 
  if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA) { 
    Serial.println("Calculation Encrypting Keys..."); 
     
    // Generating all parameters for Elliptic Curve Exchange 
    static const uint8_t basepoint[32] = {9}; 
     
    uint8_t mycurve_public[32]; 
 
    for(int i=0; i<32; i++) { mycurve_secret[i] = ESP8266TrueRandom.randomByte(); } 
    curve25519_donna(mycurve_public, mycurve_secret, basepoint); 









    Serial.print("*TIME: Sending myPubKey "); 
    time0 = millis(); 
 
    uint8_t packet_max_number = buildTXDataBuffer(mycurve_public, 32); 
    bool ACK_PENDING = true; 
    time0 = millis(); 
    uint8_t n_attempts = 0; // Return after 3 missing acks 
 
    // Loop for Sending Device's PublicKey 
    while(ACK_PENDING) { 
      Serial.println("\nEntering Sending my PublicKey Loop..."); 
      for(int i=0; i<packet_max_number; i++){ 
        delay(5); 
        if(i+1==packet_max_number){ 
          if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA){ send_data.value = buildTXFrame(CONTROLLER_ID, 
TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT, tx_data_buffer[i]); } 
          else {                 send_data.value = buildTXFrame(CONTROLLER_ID, TYPE_DATA_END, 
tx_data_buffer[i]); } 
        } 
        else {                   send_data.value = buildTXFrame(CONTROLLER_ID, TYPE_DATA, 
tx_data_buffer[i]); } 
         
        Serial.printf("Packet number %d\n", i); 
        irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
      } 
 
      Serial.print("*TIME: All PublicKey info sent"); 
      printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
      printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
      irrecv.resume(); 
      Serial.println("Waiting for ACK PublicKey"); 
      time0 = millis(); 




      while(ACK_PENDING) { 
        delay(2); 
        if(irrecv.decode(&received_data)) { 
          if(received_data.decode_type == RC6) { 
            uint32_t header_capture = getRXFrameData(packet_max_number); 
            uint8_t received_type = (uint8_t) (header_capture); 
            uint16_t received_counter = (uint16_t) (header_capture>>16); 
 
            if( received_type==TYPE_ACK && received_counter==packet_max_number+1 ) { 
              ACK_PENDING = false; 
              Serial.println("\n\n**Burst ACK Received for PublicKey**\n"); 
            } 
          } 
          if(ACK_PENDING) 
            irrecv.resume(); 
        } 
        if(millis()-time0 > 300) 
          break; 
      } 
 
      if(ACK_PENDING){ 
        n_attempts += 1; 
        if(n_attempts>=4) 
          return false; 
      } 
    } 
 
    Serial.print("\n*TIME: myPubKey Sent | Waiting for Real Data "); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
    printTimeSeconds(time0); 








  bool IS_LAST_DATA = false; 
  time0 = millis(); 
 
  while(!IS_LAST_DATA) { 
    bool CHECKSUM_ERROR = false; 
    packet_sequence = 0; 
    irrecv.resume(); 
 
    if(millis()-time0>2000) 
      return false; 
 
    while(!IS_LAST_DATA && !CHECKSUM_ERROR) { 
      delay(4); 
      if(irrecv.decode(&received_data)) { 
        if(received_data.decode_type == RC6) { 
          uint32_t header_capture = getRXFrameData(packet_sequence); 
          uint8_t received_type = (uint8_t) (header_capture); 
          uint16_t received_counter = (uint16_t) (header_capture>>16); 
 
          if( received_type==TYPE_HELLO && received_counter==packet_sequence+1 ){ 
            send_data.value = buildTXFrame(CONTROLLER_ID, TYPE_HELLO, devID_aux); 
            delay(51); 
            irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 36); 
          } 
          if( received_type==TYPE_DATA && received_counter==packet_sequence+1 ) { 
            Serial.printf("Data %d received.\n", packet_sequence); 
            packet_sequence++; 
          } 
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          if(received_type==TYPE_DATA_END || received_type==TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT) { 
            if(received_counter==packet_sequence+1){ 
              Serial.printf("**LAST** Packet %d received.\n", packet_sequence); 
              IS_LAST_DATA = true; 
              packet_sequence++; 
              if(received_type==TYPE_DATA_END_ENCRYPT) { Serial.println("*** Data End 
Encrypt!!"); } 
 
            } else { Serial.println("Checksum ERROR"); memset(&rx_data_buffer, 0, 
packet_sequence); CHECKSUM_ERROR = true; } 
          } 
        } 
        if(!IS_LAST_DATA) 
          irrecv.resume(); 
      } 
    } 
  } 
 
  Serial.print("*TIME: All DATA Received"); 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
  printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
  Serial.println("Sending DATA ACK"); 
  send_data.value = buildTXFrame(CONTROLLER_ID, TYPE_ACK, packet_sequence); 
  time0 = millis(); 
 
  for(int i=0; i<4; i++) { 
    delay(5); 
    irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 16); //ACK 
  } 
  //while(millis()-time0 < 180) { 
  //  irsend.sendRC6(send_data.value, 16); //ACK 
  //  delay(15); 
  //} 
 
  Serial.print("*TIME: ACK DATA Sent - Pre Saving Data"); 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
  printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
  byte msg[32]; 
  for(int i=0; i<8; i++) { // 8 packets with info 
    msg[4*i+0] = rx_data_buffer[i] >> 0*8; 
    msg[4*i+1] = rx_data_buffer[i] >> 1*8; 
    msg[4*i+2] = rx_data_buffer[i] >> 2*8; 
    msg[4*i+3] = rx_data_buffer[i] >> 3*8; 
    //Serial.printf("Buffer %d: ", i); 
    //serialPrintUint64(rx_data_buffer[i], HEX); 
    //Serial.println(); 
  } 
 
  if(FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA) { 
    for(int i=8; i<packet_sequence-1; i++) { // PublicKey is 32bytes: packet_seq=8-15 
      hiscurve_public[4*(i-8)+0] = (uint8_t) (rx_data_buffer[i] >> 0*8); 
      hiscurve_public[4*(i-8)+1] = (uint8_t) (rx_data_buffer[i] >> 1*8); 
      hiscurve_public[4*(i-8)+2] = (uint8_t) (rx_data_buffer[i] >> 2*8); 
      hiscurve_public[4*(i-8)+3] = (uint8_t) (rx_data_buffer[i] >> 3*8); 
      //Serial.printf("Buffer HisPublicKey %d: %d | %d | %d | %d\n", i, hiscurve_public[4*(i-
8)+0], hiscurve_public[4*(i-8)+1], hiscurve_public[4*(i-8)+2], hiscurve_public[4*(i-8)+3]); 
      //Serial.println(); 
    } 
 
    curve25519_donna(mycurve_shared, mycurve_secret, hiscurve_public); 
    //for(int i=0; i<32; i++) { Serial.printf("Mycurve_shared Byte %d: %d\n", i, 
mycurve_shared[i]); } 
 
    Serial.print("*TIME: Key Saved and Secret Calculated."); 
    printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
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    printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
    Serial.println("Message was Encrypted! Decrypting..."); 
    decryptData(mycurve_shared, msg, msg); 
  } 
 
 
  for(int i=0; i<SSID_MAX_SIZE; i++){ 
    ssid[i] = (unsigned char) (msg[i]); 
    psk[2*i+0] = (unsigned char) ( (msg[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE] >> 0*4) & 0x0F); 
    psk[2*i+1] = (unsigned char) ( (msg[i+SSID_MAX_SIZE] >> 1*4) & 0x0F); 
  } 
 
  Serial.print("*TIME: DATA Saved"); 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
  printTimeSeconds(time0); 
 
  Serial.println("*** SSID Received ***"); 
  Serial.println((char *) ssid); 
  Serial.println("*** PSK Received ***"); 
  for(int i=0; i<32; i++){ Serial.printf("%c", TO_HEX(psk[i])); } 
  Serial.println('\n'); 
 
  printTimeSeconds(ref_time); 
 
  Serial.println("All Data Received, saving all Information in EEPROM."); 
 
  devID = devID_aux; 
  saveConfigEEPROM(); 
 
  Serial.println("Info in Variables After Reading EEPROM:"); 
  loadConfigValuesFromEEPROM(); 
  printEEPROMData(); 
 
  Serial.println("Exiting Function waitForControllerCommunication()"); 







 * \defgroup main_functions 2.3. Program Main Functions 
 * Functions which must be implemented by an ESP8266. They execute the main logic of the 
program with the aid of the previous functions 
 * @{ 
 */ 
 
/// Setup function which checks EEPROM and, if not initialized, starts listening for a 
controller until receiving the information, writing it into EEPROM. 
void setup() { 
  Serial.begin(115200); 
   
  while (!Serial)       // Wait for the serial connection to be establised. 
    delay(50); 
  Serial.println(); 
 
  srand(time(NULL)); // Initialize Random Gen Seed 
 
  //Uncomment this to reset memory by removing 'Y' control char 
  //unsigned char a[2] = {'A', '\0'}; 
  //unsigned char id[2] = {0, '\0'}; 
  //writeEEPROM(ADDR_CONTROL_CHAR, a, 1); 
  //writeEEPROM(ADDR_DEV_ID, id, 1); 
 
  readEEPROM(ADDR_CONTROL_CHAR, 2, eeprom_control_char); 
  Serial.println("Memory before loading EEPROM:"); 
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  printEEPROMData(); 
 
  loadConfigValuesFromEEPROM(); 
  Serial.println("Memory after loading EEPROM:"); 
  printEEPROMData(); 
   
  // ****************************************************************** 
 
  irrecv.enableIRIn();  // Preparamos el receptor IR 
  irsend.begin();       // Preparamos el emisor IR 
  irrecv.resume(); 
 
  if(eeprom_control_char[0]!=CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR[0] || devID==0) 
    Serial.println("\n\n Memory not Setup or devID not assigned, waiting for controller 
connection"); 
  else 
    Serial.println("Device has an ID assigned, trying to connect to AP"); 
   
   
  //If control char does not exist or it is 'Y' but device has no ID, start listening to 
controller 
  while ( (eeprom_control_char[0]!=CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR[0]) 
      ||(eeprom_control_char[0]==CONTROL_EEPROM_TARGET_CHAR[0] && devID==0) ) { 
    waitForControllerCommunication(); 
    wait(1); 
  } 
  Serial.println("\nInfo Received from controller!\n"); 
 
 
  Serial.println("Setting Up connection with Access Point..."); 
  while(WiFi.status() != WL_CONNECTED) { 
    Serial.println("Connecting to AP..."); 
    connectStaticToAP(); 
    delay(100); 
  } 
 








/// Loop() function not used. Just sleep. 
void loop() { 

















Script which modifies all the necessary files in the system in order to get a customized Access Point 
running. 
It can be called manually, but it will usually be called by another credential extraction script. The 
Access Point 
configuration is persistent and should start working after a device reboot. 
To call it from a terminal, type: python3 wifi_setup.py <ssid> <key>" 




FAIL = b'Contrase\xc3\xb1a: \r\nsu: Fallo de autenticaci\xc3\xb3n\r\n' 
 
WLAN0_LINES = [ 
    'interface wlan0\n', 
    '   static ip_address=192.168.100.1/24\n', 
    '   nohook wpa_supplicant\n', 
] 
DNSMASK_LINES = [ 
    'interface=wlan0\n', 
    'dhcp-range=192.168.100.200,192.168.100.250,255.255.255.0,24h\n', 
] 
HOSTAPD_LINES = [ 
    'interface=wlan0\n', 
    'driver=nl80211\n', 
    'ssid=IoT_test\n', 
    'hw_mode=g\n', 
    'channel=7\n', 
    'wmm_enabled=0\n', 
    'macaddr_acl=0\n', 
    'auth_algs=1\n', 
    'ignore_broadcast_ssid=0\n', 
    'wpa=2\n', 
    'wpa_passphrase=ThisIsMyWPAPassword\n', 
    'wpa_key_mgmt=WPA-PSK\n', 
    'wpa_pairwise=TKIP\n', 
    'rsn_pairwise=CCMP\n' 
] 
LOCALRC_LINE = "sudo iptables-restore < /etc/iptables.ipv4.nat\n" 
 
# Main function of the script: it will install all needed packets, and configure all necessary files in 
order to create 
#   an Access Point with the credentials passed as first and second argument. 
# It can be called as many times as needed, it will destroy previous AP and create a new one. 
# It is persistent, Access Point will still be running after a device reboot. 
# It needs sudo access, if not provided, it will call itself with sudo privileges to be able to install 
packages and 
#   modify some files 
def main(): 
    if os.geteuid() == 0: 
        print("Root Access OK") 
    else: 
        print("No Root... Executing again with sudo") 
        subprocess.call(['sudo', 'python3', *sys.argv]) 
        sys.exit(1) 
    if len(sys.argv) < 3: 
        print("Wrong format!") 
        print("     Format: python3 wifi_setup.py <ssid> <key>") 
        exit(1) 
 
    myssid = sys.argv[1] 
    mypsk = sys.argv[2] 
 
    global HOSTAPD_LINES 
    HOSTAPD_LINES[2] = 'ssid='+myssid+'\n' 




    print("\nConfiguring Custom Access Point with the following parameters:") 
    print("     SSID: "+myssid) 
    print("     PSK:  "+mypsk) 
    print() 
 
    # Creates file to save the current ssid and password for user consulting 
    with open("/home/accesspoint_params.txt", 'w') as f: 
        f.write('Current Access Point Credentials:\n') 
        f.write("ssid: "+myssid+'\n') 
        f.write("psk: "+mypsk+'\n') 
 
    os.system('sudo apt install -y dnsmasq hostapd') 
    os.system('sudo systemctl stop dnsmasq') 
    os.system('sudo systemctl stop hostapd') 
 
    os.system('sudo apt install -y iptables-persistent') 
 
 
    cmd = 'sudo grep -n "interface wlan0" /etc/dhcpcd.conf' 
    resp = '0' 
    try: 
        resp = subprocess.check_output(cmd, shell=True).decode('utf-8') 
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError: 
        pass 
 
    lineNum = -1 
    overwrite = False 
 
    if re.search('interface wlan0', resp): 
        print(resp) 
        print("Interface exists, overwriting it...") 
 
        lineNum = int(re.split(':', resp, 1)[0]) 
        overwrite = True 
 
    if overwrite: 
        lines = None 
        with open("/etc/dhcpcd.conf", 'r') as f: 
            lines = f.readlines() 
            if len(lines) > lineNum: 
                for l in range(0, len(WLAN0_LINES)): 
                    try: 
                        lines[lineNum+l-1] = WLAN0_LINES[l] 
                    except IndexError: 
                        lines.append(WLAN0_LINES[l]) 
 
        with open("/etc/dhcpcd.conf", 'w') as f: 
            f.writelines(lines) 
 
    else: 
        with open("/etc/dhcpcd.conf", 'a+') as f: 
            f.writelines(['\n']+WLAN0_LINES) 
 
    os.system('sudo service dhcpcd restart') 
 
    with open("/etc/dnsmasq.conf", 'w') as f: 
        f.writelines(DNSMASK_LINES) 
 
    os.system('sudo systemctl reload dnsmasq') 
 
    with open("/etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf", 'w') as f: 
        f.writelines(HOSTAPD_LINES) # ToDo set custom SSID and PSK! 
 
    os.system('''sudo sed -i 's+#DAEMON_CONF=""+DAEMON_CONF="/etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf"+g' 
/etc/default/hostapd''') 
 
    os.system('sudo systemctl unmask hostapd') 
    os.system('sudo systemctl enable hostapd') 
    os.system('sudo systemctl start hostapd') 
    os.system('sudo systemctl start dnsmasq') 
 
    os.system("sudo sed -i 's/#net.ipv4.ip_forward=1/net.ipv4.ip_forward=1/g' /etc/sysctl.conf") 
 
    os.system("sudo iptables -F INPUT") 
    os.system("sudo iptables -F OUTPUT") 
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    os.system("sudo iptables -F FORWARD") 
    os.system("sudo iptables -t nat -F") 
 
    os.system("sudo iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE") 
 
    os.system('sudo sh -c "iptables-save > /etc/iptables.ipv4.nat"') # for rc.local, not working 
currently as rc.local gets executed before iptables service 
    os.system('sudo sh -c "iptables-save > /etc/iptables/rules.v4"') # for iptables-persistent package 
 
 
    with open("/etc/rc.local", 'r') as f: 
        lines = f.readlines() 
 
    exists = False 
    for line in lines: 
        if re.search(LOCALRC_LINE, line): 
            exists = True 
 
    if not exists: 
        lines[lines.index("exit 0\n")] = LOCALRC_LINE 
        lines.append("exit 0\n") 
 
    with open("/etc/rc.local", 'w') as f: 
        f.writelines(lines) 
 
    print('\n Configuration completed. The WiFi AP should be up and running. It will persist if device 
gets rebooted.') 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 













Script which scans QR Codes and looks for a valid format to extract the credentials (ssid and psk) from 
the decoded info 
and calls the wifi_setup.py script to setup a new Access Point in the Raspberry Pi that is executing the 
code. 
To call it from a terminal, type: python3 camera_scan.py" 
 





# Class which converts the RaspberryPi Camera in a QR Code Scanner. It will look for a QR encoding a 
<SSID,PSK> pair and 
# call the wifi_setup.py script in order to setup an Access Point with those credentials. 
class Scanner: 
    # Initializes the camera for QR scanning 
    def __init__(self): 
        cv2.namedWindow("w1", flags=cv2.WINDOW_NORMAL) 
 
        self.capture = cv2.VideoCapture(-1) 
        self.capture.set(cv2.CAP_PROP_FRAME_WIDTH, 960)     # 960px width 
        self.capture.set(cv2.CAP_PROP_FRAME_HEIGHT, 720)    # 720px height 
 
        # Scanner only detects codes with black pixels over white background. 
        # We invert image 50% of the times to capture all possibilities 
        self.invert = False 
 
        # Call scan function from class Scanner. 
        # It executes and infinite loop until a valid QR is received 
        self.scan() 
 
    def scan(self): 
        received = False 
 
        while not received: 
            # Take a photo to analyze it 
            ret, self.frame = self.capture.read() 
 
            aframe = numpy.asarray(self.frame[:, :]) 
 
            # Switch between invert ON and invert OFF 
            if self.invert: 
                self.frame = cv2.bitwise_not(self.frame) 
            self.invert = not self.invert 
 
            # Convert pixel to gray scale 
            imgray = cv2.cvtColor(self.frame, cv2.COLOR_BGR2GRAY) 
 
            raw = str(imgray.data) 
 
            # Initialization ZBAR class that looks for valid QR 
            scanner = zbar.ImageScanner() 
            scanner.parse_config('enable') 
 
            width = int(self.capture.get(cv2.CAP_PROP_FRAME_WIDTH)) 
            height = int(self.capture.get(cv2.CAP_PROP_FRAME_HEIGHT)) 
 
            # Create a ZBAR image object and search for a QR 
            imageZbar = zbar.Image(width, height, 'Y800', raw) 
            scanner.scan(imageZbar) 
 
            ssid = None 
            psk = None 
 
            # In case one or several QR codes are detected, look for a valid SSID and PSK 
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            # SSID is valid if it starts with the prefix 'IOT_' 
            for symbol in imageZbar: 
                print 'decoded', symbol.type, 'symbol', '"%s"' % symbol.data 
                if "IOT_" in symbol.data: 
                    cv2.destroyWindow("w1") # Stops the scanner, as valid QR was found 
 
                    ssid, psk = re.split(':\n', symbol.data, 1) 
                    print("Found valid Credentials. Calling the wifi_setup script:") 
                    print('python3 /home/pi/Documents/wifi_setup.py %s %s' % (ssid, psk)) 
                    os.system('python3 /home/pi/Documents/wifi_setup.py %s %s' % (ssid, psk)) 
                    exit(1) # Exit program 
 
            # Show image in the preview window (only if called locally, not from remote console) 
            cv2.imshow("w1", aframe) 
 
            # Wait 100ms between captures 
            cv2.waitKey(100) 
 
 
# Class calling: Initializes it and turns camera on for QR scanning 












Script which extracts the credentials (ssid and psk) from a ESP8266 IoT Controller by reading the serial 
USB port, 
and calls the wifi_setup.py script to setup a new Access Point in the Raspberry Pi that is executing the 
code. 
To call it from a terminal, type: python3 serial_reader.py" 
 
Author: Rafael de la Rosa Ortiz 
''' 
 
myport = '/dev/ttyUSB0'  # Linux Serial 
# myport = 'COM6'  # Windows Serial 
 
ser = None 
 
# Serial initialization. If device is not connected, display a message and wait for the user to plug it 
in 
while ser is None: 
    try: 
        ser = serial.Serial(port=myport, baudrate=115200) 
    except serial.serialutil.SerialException: 
        print('Connect Device to Serial port (/dev/ttyUSB0)') 
        time.sleep(0.25) 
 
ssid = None  # line format to extract info: b'SSID: ABCDEF \r\n' 
psk = None 
 
# Keep reading Serial until a valid psk is extracted (psk is always extracted after ssid) 
while psk is None: 
    line = ser.readline()  # Reads bytes from the serial port 
    print(line) 
 
    if re.match(b'SSID: ', line) and len(line) > 10:  # A shorter line means ssid is empty 
        ssid = re.split(b'SSID: ', line)[1] 
        ssid = re.split(b'\r\n', ssid)[0].strip().decode("utf-8") 
 
    if re.match(b'PSK: ', line) and ssid is not None: 
        psk = re.split(b'PSK: ', line)[1] 
        psk = re.split(b'\r\n', psk)[0].strip().decode("utf-8") 
 
    time.sleep(0.1) 
 
print('python3 /home/pi/Documents/wifi_setup.py %s %s' % (ssid, psk)) 







• AP: Access Point. Device which connects wireless devices, establishing a wireless 
network. 
• BER: Bit Error Ratio. It measures the number of bit errors divided by the total number 
of transferred bits in a given interval. 
• CPU: Central Processing Unit. Brain of a computer where most calculations take place. 
• DC: Direct Current. Electrical current which flows in one single direction. 
• Debian: It is a Linux free and open-source software distribution. 
• DHCP: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. It is a network management protocol in 
charge of dynamically assigning IP addresses to devices in a network, so they can 
communicate with other devices in different networks. 
• Doxygen: Tool for writing software reference documentation. 
• EC: Error Correction. In a QR Code of a given size, the Error Correction determines the 
degree of redundancy of the encoded information. A higher EC would make the QR 
more robust, but it also reduces the amount of total data that could be coded. 
• EEPROM: Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory. It is a type of non-
volatile memory used in computers to store small amounts of data. 
• ESP8266: It is a low-cost Wi-Fi microchip with full TCP/IP stack and microcontroller 
capability produced by manufacturer Espressif Systems. 
• GPIO: General Purpose Input/Output. It is an uncommitted digital signal pin on an 
electronic circuit board whose behavior is controllable by the user at run time. 
• HTML: HyperText Markup Language. It is the standard markup language for documents 
designed to be displayed in a web browser 
• ICMP: Internet Control Message Protocol. It is a supporting protocol in the Internet 
protocol suite. It is used by network devices to send error messages and operational 
information indicating success or failure when communicating with another IP address. 
• IDE: Integrated Development Environment. It is a software application that provides 
comprehensive facilities to computer programmers for software development. 
• IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. It is a professional association 
for electronic engineering and electrical engineering. 
• IoT: Internet of Things. It is a system of interrelated computing devices that are provided 
with unique identifiers and the ability to transfer data over a network without requiring 
human-to-human or human-to-computer interaction. 
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• IP: Internet Protocol. It is the principal communications protocol in the Internet protocol 
suite for relaying datagrams across network boundaries. 
• IR: InfraRed. It is electromagnetic radiation (EMR) with longer wavelengths than those 
of visible light. 
• ISP: Internet Service Provider. It is an organization that provides services for accessing, 
using, or participating in the Internet. 
• KRACK: Key Reinstallation Attack. It is a severe replay attack (a type of exploitable 
flaw) on the Wi-Fi Protected Access protocol that secures Wi-Fi connections. 
• LED: Light-Emitting Diode. It is a semiconductor light source that emits light when 
current flows through it. 
• NAT: Network Address Translation. It is a method of remapping one IP address space 
into another by modifying network address information in the IP header of packets while 
they are in transit across a traffic routing device. 
• Nonce: It is an arbitrary number that can be used just once in a cryptographic 
communication. 
• OLED: Organic Light-Emitting Diode. It is a LED in which the emissive 
electroluminescent layer is a film of organic compound that emits light in response to an 
electric current. 
• OS: Operative System. It is system software that manages computer hardware, software 
resources, and provides common services for computer programs. 
• PIN: Personal Identification Number (do not confuse with hardware input/output -GPIO- 
pin). It is a numeric or alpha-numeric password used in the process of authenticating a 
user accessing a system. 
• PSK: Pre-Shared Key. It is a shared secret which was previously shared between the 
two parties using some secure channel before it needs to be used. 
• QR Code: Quick Response Code. It is a two-dimensional barcode which encodes 
information that can be scanned using a specific QR scanner or a phone camera. 
• RAM: Random Access Memory. It is a form of computer memory that can be read and 
changed in any order, typically used to store working data and machine code. 
• RaspPi: Raspberry Pi. It is a series of small single-board computers to promote teaching 
of basic computer science in schools and in developing countries. 
• RC6: IR protocol developed by Philips as a semi-proprietary consumer IR remote control 
communication protocol for consumer electronics. It is the successor of the RC5. 
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• RISC: Reduced Instruction Set Computer. It is a computer whose instruction set 
architecture allows it to have fewer cycles per instruction (CPI) than a complex 
instruction set computer (CISC). 
• RNG: Random Number Generator. It is a device that generates a sequence of numbers 
or symbols that cannot be reasonably predicted better than by a random chance. 
• RX: Receiver. 
• SSH: Secure Shell. It is a cryptographic network protocol for remotely operating network 
services securely over an unsecured network. 
• SSID: Service Set Identifier. It is a sequence of up to 32 octets included in the header 
of a packet in a wireless network to identify it as part that network. 
• TOR Network: The Onion Router Network. It is free and open-source software for 
enabling anonymous communication. 
• TX: Transmitter. 
• USB: Universal Serial Bus. It is an industry standard that establishes specifications for 
cables and connectors and protocols for connection, communication and power supply 
between computers, peripheral devices and other computers. 
• WPA: Wi-Fi Protected Access. It is a security protocol and a security certification 
program developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance to secure wireless computer networks. There 
are currently three versions: WPA, WPA2 and WPA3. 
• WPS: Wi-Fi Protected Setup. It is a network security standard to create a secure 
wireless home network. 
• XOR: eXclusive OR.  It is a logical operation that outputs true only when inputs differ. 
